Analysis: Army Operation Knew of Amazon’s Riskiest Devastation Points, but Failed to Act

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL – Deforestation set a record in June, despite an operation led by the military. Officials from the Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA), say under anonymity that the command is making incorrect use of the National Institute for Space Research’s (INPE) unprecedented tool. Defense refutes.

The military task force, called Operation Verde Brasil 2, began in May. Under the leadership of Brazil’s Vice-president, reserve general Hamilton Mourão, 3,815 military officers, 110 land vehicles, 20 boats and 12 aircraft were deployed in the Amazon. With the goal of preventing and repressing environmental crimes before the great traditional burning period, the offensive was also a reaction to critics who accuse the Bolsonaro government of neglecting and even tacitly encouraging the destruction of the forest.

In addition to the troop contingent and the vehicles, the military in charge of the action were equipped with strategic and unprecedented data: they had a map of the five critical areas that accounted for almost 45 percent of the total deforestation of the Amazon forest in 2020, a layout drawn with the aid of images from four satellites, all of which had been provided since February by INPE. The initiative, developed in partnership with IBAMA, was named Deter-Intenso: every 24 hours a 10m² high-definition image is produced, even if clouds are present, which enables an unprecedented assessment of deforestation and burned areas. An effective surveillance action in these five points, which represent nine percent of the Legal Amazon, would translate into more standing forest. This was not the case.

Deforestation and burning set a historical record in June. In July there was a 28 percent increase, with 6,803 outbreaks compared to 5,318 in 2019. In addition, there was a 25 percent increase in cumulative deforestation in the first semester in 2020, compared to the same period in 2019; alerts from satellite images show devastation in 3,069.57 km², compared to 2,302.1 km² the previous year. According to four IBAMA inspectors directly or indirectly involved with Operation Verde Brasil 2 – all of whom have had their identity preserved to avoid retaliation, as they are subordinate to the army – there are clear reasons for the mismatch between the new tool’s precision and the results achieved: the military failed to design and execute the actions.

The reports gathered point to the lack of efficiency of the military in choosing targets. Despite operating within the area limited by the INPE-IBAMA’s new monitoring system’s critical points (hotspots), the command, according to the inspectors, is prioritizing actions that do not directly target deforestation and active burnings, such as roadblocks and seizure of logs already cut down. Illegal prospecting sites, the great environmental villains, are also being spared. The IBAMA officials also point to the Army’s lack of experience in inspection. They criticize the focus on patrolling actions and timber seizures that are not efficient in preserving the Amazon.

Asked about the rise in deforestation, the Ministry of Defense reported in a note that the operation “already accounts for meaningful numbers.” “A total of 16,104 inspections, patrols, surveys and searches were conducted, and 107 items of equipment such as extraction engines, rafts, tractors, excavators, vehicles, among others (…) were disabled,” says the text. The note also records 345 boats and 174 vehicles seized, 372 kilos of drugs and 28,000 cubic meters of wood. “33,012 hectares were also seized and 153 arrests were made,” continues the portfolio.

Despite the positive tone of the Defense note, the Vice-president himself concedes that deforestation in the Amazon was “higher than what can be considered acceptable”. “We are not denying that there was deforestation in excess of what can be considered acceptable, that is, within 20 percent of each rural property and outside of conservation units and indigenous lands,” he said on June 13th, after the release of the INPE data.

Limitation of actions

Under the command of the military, the IBAMA inspectors, who are also part of Verde Brasil 2, complain that they had little room for action, despite being in possession of precise data from the Deter-Intenso system and a list of hotspots. “We at IBAMA knew what the areas were, the hotspots, and we were even directed to some. But since the Army was in charge, we would suggest the targets and they would have to approve them. What I noticed: the prospecting sites were always left out, at the time we proposed the targets, they were all left out,” says an inspector anonymously.

According to the inspector, the Verde Brasil 2 command’s reluctance to attack illegal mining sites occurs for two reasons: “These are sites where there is much machinery in isolated locations, so the destruction procedure would need to be followed. And they made it clear that they would not want to see themselves connected to such actions, even if supported by law.” In addition, “there is President Jair Bolsonaro’s stance,” says the inspector. He refers to the fact that the President is critical of repression of illegal prospecting sites and the destruction of equipment.

The IBAMA officials are unanimous in their assessment that, despite being a great ally in the logistical support of operations against environmental crimes, the Army has neither the inclination nor the training to inspect. “They have been a great partner in several operations for some years now. But [in Verde Brasil] there is a lack of goals about what is being done in the field, as if to inspect is to maintain a presence, to patrol, to rotate. Inspection is not a simple patrol, it doesn’t create a deterrent effect in the case of environment,” says one of the inspectors. “The only thing that deters is punishment. To supervise is not to conduct a highly visible round, which has a very temporary and localized effect. You’re in one city; the environmental criminals will move on to another, the patrol ends and they come back”.

The IBAMA criteria for choosing targets was also different from those of the Army. “We always prioritize ongoing deforestation [detected by Deter-Intenso]. They often focus on numbers. Seizure of trucks with timber or logs, for instance. However, setting up roadblocks does not prevent the destruction of the forest. That is something that we were doing ten years ago,” said the inspector.

The Ministry of Defense was also asked about the choice of targets for the operation. In a statement, the portfolio reported that this “is decided within the framework of the Integration Group for the Protection of the Amazon”. “This group is made up of eleven government bodies, including environmental and public safety agencies,” notes the text. According to the Defense Ministry, data from the Deter-Intenso are used, along with other intelligence, to substantiate the target selection. The portfolio said that actions were conducted in four of the five hotspots monitored, but the type of action developed in each one (roadblock, drug seizure, etc.) was not disclosed.

Monitoring progress

Recent deforestation data are disappointing, particularly considering the tremendous progress of monitoring currently at the disposal of the Brazilian Government. To understand the extent, the progress of the methods used must be considered. Deter-Intenso was an upgrade of the Deter, which monitors the whole Amazon region and other threatened biomes with image generation every five days (compared to the 24-hour intervals of the new version). “We developed this solution for areas where there is greater demand [the hotspots]. This is a huge breakthrough in monitoring, as it allows for a precise displacement of inspection teams. We show what is growing, so that inspection teams may take action,” explains Cláudio Aparecido de Almeida, coordinator of the INPE’s Amazon Program.

In total the Deter-Intenso system monitors five critical areas: Anapu and Novo Progresso, in Pará; Apuí in Amazonas, Candeias do Jamari (Amazonas and Rondônia) and Extrema (Acre and Rondônia), totaling 485,000 km² (approximately nine percent of the Legal Amazon area). The selection of sites was based on an IBAMA document prepared in late 2019, which listed ten hotspots. Asked about why deforestation has not declined considering the material produced by the Deter-Intenso in addition to the Verde Brasil 2 workforce, the INPE’s Cláudio de Almeida stated that “the drop in deforestation is associated with the implementation of several public policies, such as the forest appreciation program, field inspections and monitoring. Among these actions, the INPE is in charge of monitoring”.

One of IBAMA’s successful cases

When it was launched in May, the Verde Brasil 2 figures were impressive: in addition to its almost 4,000 agents and vehicles, the cost of R$60 million stood out, virtually the IBAMA’s annual budget for inspection. This figure may increase further: the government drafted a bill calling for an additional R$410 million to be invested in Verde Brasil 2, which has been extended until November this year.

Despite the large human, financial and technological resources at its disposal, the main successful case in the fight against the devastation of the Amazon this year was not achieved by Verde Brasil 2, but rather by an IBAMA operation conducted between January 15th and April 30th. The region chosen was the south of Pará, near Altamira, an area that concentrates four indigenous lands – Ituna, Itatá, Apyterewa and Trincheira Bacajá. The situation there was dramatic: in one of the sites the landgrabbers eventually built a small village to attract more invaders, there was even a shed with tanks to store aircraft fuel. “These indigenous lands were the most deforested in Brazil in 2019, according to satellite imagery. There were several active deforestation hotspots there,” says an IBAMA inspector who was involved in the action. The goal was daring: to clear the devastation at the sites.

The number of inspectors was modest when compared to Verde Brasil 2: between seven and ten inspectors per month, totaling approximately 40 officials. The low cost also stands out: adding up the daily expenses of the IBAMA inspectors (R$177), the figure comes to a total of R$212,400. With the cost of using two aircraft, it reaches R$1.5 million. The outcome also differs from that achieved to date by the Army operation: “We have put an end to deforestation in the region during the period in which we operated. The impact was so great that by clearing the devastation in those areas, we reduced the total deforestation of indigenous lands in Brazil by 58 percent.” But without an effective presence of authorities in the area following the successful action, in July the area was once again affected by illegal deforestation.

According to one inspector involved in the operation on indigenous lands, understanding what is behind forest felling is required. “Nowadays the deforestation in most of the Legal Amazon is not widespread. It is a matter of organized crime, it is a concerted advance into those hotspots, because powerful interests expect to occupy and regulate land in that area,” he says. “When you act in a critical area you will dismantle a criminal organization, you will dismantle the entire environmental crime structure, the theft of resources and public land. You are not going there to fine only one individual.”

If forest destruction is on the rise, the fines imposed by IBAMA – considered one of the most effective tools to deter environmental crime – dropped by 60 percent in the first half of the year when compared to the same period in 2019. This is the second decrease in the Bolsonaro government: a 40 percent reduction in that period had already occurred between 2018 and 2019.

Source: El País