Brazil Rejects a US Memo Accusing It of Failing Against Its Two Largest Crime Gangs

A single paragraph in a routine American document accused Brazil of losing ground to its two largest criminal groups. Brazil itself was not named on any list.

A US presidential memorandum released on 16 September 2026 said Brazil had failed to confront two criminal organisations. Brazil’s justice ministry answered in writing the same week.

What the Document Actually Is

Every year the US president must name the countries judged to be major drug transit or producing states. The requirement comes from the Foreign Assistance Act and a later authorisation act.

The deadline is 15 September. This year’s memorandum went to Congress on 15 September 2026 and was published the following day.

It names 23 countries on the majors list. Four of them are described as having failed demonstrably to meet their obligations.

Those four are Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma and Colombia. Brazil is on neither list.

The Passage About Brazil

The memorandum says Brazil’s government has failed to confront two designated foreign terrorist organisations. It calls them the First Command of the Capital and the Red Command.

Those are the English renderings of the Primeiro Comando da Capital and the Comando Vermelho. It adds that the groups have turned the country into a central hub for the global cocaine flow.

It then says the Brazilian government needs to urgently take aggressive measures to confront and defeat them; one sourcing note belongs here. The White House release announcing the lists does not mention Brazil, the PCC or the Comando Vermelho at all.

The passage sits in the fuller memorandum text rather than in the announcement. That is why coverage of it varies so widely.

Why the Distinction Matters

Being named on the majors list has legal consequences; a finding of failing demonstrably can suspend most US assistance. It can also commit the United States to voting against loans in development banks.

None of that applies to Brazil, because Brazil was not listed. The paragraph carries no legal effect on its own.

Brazil’s own justice ministry made that point, describing the criticism as a circumstantial statement without formal standing. Any account saying Washington designated or sanctioned Brazil this week has the story wrong.

What Brazil Said Back

The written note came from the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, not from the foreign ministry. No individual signed it; it is attributed to the ministry as an institution.

Its central sentence is that the Brazilian government rejects any allegation that there are failures or omissions in confronting transnational organised crime. It goes on to say the American position would disregard the federal government’s efforts if accepted in full.

The verb there is conditional. It also points to tens of thousands of operations against organised crime.

Several outlets headlined this as Brazil saying Washington ignores its efforts. That is a paraphrase rather than the ministry’s own wording.

Who the Two Groups Are

The Primeiro Comando da Capital began inside São Paulo’s prison system in the early 1990s. It is now the largest criminal organisation in Brazil.

The Comando Vermelho formed earlier, in Rio de Janeiro, and controls territory in parts of the city. Both have expanded well beyond their home states over the past decade, and both operate across borders.

The United States designated them as foreign terrorist organisations, a step Brazil itself has not taken. That difference in legal category is part of why the two governments describe the same problem in different language.

The Political Timing

Brazil votes in the first round of its presidential election on 4 October; the memorandum landed nineteen days before that. President Lula was campaigning in the Federal District the same week.

His challenger, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro, has closed the gap since January. A Quaest survey, with fieldwork from 10 to 13 September, put Lula on 36% and Flávio Bolsonaro on 31%.

The same poll had Flávio ahead 42% to 40% in a runoff, within its two-point margin of error. A Datafolha survey from 1 to 3 September had Lula ahead 46% to 44% in a runoff, also a technical tie.

Neither poll shows a settled race. Anyone reporting a clear leader in the second round is reading past the margin.

What This Means for People Living in Brazil

Nothing in this memorandum changes visas, travel, banking or business rules. No sanction follows from it.

What it does change is the diplomatic temperature between Brasília and Washington, in an election period. For residents the practical read is narrow.

Security policy in São Paulo and Rio is set by state and federal authorities, not by an American list. If you follow Brazilian markets, watch the tone of the relationship rather than this document.

Trade and tariff questions carry more weight than a paragraph. It is worth keeping the two apart when reading headlines this month.

What Is Not Yet Known

The English text has not yet appeared in the Federal Register, so the verbatim wording rests on secondary reporting. Whether Itamaraty will add its own response is also open; it had not commented when Brazil’s state news agency published.

The date of the justice ministry’s note is reported as 15 September by one outlet and 16 September by others. None of those gaps changes the substance, and all of them are worth watching before the next round of coverage.

Frequently Asked Questions

Sources: The White House, the 2027 majors list announcement, Agência Brasil, the passage on the PCC and Comando Vermelho, Metrópoles, the government’s written response, Revista Fórum, further wording from the note, Band, Brazil denies failures in fighting organised crime, Poder360, the Quaest runoff numbers, Gazeta do Povo, the Datafolha September survey