ANALYSIS · ETHIOPIA · ERITREA
Key Facts
- —Population Ethiopia has about 132 million people (World Bank, 2024), the most of any landlocked country. The next largest, Uganda, has about 50 million (World Bank, 2024).
- —Coastline None since Eritrea became independent in May 1993. Ethiopian cargo used the Eritrean port of Assab until the border war of 1998 to 2000.
- —Main gateway Djibouti carries about 95% of Ethiopia’s foreign trade (Institute of Foreign Affairs, 2026). Ethiopian cargo through Djibouti reached 9.5 million tonnes (2025).
- —Port bill Ethiopian estimates put port-related fees at US$1.5 billion to US$2 billion a year (2026). Djibouti’s port authority puts its combined port revenue at about US$400 million (2025).
- —The law The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea gives landlocked states access to the sea through transit agreements (Article 125, 1982). Ethiopia signed it in 1982 but never ratified it, and Eritrea has not signed it (UN Treaty Collection, 2026).
- —The limit The UN Charter bans the threat or use of force against any state’s territorial integrity (Article 2(4), 1945). African states pledged to respect the borders they had at independence (OAU, Cairo, 1964).
- —Current front Ethiopian federal troops reached Zalambessa on the Eritrean border by 13 October. On the same day Eritrea told Security Council members that Ethiopia plans to seize Assab by force.
- —Prediction markets Polymarket gives a 17.5% chance that Eritrea invades Ethiopia by 31 October (15 October, 3:57 a.m. ET). A thin market on Ethiopian strikes on Eritrea prices 24% for October.
Ethiopia is the world’s most populous landlocked country, and it routes almost all of its trade through neighbouring Djibouti. The Ethiopia sea access question is explosive because the law grants a right of access to the sea, not to another country’s territory.
This analysis sets out what the law allows and what each side has offered. It comes as Ethiopian troops stand at the border, as reported in Ethiopian Troops Reach Zalambessa by 13 Oct.
- Part 1: Ethiopia vs Eritrea: Who Would Win a War?
- Part 2: Why Eritrea Is Independent, and Why It Is Questioned
- Part 3: Does Ethiopia Have a Right to a Sea Port? (you are here)
- Part 4: Why Ethiopia Cannot Win by Force Alone
How Ethiopia Lost Its Coast
Eritrea, a former Italian colony annexed by Ethiopia in 1962, voted for independence in an April 1993 referendum observed by the United Nations. Ethiopia’s transitional government accepted the result, and Eritrea joined the United Nations on 28 May 1993.
With it went Ethiopia’s whole coastline, including Assab, Eritrea’s southern port near the Bab el-Mandeb strait. That strait links the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden, between the Horn of Africa and Yemen.
Ethiopian cargo kept using Assab until May 1998, when a border dispute became a war that ended with the Algiers Agreement of December 2000. Since then about 95% of Ethiopia’s foreign trade has gone through Djibouti, according to its Institute of Foreign Affairs.
What It Costs Ethiopia Today
Djibouti is a small coastal state whose Doraleh terminal and rail link to Addis Ababa carry most Ethiopian cargo. Ethiopian foreign trade cargo through Djibouti reached 9.5 million tonnes in 2025, Addis Standard reported in February 2026.
The same report put Ethiopia’s port-related fees at an estimated US$1.5 billion to US$2 billion a year. That is close to a third of Ethiopia’s projected 2025 export earnings of US$5.3 billion.
Djibouti disputes the size of the bill. In December 2025 Aboubaker Omar Hadi, chairman of the Djibouti Ports and Free Zones Authority, said combined port revenue was about US$400 million.
He said the widely cited US$1.4 billion figure includes about US$1.2 billion in inland transport costs. Those costs, he added, are earned mostly by Ethiopian trucking companies rather than by Djibouti’s ports.
The UN office for landlocked developing countries says such states face trade costs nearly double those of coastal countries. The 32 of them held just 1.2% of world merchandise trade in 2024, despite more than 7% of the world’s population.
What International Law Says
The main treaty is the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, known as UNCLOS. Its Article 125 gives landlocked states “the right of access to and from the sea” and “freedom of transit” through neighbouring transit states.
The same article says the terms must be agreed with the transit state through bilateral, subregional or regional agreements. It also confirms that transit states keep “full sovereignty over their territory” and may protect their legitimate interests.
The treaty promises a passage, not a port or a coastline, which is the core of the Ethiopia sea access debate. Ethiopia signed UNCLOS on 10 December 1982 but has never ratified it, the UN Treaty Collection shows, so it is not a party.
The UN Charter sets the outer limit. Article 2(4) requires all members to refrain from “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”
In Cairo in July 1964, the Organisation of African Unity pledged to respect borders “existing on their achievement of national independence.” The African Union, the OAU’s successor, wrote the same principle into its Constitutive Act in 2000.
Eritrea became independent within the borders of the former Italian colony, which an international boundary commission delimited in 2002. Under these rules, an economic need for the sea does not create a legal claim to another state’s land.
Abiy Ahmed’s Red Sea Claim
The current dispute dates from a speech by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed, in office since 2018, aired on 13 October 2023. He said “a population of 150 million can’t live in a geographic prison,” Addis Standard reported.
In late 2023 he offered neighbours shares in the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, Ethiopian Airlines and Ethio Telecom in return for port access. On 26 October 2023 he said, “Ethiopia is not going to invade any country for a port.”
On 1 January 2024 Abiy signed a memorandum with Muse Bihi Abdi, then president of Somaliland, which declared independence from Somalia in 1991. Somaliland said it would lease 20 km of coastline to Ethiopia for 50 years.
Ethiopia’s national security adviser, Redwan Hussien, said the deal secured commercial sea access and a leased military base. In return Ethiopia agreed to an “in-depth assessment” of recognising Somaliland, which Somalia considers part of its territory.
Somalia rejected the deal as a breach of its sovereignty, and Turkey mediated. On 11 December 2024 Abiy and Somalia’s President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud signed the Ankara Declaration in the Turkish capital.
The declaration welcomed the benefits of Ethiopia’s “assured access to and from the sea” while respecting Somalia’s territorial integrity. Access was to come through commercial deals “under the sovereign authority of the Federal Republic of Somalia,” with technical talks due by February 2025.
Since then the focus has moved to Eritrea and Assab. On 28 October 2025 Abiy told parliament that sea access was “a question of national existence,” while adding that “we have no desire for war.”
Eritrea’s government says senior Ethiopian officers have since named Assab as a military objective. Its note to the United Nations quotes the deputy army chief, General Abebaw Tadesse, as saying on 27 September that “our ultimate destination is Assab.”
The Options Short of War
Ethiopia sea access could also come through routes that change no border. Their documented status varies widely, as the cards below show.
Carries about 95% of trade. A port stake agreed in May 2018 has not been shown to be completed.
Offered in September 2024 with “100 percent management” by Djibouti’s then foreign minister. No deal announced.
A 19% stake with DP World. Somaliland said in June 2022 that Ethiopia lost it after missing the conditions.
Used until 1998. Abiy says Eritrea refused cranes and generators sent to revive it; Asmara rejects any Ethiopian claim.
Kenya agreed in 2018 to lease Ethiopia space for logistics. Land was allocated, but the title deed was still pending in 2019.
Ethiopia agreed in May 2018 to become a shareholder. Sudan has been at war since April 2023.
Ankara Declaration, December 2024: commercial access under Somali sovereignty. No final agreement has been made public.
The share swaps Abiy floated in 2023 have not produced a published agreement with any coastal state. Only Somaliland signed a document, and its full text has not been released.
Eritrea’s Position
Eritrea, led by President Isaias Afwerki since independence in 1993, treats any claim on Assab as an attack on its sovereignty. A profile of the country is in Eritrea Explained 2026, a Red Sea Country Guide.
On 13 October its government circulated an information note to Security Council members, published on 14 October by the Ministry of Information. The note accuses Ethiopia of seeking “sovereign access to the sea, through negotiations if possible and force if necessary.”
It calls this a breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and of the 2018 peace agreement between the two countries. Eritrea says the Ethiopia sea access campaign now includes a naval force with claimed reach into its southern coast.
It asks the Council to condemn a “declaration of war” and act under Chapter VII, which allows sanctions or force. The note ends by saying there is “no good faith dispute between Eritrea and Ethiopia.”
In Asmara’s reading, the problem is Ethiopian policy, not a legal dispute. The note is covered in full in Eritrea Accuses Ethiopia at UN on 14 October.
What the Markets Say
Polymarket gives a 17.5% chance that Eritrea invades Ethiopia by 31 October, and 21.5% by 31 December (15 October, 3:57 a.m. ET). The two contracts have drawn bets worth about US$96,000 in total.
Under the rules, an invasion means Eritrean forces entering Ethiopia in an operation that takes control of territory for at least 48 hours. A mere presence of Eritrean troops inside Ethiopia does not count.
A separate market on whether Ethiopia strikes Eritrea from the air or with missiles prices 24% for October and 59% for December. These are bets, not polls, and this market is thin, with only about US$470 traded.
Why we show this: prediction markets turn real-money bets into a live probability that moves within minutes of the news, which is why investors, campaigns and newsrooms in the United States now follow them closely. We show them next to polls and official results, never instead of them.
What It Means for US Readers
The Bab el-Mandeb strait, beside Assab and Djibouti, is the southern gateway for ships sailing between the Indian Ocean and the Suez Canal. Fighting on that coast could raise insurance costs and delay cargo for US importers.
Djibouti also hosts Camp Lemonnier, described by The EastAfrican as the only long-term US military installation in sub-Saharan Africa. The United States has not ratified UNCLOS, but said in 1983 that it would act in line with the treaty’s rules on navigation and overflight.
For investors, Ethiopia sea access is a question of cost and risk in Africa’s second most populous country. Reliance on one corridor raises import costs, and any conflict would add political risk to Ethiopian assets.
What Is Not Known
It is not known whether the Ankara talks with Somalia produced a signed commercial agreement. Neither government has published one.
The quotes from Ethiopian generals rest on Eritrea’s note and could not be checked against Ethiopian recordings. Ethiopia’s own note of 11 October, which Eritrea was answering, has not been made public.
Whether the Security Council will act on Eritrea’s request is unclear. It is also not known whether Ethiopian troops at Zalambessa will cross into Eritrea.
The background to the demand is in Ethiopia Red Sea Access Push Risks a Wider Horn Crisis. The African Union’s appeal for calm is in AU Urges Ethiopia, Eritrea and Egypt to Show Restraint.
Frequently Asked Questions
Does Ethiopia have a legal right to a sea port?
Not to a port on another country’s territory. On Ethiopia sea access, UNCLOS Article 125 grants landlocked states transit to the sea by agreement, and Ethiopia has not ratified that treaty.
Why does Ethiopia not have a coastline?
Ethiopia lost its coast when Eritrea became independent in May 1993 after a referendum observed by the United Nations. Ethiopian trade used the port of Assab until the 1998 to 2000 border war, then moved to Djibouti.
How much does Ethiopia pay Djibouti for port access?
Ethiopian estimates put port-related fees at US$1.5 billion to US$2 billion a year. Djibouti’s port authority says its combined port revenue is about US$400 million, with much of the larger figure spent on inland trucking.
Will Ethiopia go to war with Eritrea over Assab?
Abiy says Ethiopia wants sea access through talks and has no desire for war, while Eritrea accuses Ethiopia of planning to seize Assab by force. Polymarket gives a 17.5% chance that Eritrea invades Ethiopia by 31 October, which shows how uncertain the outlook is.
Sources: UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, Article 125; UN Treaty Collection, UNCLOS status; OAU resolution AHG/Res 16(I), Cairo 1964; Eritrea Ministry of Information, information note, 14 October 2026; Addis Standard, 27 February 2026; Addis Standard, 28 October 2025; Capital Ethiopia, 7 December 2025; Turkish Foreign Ministry, Ankara Declaration; UN-OHRLLS, landlocked developing countries; The Reporter Ethiopia, February 2024; The EastAfrican, June 2022; The EastAfrican, May 2014; Reagan Library, Statement on United States Oceans Policy, 10 March 1983; World Bank population data, 2024.
Editorial responsibility: Matthias Camenzind, Editor-in-Chief · Editorial standards · Report an error
Horn of Africa and the Red Sea
- Ethiopia’s Neighbors Explained, Ports, Eritrea, Somalia
- Eritrea Explained 2026, a Red Sea Country Guide
- Somalia Explained: Al-Shabaab, Somaliland, the Ports and the Fight Over a 2026 Vote
- Bab el-Mandeb: US, China Forces Guard Oil Chokepoint