Important question for Brazilian democracy: where were the police?
The attack by violent mobs on Brazil’s democratic institutions in the capital, Brasília, on Sunday (8th) was a sudden and vital test of the South American country’s resilience.
And initially, at least, the conspicuous absence of police security was a crucial factor as supporters of former President Jair Meassias Bolsonaro rallied outside the National Congress, the federal courthouse, and the presidential palace.
The reasons for this delay are unclear, but some senior officials are now accusing the capital’s security forces of delaying their mobilization out of intent rather than confusion.
Brazilian Justice Minister Flávio Dino claimed far fewer officers were present than agreed in the security plan drawn up days earlier.
A Federal Court of Justice judge has also issued an arrest warrant for the capital’s top security chief. Multiple videos circulating online show officers present escorting protesters on their way to federal buildings, stopping to take selfies with them.
Things had changed. New police contingents arrived and took back control of government buildings.
More than 1,200 people were arrested, with more than 700 charged with involvement in the violence.
Authorities have now moved to arrest those suspected of organizing or financing the unrest.
Two government security officials are also accused of fueling the unrest through criminal negligence or complicity.
But the damage had already been done by the time the arrests began. The mob looted buildings from all three branches of the federal government and destroyed valuable works of art.
The police are usually the first to react to such mass actions, and this gives them enormous power to influence the consequences.
Those first hours were a perfect example of how police inaction can fuel political violence and increase threats to democracy.
This is particularly true in Brazil, where one of the critical issues facing the newly elected government is how far to reform or restrict the security sector.
THE POWER OF STRATEGIC INACTION
Measured against the agitators’ stated goals, the violent attack in Brasília was a failure.
Luis Inácio Lula da Silva is assured of his presidency while Bolsonaro remains in Florida. In addition, the attack met with broad public opposition and condemnation by the legislature.
On Monday (9th), the leaders of the three ruling parties issued a rare joint statement condemning the violence.
Denial of Sunday’s events may discredit Bolsonaro’s supporters and weaken the energy of his movement.
Yanilda Maria Gonzalez, a Harvard University political scientist who studies public policy and democracy in the Americas, noted that opposition to the violence in Brasilia runs far and wide within government, public opinion, and the media opinion matrix more consistent than the response to the January 6 attacks in the United States two years ago.
If this opinion prevails and the protest movement crumbles under the pressure of disapproval, the risk of further violence would be negligible.
But that could change, especially now that the government is beginning to prosecute the hundreds of people arrested for their involvement in the riots.
The new administration “needs to prosecute these people, and they will,” said Amy Erica Smith, a political scientist at the University of Iowa who studies Brazilian politics and democracy.
“But their pursuit could also have a destabilizing effect.”
It is also important to realize that a sudden coup is not the only way political violence can undermine democracy. Police in Brazil have a history of using strategic inaction as a political tool, Gonzalez said.
Her research found that in São Paulo, for example, in the 1980s, during the economic crisis, police allowed riots to create a sense of panic in society and pressure politicians.
And in 2013, after the mayor of São Paulo delayed paying overtime to the local military police, law enforcement officials were deliberately lax in policing a major cultural festival, which led to increased crime and a series of negative press headlines for the mayor.
Today, Smith sees the danger that pro-Bolsonaro factions within the police or other security services will “stand by” instead of stopping political violence in the future.
“USEFUL IDIOTS” FOR THE MILITARY?
One reason for this strategic inaction could be support for Bolsonaro, widely believed to be the preferred candidate among police and military officials.
But another, perhaps more likely, reason is that many in the security community fear Lula da Silva’s policies threaten security forces’ status, privileges, or immunities.
“The security forces have allowed themselves a lot in recent years. Police violence is virtually unchecked,” said Christoph Harig, a researcher at the Technical University of Braunschweig studying public policy and civil-military relations in Brazil.
“There are too many cases where innocent people have been killed, mostly by the police, sometimes by the armed forces as part of internal missions, and the killers have gotten away with very light sentences. This impunity prevails in many Brazilian police and military services.”
Lula da Silva does not share this political affinity with the security forces and has signaled that he wants to limit the military’s political role.
Many are wondering how far his departure from Bolsonaro-era politics will go or if he might try to go further, as he did in 2009 when he set up a truth commission into cases of torture and other crimes from the time of dictatorship and a review of the law providing amnesty for these crimes.
Lula was forced to abandon the proposal after several high-ranking military officials threatened to resign in protest.
Harig pointed out that military officials in Brasília defended the coup leaders by labeling them “peaceful protesters” and allowing them to go outside to camp barracks as their numbers have increased over the past 10 weeks.
This protected the coup movement, although the military leadership refused to support or carry out a coup.
That could be a practical lesson for the government, Harig said, about the importance of being on good terms with the military.
He cited the Lula da Silva government’s appointment of José Mucio, a civilian but widely perceived as a friend of military interests, as defense minister as a sign that these pressures have had an impact.
“I think the people in these protest camps have been sort of ‘useful idiots’ to the military over the past few weeks,” Harig said. “They will not accept anything that threatens their institutional privileges.
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