China’s Trade Surplus and Latin American Exporters

CHINA · ANALYSIS

China’s monthly trade surplus says little about demand for Latin American soy, copper, iron ore and oil. For US readers, the detail behind it matters for tariff talks, farm exports and shares in Latin American miners.

Latin American farms and mines sell large volumes of soy, copper, iron ore and oil to China, and Chinese customs data is the quickest check on that demand. This analysis explains what the figure measures and how Brazil, Argentina, Chile and Peru are exposed, building on the Asia Intelligence Brief of 9 November.

What the Trade Balance Measures and What September Showed

The trade balance is the value of goods a country exports minus the goods it imports, as China’s General Administration of Customs (GACC) counts them. It is one net number and does not describe demand on its own.

A wider surplus can come from strong exports or from weak imports. Only imports, in volume and in price, are demand for what Latin American farms and mines sell.

The September figures, released on 14 October, show why the distinction matters. According to GACC data reported by AP, exports rose 36.3% year on year to $447.18 billion, and the monthly surplus reached $133.53 billion, up from $119.1 billion in August.

• Exports, September 2026: $447.18 billion, up 36.3% year on year.
• Imports, September 2026: up 31% year on year.
• Surplus, September 2026: $133.53 billion, against $119.1 billion in August.
• Surplus, January to September 2026: about $938 billion, according to AP.

Imports rose 31% in September, up from 28.2% in August. Reports by AP and the South China Morning Post attribute much of the growth to AI-related products such as semiconductors and computing equipment.

The nine-month surplus puts China on course to beat the record of about $1.19 trillion set in 2025, according to those reports. Because the surge is led by technology, the import jump does not point to broad commodity demand.

Four Commodities, Four Different Stories

Commodity volumes in September were mixed or weak, even as the headline surged. The detail below comes from secondary reports of GACC data, because the customs tables themselves were not opened for this analysis.

Soy: Brazil and Argentina

China imported 11.88 million tonnes (Mt) of soybeans in September, down 7.7% from 12.87 Mt a year earlier, according to Fastmarkets, a commodity price reporter.

Brazil supplied 10.70 Mt, about 90% of the total, down from 10.96 Mt a year earlier.

US soybeans arrived at 360,879 tonnes, against none a year earlier, in cargoes bought by state buyers.

Copper: Chile and Peru

Imports of copper concentrate, the semi-processed ore that smelters refine, were 2.482 Mt in September, down 4.06% year on year, according to SMM, a metals data provider.

Imports of refined copper, known as cathode, were 254,600 tonnes, up 21% on August but down 24% year on year. For January to September they reached 2.1383 Mt, down 16.34%.

SMM analysts tie the weakness to US-tariff-driven diversion of refined copper, which is their view and not an official finding.

Peru is mainly a concentrate supplier, so the concentrate decline is the relevant gauge for its miners. No Peru-specific September figure was available for this analysis.

Iron Ore: Brazil

Iron ore imports were 109.817 Mt in September, up 1.6% on August but down 5.6% year on year, according to SteelOrbis, a steel industry news site. From January to September they reached 954.967 Mt, up 4.1%.

No 2026 figure for Brazil’s share was available.

Oil: Brazil and Argentina

Estimates differ by source: customs-based data gives about 9.03 million barrels a day against 8.93 in August, while Kpler, a vessel-tracking firm, gives 7.84.

Reports tie the weakness to the Iran war and Gulf disruption. Kpler says onshore inventories fell about 1.6 million barrels a day in September, a record pace, while imports from the Middle East rose for a third straight month.

Russian volumes fell 11.4% on August. The share of Latin American crude in these flows could not be confirmed, so Brazil and Argentina cannot be read from this data.

Who Is Who and What Each Wants

Several actors shape how the surplus turns into orders for Latin America. Each is described in one line below.

• General Administration of Customs: China’s customs authority, led by Sun Meijun as of July 2026, which publishes the monthly trade data.
• Wang Wentao: China’s Commerce Minister, who on 3 November co-chaired the APEC ministerial meeting by video, according to CGTN.
• Sinograin and COFCO: Chinese state buyers that bought 45 cargoes of US soybeans in the week starting 12 October, according to Fastmarkets.
• Scott Bessent: the US official whose reported remarks on Argentina’s ties to China are covered below.
• Javier Milei: Argentina’s president, who faces US pressure while China remains a major trading partner.
• Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva: winner of Brazil’s 25 October runoff, according to CNBC, with inauguration due in January 2027.
• Keiko Fujimori: Peru’s president, sworn in on 28 July 2026 after winning the June runoff by fewer than 50,000 votes, according to Al Jazeera.

Argentina shows the pressure on a smaller exporter. Reports cite Bessent as saying Milei is “committed to getting China out” of Argentina, while Argentina’s foreign minister said the US trade deal “does not imply that China cannot participate,” according to the Buenos Aires Times.

In 2025, China supplied 23.7% of Argentina’s imports and took 11.3% of its exports, according to INDEC, Argentina’s statistics agency, as reported by the same newspaper. That mix explains why Buenos Aires avoids choosing sides.

In Brazil, Senator Flávio Bolsonaro said after the 25 October runoff that it was “impossible to accept the results” and that he would seek to annul them, according to AP. The dispute adds political risk to a trade in which Brazil supplies about 90% of China’s soybean imports.

China–Latin America trade was 3.93 trillion yuan in 2025 (about $565.28 billion, as converted in a Xinhua report), up 6.5% year on year, according to Chinese customs. No official country breakdown for January to September 2026 was available for this analysis.

Three Scenarios for the Coming Months

These are scenarios, not forecasts, and each rests on the figures reported above. The first test is whether October’s surplus narrows because imports grow or because exports weaken.

In a stabilising scenario, the surplus narrows while commodity imports recover from September’s year-on-year falls. That would help Brazilian soy and iron ore and Chilean and Peruvian copper, provided the data show volumes and not only prices.

In a stalling scenario, the surplus narrows only because technology exports cool, while soybean, crude and cathode imports stay below 2025 levels. Latin American sellers would then gain little from a smaller headline number.

In a tipping scenario, the US-China tariff truce lapses on 10 January 2027 without a successor, after Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced in September that it had been extended to that date. Tariff-driven diversion of refined copper and state purchases of US soybeans could then reshape orders for Chile, Brazil and Argentina at the margin.

What It Means for You

For US farmers and grain investors, Chinese buying of US soybeans is currently done by state buyers. About 12 Mt of US soybeans had been bought by mid-January 2026, and DTN, a US farm publication, reported that the September extension brought no new soybean commitments.

Fastmarkets reports more than 16 Mt of US beans booked for loading between October 2026 and March 2027. That buying displaces some Brazilian and Argentine volume at the margin, although Brazil still supplied about 90% of September’s imports.

For US investors in Latin American miners, the evidence here is limited to copper flows, because no company filings or October copper prices were reviewed. Falling cathode imports are a reason to read company guidance against China’s import volumes, not its surplus.

For readers who follow tariffs, a large surplus feeds pressure on Beijing to rebalance trade, which AP reports is growing among trading partners including the EU. The next dated tariff marker is 10 January 2027.

For Latin America, the message is that Chinese demand is selective. Brazil depends on soy, and refined copper imports are weak.

What Is Not Known

The October result itself is not known at the time of writing.

Several data points were not found: Brazil’s share of China’s 2026 iron ore imports, the Latin American share of China’s crude imports, and official country figures for China–Latin America trade from January to September 2026. No copper price for October 2026 was reviewed either.

A report that China committed in May 2026 to buy $17 billion a year of US farm goods in 2026 to 2028 was not verified against a primary source. The customs tables behind the September figures were also not opened, so the numbers rest on press reports of GACC data.

Political outcomes remain open as of 9 November 2026. Brazil’s contested runoff, the next government’s trade stance and US pressure on Argentina over China are all unresolved.

What to Watch

The calendar below lists the dated events that will show whether Chinese demand is broadening. Dates come from the Rio Times brief and the reports cited above.

• 18 and 19 November: the APEC leaders’ meeting in Shenzhen, where Peru, Chile and Mexico are members, according to the brief.
• Early to mid December: November trade data, with the date unconfirmed; last year’s release came on 8 December.
• 10 January 2027: the end of the extended US-China tariff truce, as announced by Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent.
• January 2027: the inauguration of Brazil’s next president, which is due that month.

The most useful habit is to compare each commodity’s import volume with the same month a year earlier. A surplus that narrows while those lines rise would be the clearest sign of stronger demand for Latin American exporters.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is China’s trade surplus?

It is the value of goods China exports minus the goods it imports, as counted by the General Administration of Customs. In September 2026 it was $133.53 billion, up from $119.1 billion in August.

Does a large trade surplus mean strong demand for Latin American commodities?

Not necessarily, because a surplus can widen when exports surge. In September 2026, soybean, crude oil and copper cathode imports were all lower than a year earlier.

How much of China’s soybean imports come from Brazil?

Brazil supplied 10.70 million tonnes of China’s 11.88 million tonnes of soybean imports in September 2026, about 90%, according to Fastmarkets.

What happens to the US-China tariff truce in 2027?

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent announced in September 2026 that the truce was extended to 10 January 2027. DTN reported that the extension brought no new soybean commitments.