Small but strategically pivotal Uruguay in military dilemma between U.S. and China

On September 1, the exclusive flagging of three Marine Protector-class vessels was decommissioned by the U.S. Coast Guard and transferred to the Uruguayan Navy at the U.S. Coast Guard shipyard in Baltimore, Maryland.

These ships, the first of the class to be transferred to another country after decommissioning – except for some originally built for Malta and Yemen – are modern, highly efficient units and remain the backbone of the U.S. Coast and Harbor Patrol.

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Negotiations for the acquisition of these ships began about two years ago and, after a hiatus caused primarily by the Covid 19 pandemic, were completed with the delivery of the units after they were completely overhauled at the USCG shipyard.

However, this transfer, which is very minor in financial and geostrategic terms, restores naval cooperation between the United States and Uruguay that had been virtually interrupted for more than three decades after the procurement of two Cape-class patrol boats, one of which is still in service.

Although smaller donations of equipment, primarily Metal Shark boats and semi-rigid maintenance equipment, have been made from Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) funds for use in United Nations-flagged peacekeeping missions, this is the first time in many years that a transfer of this type has occurred.

Statements by Rear Admiral (USCG) Douglas M. Schofield and Mira Resnick of the U.S. Department of State underscored the willingness of the United States to continue and expand cooperation with Uruguay, which was reiterated by the Commander-in-Chief of the Uruguayan Navy, Admiral Jorge Wilson, and the Uruguayan Ambassador to the United States, Andrés Duran Hareau.

Wilson, accompanied by other senior Uruguayan Navy officers, visited several senior Navy officials, including U.S. Secretary of the Navy Carlos del Toro, USCG Commander Admiral Linda L. Fagan, and old U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officials.

In addition to the protocol aspects, the main purpose of these meetings is to create new lines of cooperation and strengthen existing ones.

The Uruguayan Navy urgently needs solutions to its operational situation.

It currently has no warships, only a handful of active auxiliary and service vessels, and its patrol and rescue capabilities are minimal.

Hopefully, some positive developments will emerge from these negotiations in the short term that can help restore these capabilities.

CHINA AND ITS INFLUENCE IN LATIN AMERICA

The decades-long vacuum of military support in the region opened the door for China to build defense relationships with countries traditionally dependent on U.S. military assets.

Through donations and a strong political presence, China gained a foothold in the region, making large sales to Venezuela and extending its influence to Argentina, where it installed a satellite surveillance base and sold aircraft to Bolivia, among others.

China also continuously provides military equipment to many Latin American countries, including Ecuador, Peru, and Uruguay.

In the latter case, the recent technical selection of Chinese deep-sea patrol vessels to equip the Navy may be at odds with strengthening cooperative relations with the United States, especially given the complex geopolitical situation in the China Sea and Taiwan.

On the other hand, Uruguay is also negotiating a free trade agreement with China, its leading trading partner, which puts it in a very complex geopolitical position.

Either buy Chinese ships, even if the United States does not want to, and try to avoid a problem with the Asian giant, or strengthen its defense ties with Washington and eventually affect relations with the main buyer of its products.

In addition, the budget available to purchase new ships would be far below what Chinese shipyards can offer, opening the possibility that the deal is not financially viable and leaving the door open for an agreement with another country, possibly the United States.

Meanwhile, China continues its efforts to expand its influence in the region and is seeking agreements with Argentina to participate in the development of an independent access channel to the port of Buenos Aires.

This new access channel, known as the Magdalena Channel, would be different from the current channel and avoid crossing waters administered by Uruguay and eventually the port of Montevideo.

It is a new route for direct sea access from Buenos Aires ports, which could improve fiscal controls by the State.

The geopolitical importance of this canal for China lies in its control over the region’s bulk exports, among the richest in the world.

The “Paraná-Paraguay Waterway” is a 3,442 km river transport route that includes the ports of Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay.

It is key at the geopolitical level: products from five countries go abroad from there.

For its part, Uruguay, a small country with barely 3.5 million inhabitants but with a critical geostrategic position as a gateway to the continent via the waterway and hundreds of thousands of kilometers of the sea to protect and exploit, is trying to rebuild its naval fleet with a meager budget and conditioned by the political consequences of possible ship purchases.

It will be in the hands of politicians to raise the necessary funds to enable the national Navy to fulfill its mission while minimizing the geopolitical impact of such decisions to achieve the best benefit for the Navy and the country in general.