BOLIVIA · MINING
Key Facts
- —The country Bolivia, a landlocked Andean country, grants and polices mining rights through a state authority known as AJAM, short for Autoridad Jurisdiccional Administrativa Minera.
- —Why it matters Gold is a source of the US dollars that Bolivia is short of, and the regulator says weak checks on gold sales make illegal metal hard to trace.
- —Why now AJAM went public on Thursday 8 October 2026 with an inspection from Tuesday 6 October, and a new account on Tuesday 20 October added a complaint to prosecutors.
- —What happened Inspectors found more than 100 excavators, 200 dump trucks and about 500 people working a gold site on the Tagoni river in Pocoata, Potosí, with no valid enabling title.
- —The numbers AJAM counted 25 mining grids in its inspection note, and its national director estimated 120 kilograms of gold a month, or about 1.4 tonnes a year, on stated assumptions.
- —What it means for you Gold buyers, refiners and lenders face more questions about the origin papers of Bolivian metal, while visitors to Bolivia are not affected directly.
- —Still open Who financed the machines, who bought the gold, and whether prosecutors can show any link to organized crime.
- —Power Index Bolivia ranks 12th of 14 in The Rio Times Latin America Power Index, with 28.4 points (October 2026 edition).
Bolivia gold mining is under new scrutiny after the state mining authority AJAM said it found more than 100 excavators, 200 dump trucks and about 500 people working a gold site on the Tagoni river in Potosí department. For US readers the case tests whether gold from the Andes can be traced from pit to buyer, because AJAM’s Potosí director says weak checks on gold sales make the metal hard to follow.
The inspection took place on Tuesday 6 October 2026 in Pocoata municipality, Chayanta province, after a complaint, and AJAM announced it two days later. On Tuesday 20 October the Bolivian outlet Erbol revisited the case, writing that AJAM has filed a complaint with the public prosecutor and warns of links to organized crime that investigators still have to establish.
The case follows other river-mining stories we have covered, including a navy raid on an illegal camp on the Beni river and a court order on rivers damaged by gold mining. Gold is also a dollar question for La Paz, as our report on the rule on gold exporters’ dollars shows.
What AJAM Found on the Tagoni River
AJAM said the inspection covered 25 mining grids in four areas named Chaupichuro, Taruquiri 1, Aguilita and Lumina II, according to its press note as carried by Los Tiempos and Visión 360. Los Tiempos adds that each grid covers 25 hectares, which our arithmetic puts at about 625 hectares of inspected ground.
Inspectors recorded excavation, removal, transport, washing and concentration of gold-bearing material, along with engines, vehicles, fuel, processing equipment, large pools and makeshift camps. They counted more than 100 excavators, 200 dump trucks and more than 500 people, among them machine operators, drivers and workers who sorted and washed the material.
AJAM called it the largest illegal mining operation it has found in its inspections in Potosí department. Technicians from the Mother Earth secretariat of the Potosí governorate joined the walk-through within their own remit.
AJAM’s cadastre system lists the four areas as currently valid, yet the work on site had no valid enabling title, according to the agency’s review of its records. National director Jaime Sanabria said three of the areas belong to companies and one to a cooperative, and that their documents do not allow mining because they lack a mining right and an environmental licence.
The team entered at first, but the access roads were later closed with chains and other barriers, which limited the inspection. AJAM said it will continue a technical and legal review and then decide on administrative and legal steps.
Bolivia Gold Mining Output and Royalty Estimates
At a press conference on 8 October, Sanabria gave a rough calculation of the scale: 200 trucks making one trip a day at about 20 tonnes each would move some 4,000 tonnes of ore daily. At one gram of gold per tonne, which he called the lowest yield one can obtain, that gives 4 kilograms a day, 120 kilograms a month and about 1.4 tonnes a year.
This is an estimate built on assumptions about truck loads and gold content, not a measured output or a sales record. Sanabria also said the work had run for about six years without paying royalties or taxes and without protecting the environment, an AJAM assertion that the sources do not back with documents.
On 15 October the news site eju.tv wrote that Potosí department and Pocoata municipality could be missing about US$14 million a year in mining royalties, and it said the figures need verification. Under the Mining Law, it noted, 85% of such royalties go to the department and 15% to producing municipalities, which on that estimate would be about US$11.9 million and US$2.1 million.
FM Bolivia, citing the daily El Potosí, put the revenue at close to US$200 million a year, a figure we could not trace to a primary document. Mining researcher Héctor Córdova, as presented by eju.tv, puts Bolivia’s gold market at roughly US$8 billion a year and argues for centralizing trade under the state to ease the dollar shortage.
The Organized Crime Warning and What It Rests On
On 16 and 17 October, Óscar Santos Orellana, AJAM’s departmental director in Potosí, presented the case at a journalism and mining workshop run by the Fundación para el Periodismo, Erbol wrote. In that account the site covers about 30 grids rather than the 25 in AJAM’s press note, a difference the sources do not explain.
Santos said illegal mining can involve a chain of financing, machinery, fuel, transport and sales, and that investigators must find out who financed the equipment, who buys the gold and what papers support its origin. Erbol stressed that any link to organized crime has to be established through investigation and evidence, and that communities, cooperatives and miners should not be tied to criminal groups automatically.
AJAM has filed a complaint with the public prosecutor’s office, which is a first step and not a finding. None of the sources reviewed says that anyone has been charged, arrested or named, or that the machinery has been seized.
Threats, Weak Controls and Rising Gold Prices
Santos told the workshop that officials have faced threats and attacks, and he cited a 20 March 2026 inspection near Cotagaita, Potosí, where staff were attacked and withdrew, according to his account. He said some interventions have to be suspended for safety and that extraction starts again once state staff leave.
Erbol also quoted Alfredo Zaconeta of the labour and agrarian research centre CEDLA, who called for a full review of gold policy, oversight and how the benefits are shared. His analysis, as summarized by Erbol, points to trading firms that can finance operations by supplying machinery.
Sanabria went further on 8 October, saying the state has lost sovereignty and control over its natural resources, and that AJAM will coordinate with the police, the armed forces and environment authorities. The daily Crónica wrote on 19 October that illegal gold mining is spreading in Potosí, including around Tupiza and Villazón, pushed by high metal prices.
What It Means for You
Buyers, refiners and lenders in the gold trade have reason to ask for origin papers on Bolivian metal, since AJAM’s own Potosí director says document checks on sales are weak. The Pocoata case shows how a site of this size can run for years before the state counts it.
Visitors to Bolivia are not affected directly, because the reports describe a rural river site in northern Potosí. For the wider picture, see our guides to who holds power in Bolivia and Bolivia’s role in Latin America, and our report on the 120 young miners dead in Potosí.
What Is Not Known
The sources on Bolivia gold mining at Pocoata do not say who owns or finances the machinery, who bought the gold, or whether any gold has left the country. They also do not say whether work has stopped since 6 October or whether the roads remain blocked.
Reports differ on the size of the site, with AJAM’s press note citing 25 grids and Erbol citing about 30, and on the licence status, since the cadastre lists the areas as current while Sanabria says the holders lack mining rights and an environmental licence. The river is spelled Tagoni by AJAM and most outlets and Takjoni by Erbol.
We could not open AJAM’s own press note because its website did not load, so the inspection details rest on the note as carried by Los Tiempos, El Diario, Visión 360 and Radio Pío XII. The output, royalty and revenue figures are estimates, and the US$200 million figure comes from a daily we could not open.
Frequently Asked Questions
What did AJAM find on the Tagoni river?
AJAM found more than 100 excavators, 200 dump trucks and about 500 people working a gold site on 6 October 2026. It said the work had no valid enabling title.
Where is Pocoata?
Pocoata is a municipality in Chayanta province in the north of Potosí department, Bolivia. The Tagoni river runs through the area inspected.
How much gold could the site produce?
AJAM national director Jaime Sanabria estimated 4 kilograms a day, 120 kilograms a month and about 1.4 tonnes a year. That is a rough calculation based on assumed truck loads and a yield of one gram per tonne, not a measured output.
Is organized crime proven to be involved?
No, because the sources say any link has to be established by investigation and evidence. AJAM has filed a complaint with the public prosecutor, but nobody has been named or charged in the reports reviewed.
Why does Bolivia gold mining matter to US readers?
Buyers, refiners and lenders in the gold trade need clear origin papers, and AJAM says document checks on sales are weak. The case shows how hard it is to trace gold from a river pit to a buyer.
Sources: Los Tiempos, 9 October 2026; Visión 360, 8 October 2026; Visión 360, estimate, 8 October 2026; El Diario, 9 October 2026; Radio Pío XII, 9 October 2026; eju.tv, 15 October 2026; FM Bolivia, 13 October 2026; Erbol, 20 October 2026; Crónica, 19 October 2026.
This article was produced by The Rio Times’ automated newsroom system. How we use AI · Report an error · Editorial responsibility: Matthias Camenzind, Editor-in-Chief