Promises and Pressure: Brazil’s Late Push to Ease Fertilizer Dependence on Russia
Brazil says it wants to reduce its 85% dependency on imported fertilizer by building four new factories that will, by official projections, cover just 35% of national urea demand.
Government officials, led by Petrobras and the Ministry of Development, framed this move as strategic, but the timing tells a less heroic story.
For years, Brazil’s agriculture sector—feeding global markets with soy and beef—grew ever more dependent on imported Russian fertilizer and cheap Russian diesel.
Official customs and trade data confirm Brazil spent over $4 billion on Russian fertilizers and another $3 billion on diesel in 2024 alone.
These purchases powered record harvests, supporting around a quarter of the nation’s GDP, but also sent billions in hard currency to Russia, much to the annoyance of Western policymakers.
After over a year of warnings from the United States and NATO about the risks of fueling Russia’s war budget, Brazilian authorities suddenly found urgency.
Petrobras announced a $900 million investment to bring four dormant or new fertilizer plants online by 2028, in Paraná, Bahia, Espírito Santo, and Mato Grosso do Sul.
This, officials say, will secure a hefty 35% of urea demand domestically—meaning Brazil will still depend on imports for well over half its needs.
Brazil’s Fertilizer Gamble
Vice President Geraldo Alckmin and Petrobras’s leadership insist these factories will safeguard food supply and insulate Brazil from global supply shocks.
Customs figures and Ministry statements confirm that, under political pressure, Brazil accelerated its push for so-called fertilizer “sovereignty.”
Yet the government admits the country will remain exposed for at least three to four more years until local production ramps up. Western governments continue to signal stronger sanctions are at stake, as ongoing imports from Russia provide a financial lifeline for the Kremlin.
Brazil’s leaders tout the new domestic investment as bold, but had years to address this gap and chose to act only when Washington and Brussels began to tighten the screws.
Behind the upbeat speeches about food security and independence, Brazil’s strategy looks more like an emergency maneuver forced by outside threats. Foreign pressure, not foresight, forced this scramble.
Even after the new plants open, Brazil will still remain exposed to global volatility and political leverage, since most of its fertilizer will still come from abroad.
For the global food market, Brazil’s delayed reaction puts supply stability at risk. Western powers want to disrupt Russian finances; Brazil wants to keep its agriculture humming.
In the middle lies a multi-billion-dollar gap, plugged for now with promises and patches, and no easy exit from dependence—only a little less of it.