Somalia Cancels Berbera Port Deals as Ethiopia and UAE Reshape Horn of Africa Geopolitics

Geopolitics · Horn of Africa

The Red Sea coastline has become the Horn of Africa’s most expensive political real estate. Sovereignty claims, port concessions, and foreign military bases now price every shipping lane and every logistics contract along the Bab el-Mandeb.

The Memorandum That Broke a Regional Order

Ethiopia signed a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland on 1 January 2024. The arrangement was widely reported as linking possible Ethiopian recognition of Somaliland to access to the Berbera coastline on the Gulf of Aden.

One source states the memorandum envisioned a 50-year access arrangement and roughly 20 km of coastline near Berbera. Another says it included a leased military base in exchange for recognition.

The Somali Federal Government rejected the deal as ‘null and void’ one day later. Mogadishu treated the memorandum as a violation of Somalia’s sovereignty.

That rejection set off a diplomatic realignment that pulled Turkey and Egypt closer to Somalia. It also pushed Ethiopia toward alternative Red Sea access calculations.

The Berbera Axis and the DP World Stake

Berbera sits on Somaliland’s Gulf of Aden coast near the Bab el-Mandeb chokepoint linking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This location gives the port outsized strategic value for ships avoiding or managing Red Sea risk.

DP World is reported as the operator and developer tied to Berbera port expansion. The investment commitment cited is up to US$442 million for the port, an economic zone, and a corridor linking Somaliland to Ethiopia.

In January 2026 Somalia reportedly cancelled port agreements covering Berbera, Bosaso, and Kismayo along with related security and defence cooperation with the UAE. Somaliland rejected the cancellation and DP World said operations would continue.

Some 2026 analysis describes an emerging ‘Berbera Axis’ involving Somaliland, Ethiopia, the UAE, and in some accounts Israel. This framing is analytical rather than an established official bloc.

Eritrea and the Assab Alternative

Several 2025 to 2026 analyses suggest Ethiopia’s sea access calculus shifted toward Eritrea’s Assab port. This shift followed the Ethiopia-Somalia rapprochement in late 2024 and the loss of momentum around the Somaliland deal.

Assab sits on the southern Red Sea and has long been linked to maritime access and military logistics discussions. Its proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb gives it a similar corridor logic to Djibouti and Berbera.

One source claims Egypt reached discreet late 2025 understandings to develop Assab and Djibouti’s Doraleh terminal. This appears in secondary analysis and requires independent confirmation before being treated as hard fact.

Eritrea remains strategically relevant because Assab offers another pressure point in a tightly contested maritime corridor. The port’s political use matters as much as its commercial throughput.

Djibouti and the Weight of Military Density

Djibouti remains one of the most strategically important maritime states in the world because it sits astride the Bab el-Mandeb. It hosts multiple foreign military presences in extremely close proximity.

The sources describe Djibouti as hosting US Camp Lemonnier and China’s only overseas military base. That density of basing gives Djibouti unique strategic value but also high geopolitical exposure.

The country has been affected by the wider Houthi and Red Sea shipping crisis because the Bab el-Mandeb traffic environment directly affects shipping lanes adjacent to Djibouti’s ports and coastline.

One 2026 analysis says Djibouti increased maritime patrols across the Bab el-Mandeb with international naval partners in response to Red Sea security alerts. The patrols signal both vulnerability and operational capacity.

Red Sea Shipping and the Houthi Premium

The Bab el-Mandeb Strait is the key maritime chokepoint repeatedly highlighted as central to Horn of Africa geopolitics and global shipping. It is the narrow gate between the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.

The Red Sea shipping crisis created by Houthi attacks intensified the strategic value of Horn ports, especially Djibouti and Berbera. Shipping risk and rerouting increase the premium on security and logistics control.

One source specifically ties the Ethiopia-Somaliland port deal to access to Red Sea shipping lanes via Bab el-Mandeb. Another frames the region as a contest over the security of maritime corridors rather than a single bilateral dispute.

For investors, the Houthi threat converts port access from a commercial convenience into a geopolitical insurance policy. The cost of rerouting is measured in insurance premiums, delivery delays, and carrier decisions.

Turkey’s Deep Footprint in Mogadishu

Turkey has built one of the region’s most extensive external presences in Somalia. Its role spans military training, infrastructure, education, healthcare, aviation, trade, and energy.

Turkey operates a major military training facility in Mogadishu known as Camp Turksom or TURKSOM. One source describes it as a sprawling 30-hectare complex with around 1,000 Turkish personnel.

One source states Turkey trained over 10,000 Somali recruits annually and has used drone operations and other military support to strengthen Somali counterterrorism capacity. This is a secondary claim that should be verified against primary defence or government sources before publication.

In 2024 Somalia and Turkey signed a defence and economic cooperation agreement under which Turkey would provide maritime security support and help rebuild, equip, and train the Somali navy. Secondary analysis says the deal extends for 10 years, but this is reported analysis rather than confirmed treaty text.

Gulf Competition and the UAE’s Port Network

The sources consistently identify UAE influence as significant in the Somaliland and Berbera orbit, especially through DP World and logistics and port development. That influence is commercial in form and strategic in function.

The Horn is described as a space of Gulf competition where port investments and security alignments are used to shape influence rather than purely commercial returns. Rival Gulf states use infrastructure as an instrument of alignment.

Somalia’s January 2026 cancellation of UAE-linked port and security arrangements is reported as a major political signal in the rivalry over sovereignty and external influence. The cancellation was as much about Mogadishu’s red lines as about Berbera’s operations.

Some sources mention deeper 2025 to 2026 activity by Egypt in Eritrea and Djibouti, but these claims are secondary and should be verified carefully before being used as hard fact.

Al-Shabaab and the Unfinished Counterterrorism Front

Multiple sources say the Ethiopia-Somaliland crisis likely weakened regional counterterrorism cooperation. That weakening created political conditions that could benefit al-Shabaab, the Islamist insurgency fighting the Somali Federal Government.

One source explicitly says the deal increased anti-Ethiopian sentiment in southern Somalia and would likely energize al-Shabaab by complicating security coordination. Political grievance is a recruitment accelerant for the group.

A 2026 analysis reports Ethiopian forces withdrew from Burhakaba on 8 August 2026, handing the base to the Somali National Army’s 60th Division. Al-Shabaab remains nearby according to that analysis, indicating active front-line instability.

The available sources do not provide a clean comprehensive 2026 battlefield balance sheet for al-Shabaab. They do support the conclusion that the insurgency remains a live factor shaping port security and investor risk.

Berbera’s Investor Logic and Limits

Berbera matters to investors because it can function as an alternative logistics gateway for Ethiopia. That potential reduces dependence on Djibouti if infrastructure, diplomacy, and security hold together.

The port’s value depends on a fragile chain of assumptions: Somaliland’s de facto stability, Ethiopia’s political will, DP World’s continued operation, and the absence of wider conflict.

Somalia’s rejection of the original memorandum and its 2026 cancellation of port agreements create legal uncertainty around Berbera contracts. Investors must price sovereign-risk layers on top of operational risk.

Berbera is not a substitute for Djibouti in the near term. It is a potential second corridor, and even as a contingency option it reshapes pricing power for all parties.

Djibouti’s Stability Premium and Geopolitical Tax

Djibouti remains the most established logistics node for Ethiopia and for foreign military supply chains. Its infrastructure maturity and multilateral basing ecosystem are unmatched on the Red Sea coast.

But its premium is constrained by high geopolitical exposure, foreign military density, and any spillover from Red Sea insecurity. A chokepoint state is always a target and always a bargaining chip.

The 2026 analysis of increased maritime patrols suggests Djibouti is actively managing the Houthi-related threat environment. That management is essential to keeping its port economy credible for shippers and insurers.

For investors, Djibouti offers reliability at a geopolitical price. The question is not whether Djibouti remains central but whether its centrality can be monetised without being captured by security logic.

The Trade Route Premium and What It Means for Investors

The strategic value of Horn ports is tied to control over or proximity to the Bab el-Mandeb and the ability to provide redundancy when Red Sea shipping is disrupted. Ports are now dual-use assets: commercial and military.

Logistics, warehousing, energy, and port-adjacent infrastructure in the Horn face elevated political and security risk. The sources support that general conclusion with specific evidence of cancelled agreements and active insurgency.

There is also strategic upside where access, protection, and corridor control are credible. The investor question is which corridor has enforceable contracts, stable partners, and a realistic security perimeter.

The region’s port economy is now strongly shaped by sovereignty disputes, military patronage, and great-power competition. Risk assessments are inseparable from geopolitical analysis, and no port project can be evaluated on spreadsheets alone.

The Horn’s contested coastline will keep commanding attention because every alternative route through the Red Sea ultimately passes the same narrow gate. Whoever holds credible control over Bab el-Mandeb access holds a claim on global shipping’s risk premium.