EU Pays Tunisia and Mauritania Millions as Migration Deals Cut Departures
Geopolitics · Africa
—The stakes. The EU has paid hundreds of millions to North African states to block sea crossings to Italy.
—The evidence. Arrivals from Tunisia to Italy fell 80 percent in 2024, to 19,460 people, but Libyan departures still dominate in 2026.
—The rights cost. Amnesty International says EU support fuels serious abuses without monitoring or human rights conditions.
—The local backlash. Tunisia now calls the 2023 pact imbalanced and wants more economic benefits, not just border cash.
—The investment angle. Migration funding now shapes budget support, loans and stability risk across North and West Africa.
The European Union is still paying African partners to police borders, but the numbers mask a fragile bargain. Tunisia has cut departures sharply while demanding a better economic deal, and rights groups accuse Brussels of ignoring abuses.

The Tunisia Pact From 2023
The European Commission and Tunisia signed a Memorandum of Understanding, or MoU, on 16 July 2023.
It covers five pillars: macroeconomic stability, trade and investment, the green energy transition, people-to-people contacts, and migration and mobility.
The EU pledged €105 million in immediate border management aid.
That equals about US$113 million at late-2023 exchange rates.
Brussels also offered €900 million in macro-financial assistance loans and €150 million in budgetary support grants.
What the Money Bought
In September 2025 the EU delivered two search-and-rescue vessels to Tunisia.
By June 2026 Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced three more SAR vessels in a leaked letter.
A broader migration support package of €675 million for 2025 to 2027 covers Tunisia and other countries.
The Commission disclosed that package in April 2026 after a Freedom of Information request.
Earlier funds included a €279 million migration package from June 2023 for Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.
Did Departures Actually Fall
European Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi claimed in January 2024 that departures from Tunisia dropped 80 to 90 percent since October 2023.
Academic analysis based on Italian Ministry of Interior data found arrivals from Tunisia to Italy fell 77 percent in 2024 compared with 2023.
A further 80 percent decline occurred between January and July 2025 compared with the same period in 2024.
The decline mostly came from fewer Sub-Saharan departures, especially Ivorians and Guineans.
Those two nationalities had accounted for more than 33,000 arrivals in Italy from Tunisia between August 2022 and July 2023.
The Early Surge Problem
The Mixed Migration Centre reported that in the six weeks after the July 2023 signing, arrivals to Italy from Tunisia rose by 69 percent compared with the six weeks before.
A June 2026 DGAP report confirmed around 60,000 migrants reached Italy by sea from Tunisia between July and September 2023.
That single quarter accounted for 60 percent of total 2023 arrivals from Tunisia.
The initial surge suggests people rushed to leave before controls tightened.
By mid-2025 Tunisia had also tightened controls on its own citizens, with Tunisian arrivals in Italy declining significantly.
The 2026 Reality Check
In the first quarter of 2026 Libya remained the main departure point to Italy, accounting for 87 percent of arrivals, or 5,373 individuals.
Tunisia accounted for only 7 percent, or 458 individuals, while Algeria supplied 5 percent, or 318 people.
Compared with the first quarter of 2025, departures from Libya fell 37 percent.
But departures from Tunisia rose 23 percent and from Algeria rose 94 percent.
Von der Leyen cited a 97 percent decrease in irregular arrivals to Italy since 2023 in the leaked June 2026 letter.
Tunisia Calls the Deal Imbalanced
Tunisian authorities have signalled an intention to reopen discussions on the 2023 EU-Tunisia migration agreement.
They argue the framework positions Tunisia as a migration containment zone without commensurate economic benefits.
The mixed migration update notes that Tunisian officials want more investment, not just border management support.
This creates political risk for the EU because Tunisia can slow cooperation if its demands are ignored.
Foreign investors should watch whether macro-financial assistance conditions become bargaining chips.
Mauritania and Morocco Money
The EU has also pushed migration cooperation with Mauritania, though current verified data on specific new payment amounts remains limited.
The European Commission’s June 2023 package explicitly included Morocco among recipients for border management and anti-smuggling.
A 2024 Annual Action Plan for €208 million again covered Egypt, Libya, Morocco and Tunisia.
The Rights Cost
Amnesty International concluded in July 2026 that EU support has fueled serious human rights violations against migrants in Tunisia.
The group says EU and member state officials celebrate the drop in irregular departures without rigorous monitoring.
Tunisia dismantled its asylum system in 2024, removing what Amnesty called the only avenue for protection.
EU cooperation persisted despite that dismantling.
Rights groups say the EU has failed to embed human rights conditionality in the migration pillar.
Return and Readmission Pressure
The EU migration packages include funding for voluntary returns and reintegration.
Return pressure is central to the deals because Brussels wants African states to take back their nationals.
The €325 million package from June 2023 lists voluntary returns as a core component.
Readmission pressure also feeds into macro-financial assistance conditions tied to IMF criteria.
Tunisia’s demand for a better economic deal reflects frustration with being a return destination without investment benefits.
Remittance Pressure
Remittances from African migrants in Europe are a major source of income for Tunisia, Morocco and Mauritania.
The EU has not yet formally linked remittance flows to migration cooperation in the verified research.
But the economic pillar of the Tunisia MoU includes budget support and loans that dwarf remittance pressure.
Tunisia’s argument that the deal lacks economic benefits suggests remittances alone cannot offset the cost of containment.
Investors tracking North African currency stability should watch how migration-linked budget support affects foreign reserves.
The Africa Payments Are Also Attached to Italy Albania Centres
The EU has been paying Tunisia and Mauritania to stop boats before they reach Europe. But Italy has also opened centres in Albania to process people rescued at sea. The 2026 research links these two tracks. Money goes to African governments for interceptions and returns. At the same time, Italy is trying to shift asylum processing outside the EU. This is a double externalisation effort.
The EU Tunisia deal includes 105 million euros for immediate border aid. The Mauritania package is 210 million euros. These sums pay for patrol vessels, cameras, training and returns. Meanwhile, the Italy Albania centres are meant to handle people who still make it across the central Mediterranean. The research brief does not give a separate cost for the centres. But it shows that payment deals and offshore processing now sit side by side.
In 2026 the Commission disclosed a 675 million euro migration support package for Tunisia and other countries covering 2025 to 2027. That regional package is far larger than the headline Tunisia deal. It suggests the EU is no longer negotiating one country at a time. Instead, it is building a paid network of gatekeepers. The Albania centres are the European end of that network. The African payments are the southern end.
What the Payments Have Not Fixed
The EU payments have reduced departures from Tunisia but shifted routes rather than stopping migration.
Libya still dominates sea arrivals to Italy in 2026, and departures from Algeria rose 94 percent year-on-year.
The early post-MoU surge shows people react to border crackdowns by leaving faster before enforcement tightens.
Tunisia’s move to reopen talks signals that short-term cash for border control does not buy long-term political stability.
For investors, the migration deals are now a structural part of EU-Africa financial relations, with enforcement risk concentrated in North African partners.
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