Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace Gamble in Colombia

Colombia · Politics

2026 Update

—Petro’s Total Peace strategy has effectively collapsed — ELN peace talks were called off in January 2025 after the Catatumbo offensive, and the Gulf Clan (EGC) suspended Doha negotiations in February 2026

—Trump-Petro relations swung from crisis to cautious diplomacy — after Trump threatened Colombia in January 2026, a White House meeting in February eased tensions but produced no clear path forward

—Petro’s approval rating stands at 38% as of March 2026, with disapproval at 54%, as his presidency enters its final five months before the August handover

—Colombia strongly condemned the US military strikes against Venezuela in January 2026, deploying forces to the border and hosting the world’s largest Venezuelan diaspora of nearly 3 million people

Gustavo Petro in 2026: A Presidency in Its Final Act

Gustavo Petro’s presidency is entering its final months. Colombia’s first left-wing president, who took office in August 2022 with a bold vision to end decades of armed conflict through dialogue, now faces a reality far removed from his original promise. His signature Total Peace policy — designed to bring every armed group and criminal network to the negotiating table simultaneously — has largely unraveled.

The ELN peace talks collapsed in January 2025 after the guerrilla group launched a coordinated offensive in the Catatumbo region along the Venezuelan border, killing over 80 people and displacing more than 50,000 civilians in one of Colombia’s worst humanitarian crises in decades. In February 2026, the Gulf Clan — Colombia’s largest criminal organization with an estimated 9,000 fighters — suspended its Doha-based negotiations after Petro pledged at a White House meeting with Donald Trump to target its leader, Chiquito Malo. Although talks later resumed, the episode exposed the fundamental contradiction of Petro’s approach: pursuing peace while simultaneously bowing to US pressure for aggressive drug enforcement.

The Trump-Petro relationship has been one of the most volatile diplomatic dynamics in the region. Trump accused Petro of being involved in the drug trade and threatened military action against Colombia. After Petro blocked US deportation flights carrying Colombian migrants in January 2026, Trump imposed 25% tariffs on Colombian goods and announced travel bans against officials. A February 2026 White House meeting produced a temporary détente, with Petro presenting a counter-narcotics dossier to demonstrate cooperation. But full normalization of relations remains elusive.

With the May 31 presidential election approaching, Petro’s political legacy hangs in the balance. His approval rating has fluctuated significantly — dropping to 26% in mid-2024, recovering briefly, then settling around 38% according to AtlasIntel’s March 2026 survey. He is constitutionally barred from seeking reelection, and his term ends in August 2026. The leading candidates to succeed him include Iván Cepeda of his own Historic Pact coalition on the left, far-right lawyer Abelardo de la Espriella, center-right Senator Paloma Valencia of the Democratic Center, and centrist former Medellín mayor Sergio Fajardo.

The International Crisis Group warned that unless Total Peace produces tangible results before Petro leaves office, “negotiation itself could be discredited as a strategy for addressing conflicts” in Colombia’s future.

What Is Total Peace?

Total Peace — or Paz Total — is the defining security and peace policy of Petro’s administration. Passed as Law 181 by Colombia’s Congress in November 2022 with overwhelming bipartisan support (62-13 in the Senate, 128-7 in the House), it created an unprecedented legal framework for the Colombian government to negotiate simultaneously with both insurgent groups and criminal organizations.

The policy distinguished between two types of armed actors. Organized Armed Groups — such as the ELN guerrilla and FARC dissident factions — were eligible for formal peace dialogues that could lead to comprehensive political agreements. Criminal organizations — such as the Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo) — could enter what the law called “socio-juridical conversations” aimed at their surrender and submission to justice, with more limited scope for negotiation.

By mid-2024, the government was running seven parallel negotiation tracks with different armed and criminal groups, all at varying stages of progress. No previous Colombian government had attempted anything on this scale. The ambition was both Total Peace’s greatest strength and its most dangerous vulnerability.

Why Petro Pursued Total Peace

To understand Total Peace, it helps to understand the man behind it. Gustavo Petro joined the M-19 guerrilla movement at 17, was arrested by the Colombian army in 1985, and after the M-19 signed a peace deal with the government in 1990, transitioned into democratic politics. He served in Congress, became mayor of Bogotá, and spent decades as a whistleblowing senator investigating ties between politicians and paramilitary death squads.

When Petro won the presidency in June 2022 — defeating populist businessman Rodolfo Hernández in a runoff — he carried a mandate shaped by Colombia’s exhaustion with violence. He won most heavily in the same regions that had voted “Yes” in the 2016 peace plebiscite with the FARC. His coalition, the Historic Pact (Pacto Histórico), made peace its central identity.

The 2016 FARC peace agreement had ended the war with Colombia’s largest rebel group, but created a power vacuum that dozens of smaller armed factions rushed to fill. Under Petro’s predecessor Iván Duque (2018-2022), FARC dissident groups multiplied from a handful to over 30 distinct factions, paramilitary violence surged, and hundreds of social leaders and former combatants were killed. Petro’s diagnosis was that military force alone had failed for decades, and that only a comprehensive approach — bringing all groups to the table at once — could break the cycle.

The Seven Negotiation Tracks

Total Peace launched processes with an extraordinary range of actors:

The ELN (National Liberation Army): Colombia’s oldest surviving guerrilla group, founded in 1964. Petro’s government achieved what no previous administration had managed — a nationwide bilateral ceasefire with the ELN that held for nearly a year. But negotiations stalled by mid-2024, and in January 2025, the ELN attacked FARC dissidents in Catatumbo, killing dozens and shattering the ceasefire. Petro suspended talks.

FARC Dissident Factions: After the 2016 peace deal, several FARC commanders refused to demobilize. The largest faction, the Estado Mayor Central (EMC), entered negotiations with Petro’s government. A second faction, the Segunda Marquetalia led by alias Iván Márquez, also engaged in talks. Both processes have been plagued by continued violence even during negotiations.

The Gulf Clan (Clan del Golfo / AGC): Colombia’s most powerful criminal organization, with approximately 9,000 fighters and deep involvement in cocaine trafficking. Unlike guerrilla groups, the Gulf Clan had no political ideology — its negotiations fell under the “submission to justice” framework rather than formal peace talks. The Doha-based process was suspended in February 2026 after Petro’s White House meeting.

Urban Criminal Structures: Petro also opened dialogue tracks with criminal gangs in cities like Buenaventura, Colombia’s key Pacific port, and in Medellín. The Buenaventura ceasefire was initially considered one of Total Peace’s few success stories.

What Went Wrong

Total Peace faced criticism from multiple directions. Security analysts argued that the simultaneous ceasefires declared in early 2023 put the military at a structural disadvantage, allowing armed groups to consolidate territorial control while officially “at peace.” Colombia’s Constitutional Court ruled in November 2023 that the government could only negotiate politically with groups that had genuine political status — not with criminal cartels — limiting the scope of what could be offered to organizations like the Gulf Clan.

The lack of a unified security strategy alongside the negotiations became the policy’s most damaging weakness. Armed groups expanded their recruitment, with total membership rising above 21,000 fighters by 2025 — a 14% increase from 2023. Child recruitment and extortion continued to rise even in areas covered by ceasefires. By June 2025, only 19% of Colombians believed Total Peace was on track, while over 70% said it was failing.

A government negotiator acknowledged the difficulty in an interview with the International Crisis Group: engaging with small, splintered criminal groups required an entirely different approach from traditional peace talks. The government eventually pivoted toward localized, micro-level agreements rather than sweeping national deals — a pragmatic adjustment, but one that fell far short of the original Total Peace vision.

The Catatumbo Crisis

The breaking point came in January 2025. The ELN launched a devastating coordinated offensive against FARC dissident forces in the Catatumbo region along the Venezuelan border. The violence killed more than 80 people and displaced over 50,000 civilians in a matter of days, creating what officials called one of Colombia’s worst humanitarian crises in recent memory.

Petro declared a state of emergency and deployed 10,000 soldiers to the region. He formally suspended peace talks with the ELN. But within hours of the Catatumbo outbreak, fighting erupted on other fronts across the country — in the Amazon region and in central Colombia — often involving armed groups that were simultaneously sitting in peace talks with the government. The contradiction was impossible to ignore.

US Relations: From Confrontation to Fragile Truce

Petro’s relationship with the United States under Donald Trump added another layer of crisis to his final year. In January 2026, following US military strikes against Venezuela, Petro condemned the action as an assault on Latin American sovereignty and deployed forces to the Colombian-Venezuelan border.

The confrontation escalated when Petro blocked US deportation flights. Trump responded with tariff threats and personal attacks. A February 2026 meeting at the White House brought a temporary de-escalation, but fundamental tensions remain. Colombia is the world’s largest cocaine producer, and US pressure for more aggressive enforcement directly conflicts with Petro’s negotiation-first approach.

Colombia also hosts approximately 2.8 million Venezuelan migrants — the largest diaspora in the world — making the country acutely vulnerable to any further deterioration in Venezuela.

Petro’s Legacy and the 2026 Election

As Colombia prepares for the May 31, 2026 presidential election, Petro’s legacy is deeply contested. His supporters point to genuine achievements: the historic FARC peace implementation, a pension reform, reduced poverty rates, and the courage to attempt what no previous government dared. His critics argue that Total Peace empowered criminal organizations, weakened the military, and left Colombia less safe than when he took office.

The presidential race to succeed him is wide open. Iván Cepeda leads polls for the left, offering continuity with Petro’s agenda. Abelardo de la Espriella represents a sharp turn to the right, with a security-first platform. Paloma Valencia of the Democratic Center won the March 8 coalition primary decisively. Sergio Fajardo occupies the center. Former president Álvaro Uribe is attempting a congressional comeback, adding further volatility to the race.

The bitter lesson of Total Peace, analysts argue, should not lead Colombia to reject dialogue entirely. The 2016 FARC agreement proved that even the longest conflicts can be resolved at the negotiating table. But Petro’s experience also demonstrated that political will alone is not enough — without a coherent security strategy, clear legal frameworks, and realistic expectations, negotiations can be exploited by the very groups they aim to pacify.

Petro’s presidency ends in August 2026. Whether history judges Total Peace as a noble failure or as the beginning of a longer process toward genuine peace in Colombia will depend largely on what his successor chooses to do with the infrastructure — and the lessons — he leaves behind.

This article was originally published in 2022 covering Petro’s Total Peace launch. It has been comprehensively updated in March 2026 to reflect the policy’s outcomes, the collapse of key negotiation tracks, and the approaching end of Petro’s presidency.