China’s New Minerals Law Tightens Its Grip on Africa
AFRICA · GEOPOLITICS
Key Facts
—The law: China’s new Implementation Regulation of the Mineral Resources Law gives Beijing a legal mechanism to restrict or retaliate over materials it deems strategically sensitive.
—The dominance: China controls more than half of global critical-minerals production and an estimated 87% of processing and refining.
—African mines: Chinese groups bought Botswana’s Khoemacau copper mine, Mali’s Goulamina lithium mine and secured offtake rights and a major stake in Tanzania’s Ngualla rare earth project.
—The contest: The United States and Europe are scrambling to break China’s grip, courting African producers directly.
—African leverage: Producers from Kenya to Congo are pushing to process minerals at home rather than ship raw ore.
—Why it matters: The metals run through batteries, electronics and defence systems, making them central to the great-power rivalry.
A new China minerals regulation that took force in 2026 gives Beijing a formal legal lever to restrict access to strategic metals, raising the stakes in Africa, where Chinese firms already own key mines and dominate the processing of the continent’s minerals.
What the China minerals law changes
China’s new Implementation Regulation of the Mineral Resources Law gives Beijing a clearer legal basis to control the flow of materials it considers strategic.
In practice, it formalises a lever China has already used: tightening or loosening exports to apply pressure.
For a country that dominates the world’s critical minerals, that is a powerful tool of statecraft.
It mirrors the export controls China has already used on metals like gallium and germanium.
A grip built over years
China’s control of these metals did not happen overnight, but through steady investment across the supply chain.
It now accounts for more than half of global production and an estimated 87% of processing and refining.
That means even minerals dug elsewhere often pass through Chinese plants before reaching world markets.
That chokehold on refining, more than mining itself, is the source of Beijing’s leverage.
Africa at the centre
Much of the upstream story runs through Africa, where Chinese firms have bought into mine after mine.
Recent deals include Botswana’s Khoemacau copper mine, Mali’s Goulamina lithium project and offtake and stake acquisition in Tanzania’s Ngualla rare earth project.
These assets feed the refineries back home that give Beijing its commanding position.
Chinese capital has also built the roads, ports and power lines that carry the ore to the coast.
For many African governments, that infrastructure has been the price of admission to global supply chains.
Why the metals matter
Copper, lithium and rare earths are the raw materials of the modern economy, from electric cars to smartphones.
They are also vital to defence systems, which is why governments treat them as a security issue, not just a commodity.
Control over their supply has become a front line in the rivalry between Washington and Beijing.
Whoever secures the metals shapes the next generation of industry and weapons alike.
The West plays catch-up
Alarmed by their dependence, the United States and Europe are racing to secure alternative sources.
Both have courted African governments directly, dangling investment and processing deals.
But they start far behind, with little of the refining capacity that China spent two decades building.
Building rival refineries takes years and billions, with no guarantee of competing on cost.
Africa’s own demands
African producers are no longer content to ship raw ore and watch the value added elsewhere.
Countries from Kenya to Congo are insisting that more processing happen on home soil.
The new law sharpens that debate, by reminding everyone how much leverage sits with whoever controls the refining.
Local processing promises jobs and tax revenue, but it needs reliable power and patient capital.
A double-edged dependence
For African producers, China is both the biggest customer and the biggest investor, a relationship that brings roads, mines and jobs.
It also leaves them exposed if Beijing decides to turn the taps, or if the great-power contest spills over.
Balancing the two giants without being squeezed by either is the diplomatic puzzle of the decade.
Some governments are hedging, signing with the West while keeping Chinese partners close.
The smartest may turn the contest itself into a bargaining chip.
What to watch
The first test is whether Beijing actually invokes its new powers, and against whom.
Watch, too, whether African governments win better terms by playing rival suitors off against one another.
The outcome will shape who profits from the metals beneath the continent’s soil.
For now, the balance of power still tilts toward the country that controls the refining.
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Frequently Asked Questions
What is China’s new minerals law?
It is a Mineral Resources Law that took force in 2026, giving Beijing a formal legal mechanism to restrict or retaliate over access to materials it deems strategically sensitive.
How dominant is China in critical minerals?
China controls more than half of global critical-minerals production and an estimated 87% of the world’s processing and refining capacity.
How is Africa involved?
Chinese firms own major African mines, including Botswana’s Khoemacau copper mine, Mali’s Goulamina lithium mine and Tanzania’s Ngualla rare earth mine, which feed Chinese refineries.
Why does this matter for the great-power contest?
Critical minerals are essential to batteries, electronics and defence systems, so control over their supply has become central to the rivalry between China and the West.
Connected Coverage
The struggle over these metals is the heart of our pillar coverage, Africa: The New Scramble. See also how Washington is betting on Congo’s minerals, and how Kenya is negotiating a minerals deal with the US on its own terms.
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