Morocco Faces 12.5% US Tariff Over Forced-Labour Import Rules
Africa · Northern
Key Facts
—The proposal. On 2 June 2026, the US Trade Representative proposed a 12.5% additional duty on most Moroccan goods under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
—The reason. Washington says Rabat fails to prohibit the import of goods made with forced labour, even though Morocco bans the practice domestically.
—Trade at stake. US imports from Morocco totalled roughly $1.9 billion in 2025, with textiles, auto components, phosphates and agrifoods most exposed.
—The timeline. Written comments are due by 6 July 2026, with public hearings the following day and a possible entry into force around 24 July 2026.
—The context. The measure is part of a sweeping US campaign covering 60 economies that account for roughly 99 percent of all American goods imports.
The United States has proposed a Morocco 12.5% US tariff on virtually all exports from the North African kingdom, not because Rabat uses forced labour at home but because it lacks a legal mechanism to block imports produced with it—a move that threatens to erode nearly two decades of preferential trade access and forces Moroccan businesses to navigate a new era of values-based conditionality.
What Washington actually proposed
On 2 June 2026, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) released a determination under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 finding that the practices of 60 economies regarding forced-labour import bans are “unreasonable” and burden American commerce. The agency proposed additional ad valorem duties on all products from these economies, splitting them into two tiers: a 10 percent surcharge for those with partial or committed import-ban regimes, and a steeper 12.5 percent for those without any effective prohibition.
Morocco falls squarely into the 12.5 percent cohort, alongside China, India, Japan, Brazil, South Africa, Nigeria and 40 other economies. The tariffs are not yet in force, but the procedural calendar is tight: written comments are due by 6 July, public hearings follow on 7 July, and USTR has signalled it aims to be ready to impose the duties around 24 July 2026.
Why Morocco is caught in the forced-labour net
The US legal framework has prohibited imports produced with forced labour for nearly a century, but enforcement has traditionally relied on product-specific Withhold Release Orders issued by Customs and Border Protection. The Trump administration is now extending the concept to country-level tariffs, arguing that economies without import-ban regimes grant their firms an artificial cost advantage by allowing cheaper, abuse-tainted goods into supply chains.
Morocco already prohibits forced labour domestically through Article 10 of its Labour Code and a 2016 anti-trafficking law that criminalises exploitation, servitude and slavery-like practices. What it lacks is a separate customs mechanism to investigate supply chains and block imported goods specifically because they were produced with forced labour—the precise gap USTR’s nearly 100-page report identifies as the problem.
The money at stake for Moroccan exporters
Under the US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement (USMFTA), in force since 2006, the kingdom has enjoyed preferential access to the world’s largest consumer market. In 2025, American imports from Morocco reached roughly $1.9 billion, while US exports to the kingdom stood at about $5.5 billion, giving Rabat a trade deficit with Washington but a valuable export platform nonetheless.
A 12.5 percent surcharge would sit on top of existing tariff rates, effectively eroding much of the USMFTA preference margin. A simple first-order estimate suggests the duty could add roughly $240 million a year in extra costs on Moroccan-origin goods, with textiles and apparel, automotive components, phosphates and chemicals, and agrifood products facing the most immediate pressure on price competitiveness.
A free-trade pact under siege
The proposed Section 301 action is not the first time the USMFTA has been tested. In April 2025, the Trump administration imposed a general 10 percent tariff on Moroccan imports, a move that contradicted Article 2.3 of the bilateral pact and signalled that unilateral trade tools could override treaty commitments.
That earlier global surcharge is now expiring, and the forced-labour tariffs are designed in part to replace it with country-specific duties under a different legal hook. For investors who banked on the stability of the USMFTA, the sequence illustrates a growing risk premium on relying solely on treaty-based preferences when Washington can deploy Section 301 to pursue labour, security and great-power objectives.
Africa in the great-power tariff crossfire
Morocco is one of seven African economies singled out in the 12.5 percent cohort, alongside Algeria, Angola, Egypt, Libya, Nigeria and South Africa. The sweep highlights a broader shift: African markets are no longer peripheral in US trade enforcement but are now integrated into a compliance regime that covers roughly 99 percent of all American goods imports.
This reordering coincides with the expiry of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) in September 2025, which removed long-standing duty-free preferences for many African exports. The combined effect is a double shock for African producers, who must now navigate both the loss of traditional preferential schemes and new conditionality tied to labour practices and supply-chain transparency—a dynamic we track closely in our pillar series Africa: The New Scramble.
The BRICS and South-South read-through
For readers in Latin America and other emerging markets, Morocco’s predicament carries familiar echoes. Brazil also appears in the 12.5 percent bracket, while Argentina, Mexico and several Southeast Asian economies landed in the 10 percent tier, creating a patchwork of tariff differentials that will reshape competitive dynamics across the Global South.
As the US tightens labour-based conditionality, China, the European Union and Gulf states are simultaneously deepening infrastructure, energy and manufacturing ties across Africa, often with fewer explicit labour-rights requirements. The forced-labour tariff regime thus functions as a geopolitical filter: governments that adopt US-style import bans can retain better American market access, while those that do not may lean more heavily on non-US partners, reinforcing the multipolar pattern of Africa’s external economic relations.
What Rabat can do next
To avoid or reduce the 12.5 percent tariff, Morocco would likely need to legislate an explicit customs-based prohibition on importing goods made with forced labour and establish investigative and enforcement mechanisms—for example, empowering customs officials to detain, block or seize suspicious shipments. Rabat could also engage USTR bilaterally, potentially under the existing USMFTA framework, to secure recognition of a new regime and a shift to the 10 percent bracket or a full exemption.
Moroccan business associations and exporters have a direct incentive to lobby for such reforms, given the immediate cost of the tariff and the competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis countries that have already adopted forced-labour import bans. The coming weeks will reveal whether Rabat opts for rapid legislative alignment, diplomatic negotiation, or a longer-term strategy of market diversification toward Europe, Africa and Asia.
Connected Coverage
Frequently Asked Questions
Why is Morocco facing a 12.5% US tariff if it already bans forced labour domestically?
Morocco prohibits forced labour within its borders through its Labour Code and a 2016 anti-trafficking law, but it lacks a customs mechanism to block the import of goods produced with forced labour elsewhere. The US Trade Representative determined that this gap constitutes an “unreasonable” practice that burdens American commerce, placing Morocco in the higher 12.5 percent tariff tier alongside 45 other economies without effective import-ban regimes.
Which Moroccan export sectors are most exposed to the proposed tariff?
Textiles and apparel, automotive components, phosphates and chemicals, and agrifood products are the sectors most likely to feel the impact, though some food items and raw materials may qualify for exemptions listed in Annex A of the USTR notice. With US imports from Morocco totalling roughly $1.9 billion in 2025, a full 12.5 percent surcharge could theoretically add around $240 million in extra annual duties, eroding the price advantage Moroccan exporters have enjoyed under the 2006 free-trade agreement.
Can Morocco negotiate its way out of the 12.5 percent tariff bracket?
Yes, the proposed duties are not yet final, and the procedural calendar allows for written comments until 6 July 2026 and public hearings on 7 July. Morocco could legislate an explicit forced-labour import ban with customs enforcement powers and then negotiate with USTR—potentially under the existing US-Morocco Free Trade Agreement framework—to secure reclassification into the 10 percent tier or obtain a full exemption before the tariffs take effect, likely around 24 July 2026.
Sources
Sources: Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR).
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