These are the countries on which Russia’s military investment in Latin America is focused

The Kremlin has long supported governments that the United States outlaws. An article by author Caroline C. Cowen in the National Interest describes how the governments of Nicolás Maduro and Daniel Ortega, which like all other countries, desperately need money and credit for their development and prosperity, are asking Russia and Cuba for military support.

Russia’s support in the region has been joined by China, which has played an essential role in lending, investing, and buying commodities over the past two decades.

Beijing provided Venezuela with US$62.2 billion in loans between 2007 and 2016. China’s financing has enabled Maduro to remain economically and politically stable enough to avoid a collapse that would have been equivalent to a full-blown social earthquake in Latin America.

Since 2005, Russia’s military cooperation with Venezuela has increased, while Moscow military officers visited Cuba and Nicaragua during times of tension with the West.

Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua defended the Kremlin’s actions during the 2008 Russian-Georgian war.

Then in 2014, the three countries and Russia voted against UN Resolution 68/262, which was proposed in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea.

Nicaragua, Cuba, and Venezuela signed secret military agreements with each other, creating a new regional security triangle. Their commitments to the inter-American security regime, including the Central American Regional Security Initiative, slipped naturaly into the background.

On the other hand, Russia and China provided their friends in Latin America with higher-quality military intelligence systems and equipment.

In 2019, the Wagner Group, a private military company that can deploy thousands of mercenaries, came to Venezuela to provide security for dictator Maduro.

In 2008, Cuba and Venezuela signed fifteen secret agreements to transform the military in Caracas. Three of these involved strengthening defense cooperation, developing and sharing intelligence, and providing technical assistance to the Venezuelan military.

The plan also included special training of Venezuelan troops in Cuba and the creation of a Cuban military unit in Venezuela.

Between 2010 and 2019, Russian state-owned companies pledged US$9 billion to the Venezuelan state oil company PDVSA to mitigate the impact of U.S. sanctions.

In addition, Hugo Chávez offered Russia the use of a Venezuelan military base on the Caribbean island of La Orchila. The Kremlin sold Venezuela billions of dollars in military equipment, including tanks, fighter jets, and small arms.

Caracas still owes Moscow at least US$10 billion for fighter jets it bought between 2009 and 2014. The two countries also reportedly set up a factory in Venezuela to produce Kalashnikov rifles.

In 2018, Russia sent two TU-160 bombers. When the Maduro regime was weakened in 2019, Putin provided S-300 systems to prevent U.S. military intervention.

In addition, the S-300s arrived with Russian “experts” who could provide security for Maduro, according to the National Interest.

The Ortega regime authorized the entry of Russian personnel, ships and aircraft into the Central American country from July 1 to Dec. 31, 2022, as well as participation in humanitarian and military exercises and operations in the Caribbean and Pacific.

Nicaragua has been one of Russia’s most important partners in the region since Ortega’s return in 2007. The Kremlin has supported the regime with Mi-17 helicopters, Yak-130 combat trainers, An-26 medium transport aircraft, TIGR tanks, T-72 tanks, and ZU-23 anti-aircraft guns, among other equipment.

Recently, the Nicaraguan regime announced that it will purchase a new supply of buses and wheat from Russia following the renewal of a cooperation agreement between the two countries.

It was also announced that the two countries are working on a new purchase of Russian wheat under an annual agreement that has been in place for several years.

“The National Interest” concludes that the shift to the left in Latin America gives Russia the opportunity to offer an alternative while limiting U.S. influence on bilateral security cooperation.