G7’s $64 Billion Minerals Push Gives Kenya and Africa New Leverage

Africa · Eastern

The G7’s $64 billion critical minerals push, launched at the Evian summit on 17 June 2026, has handed African producers a rare moment of leverage to demand local processing and higher-value participation in global supply chains.

What the G7 actually pledged at Evian

On the shores of Lake Geneva, G7 leaders adopted a dedicated declaration on securing supply chains for critical minerals that goes far beyond earlier communiqués. The document welcomes progress on 195 projects announced since the start of 2026, which together have reached €64 billion in investment, including equity participation and offtake agreements.

For the first time, the group set a numeric diversification target: dependence on any single supplier outside the G7 and partner countries for rare earths and permanent magnets must fall below 60 percent by 2030, with a longer-term ambition of 50 percent. The target is an unmistakable response to China, which controls roughly 70 percent of global rare-earth mining and about 90 percent of processing capacity.

The declaration also foresees strategic stockpiles, accelerated recycling, exploration of floor-price mechanisms, and an expanded role for the International Energy Agency in coordinating data and stockpiling. Policy analysts in European capitals argue this architecture could evolve into a formal G7 Critical Minerals Investment Fund, pooling capital to de-risk projects in the Global South while guaranteeing offtake to Western industries.

Africa’s mineral leverage enters a new phase

Africa holds roughly 30 percent of known global mineral reserves, including around 85 percent of the world’s manganese, 80 percent of platinum and chromium, and vast deposits of cobalt, copper, lithium, graphite and rare earths. The Democratic Republic of Congo alone produces about 70 percent of global cobalt, a metal essential to every electric-vehicle battery.

Demand projections turn these geological endowments into hard bargaining power. The International Energy Agency expects nickel demand to double, cobalt to triple, and lithium to increase tenfold by 2050, driven by batteries and low-carbon technologies.

This demand surge, combined with the G7’s urgent need to diversify away from China, has transformed the continent from a peripheral supplier into a strategic battleground for industrial supremacy.

African governments are responding with a coordinated shift toward resource nationalism. Governments from Namibia to Zimbabwe have imposed export controls and local-ownership rules, while continental bodies explore using the African Continental Free Trade Area to strengthen collective bargaining. As explored in our ongoing coverage of Africa: The New Scramble, this marks the first time in decades that African states enjoy genuine leverage over external powers competing for access.

Kenya bets on processing, not just extraction

On the sidelines of the Evian summit, Kenyan President William Ruto announced that Nairobi and Washington are close to sealing a critical minerals deal covering rare earths and other strategic minerals. His public message was unambiguous: “Kenya will no longer export raw materials. They must be processed inside the country.”

The proposed agreement would channel US and G7-linked investment into rare-earth separation plants, refining facilities, and associated power and transport infrastructure. Kenya’s mineral reserves are modest compared with giants such as South Africa or the DRC, but Nairobi’s ambition is to become East Africa’s processing hub, inserting itself into global supply chains at the refining and manufacturing stages rather than remaining a mere exporter of raw ore.

The strategy carries geopolitical risk. By deepening US military, digital and industrial footprints, Kenya risks being drawn further into US-China rivalry even as it publicly maintains a non-aligned posture.

Analysts at LSE and elsewhere warn that countries like Kenya must navigate offers from multiple external actors without undermining domestic sovereignty or regional stability.

The great-power contest behind the critical minerals push

The Evian declaration is the latest move in a long-running Western effort to reduce dependence on China, which controls about 60 percent of global critical mineral production and 85 percent of processing capacity. Beijing built this dominance over two decades through state-backed loans, infrastructure-for-resources deals, and long-term offtake agreements, especially in fragile states where Western capital was reluctant to venture.

Since Donald Trump’s return to office, US efforts to secure non-Chinese supply chains have intensified. In February 2026, Washington hosted dozens of countries to discuss a “strategic mineral alliance,” while the US National Security Strategy of December 2025 explicitly frames Africa as an arena of competition with China over critical minerals supply chains.

The G7 is trying to frame its intervention as a partnership for diversification and local value creation, marketing initiatives such as the EU’s Global Gateway as pathways for African states to develop their own processing capacities and sell higher-value products back to Europe. Yet the underlying priority remains Western supply security and industrial competitiveness, and African policymakers are increasingly aware that they hold cards worth playing carefully.

What the critical minerals push means for investors and frontier markets

For international investors and professionals watching African markets, the G7 pledge signals a structural shift in how mineral projects will be financed and structured. The combination of G7 offtake guarantees, blended finance, and political risk insurance could unlock projects that have languished for years due to capital scarcity and perceived jurisdictional risk.

The 195 projects span rare earths, lithium, nickel and graphite, with African producers including the DRC, Zambia, Namibia, Nigeria and Tanzania all identified as key protagonists. West Africa is already seeing a rare-earth processing plant take shape outside direct G7 financing, illustrating that African governments are sourcing capital from multiple partners, including China, Gulf states and private investors.

For Latin American readers, the parallels with South America’s own lithium triangle are instructive. Both regions face the same question: whether the current scramble produces genuine industrialisation and diversified economies, or simply a more complicated version of old extractive patterns under a more intense geo-technological rivalry.

The real test: industrialisation or new dependency

Think tanks such as Afripoli describe critical raw materials as a new “currency of power” in a multipolar world, influencing national defence capabilities, technological dominance and economic statecraft. Control over these materials shapes everything from missile systems and radars to semiconductors and AI hardware.

Yet access to capital remains the core bottleneck for African processing and industrialisation. Most projects still depend on Northern capital and technology, reinforcing dependencies even as rhetoric emphasises partnership.

Civil-society organisations stress that intensified mining can exacerbate environmental damage, land conflicts and governance failures if regulations remain weak.

The coming months will test whether the €64 billion pledge translates into processing plants, power lines and skilled jobs on African soil, or whether the familiar pattern of raw-material extraction reasserts itself under new branding. For Kenya, the DRC, Zambia and others, the window of leverage is real but may not stay open indefinitely.

Frequently Asked Questions

What is the G7’s $64 billion critical minerals push?

It is a coordinated investment initiative adopted at the Evian summit on 17 June 2026, covering 195 projects across rare earths, lithium, nickel and graphite. The €64 billion (about $69 billion) figure includes equity participation and offtake agreements designed to diversify Western supply chains away from China while offering African producers investment in local processing capacity.

How does the Kenya-US critical minerals deal change the game?

President William Ruto announced that the near-final agreement requires Kenya to process its rare earths and other strategic minerals domestically rather than exporting raw ore. The deal positions Kenya as East Africa’s processing hub and signals a broader continental shift toward demanding local value addition, though it also deepens Kenya’s entanglement in US-China rivalry.

Why are critical minerals so important in the US-China rivalry?

Critical minerals underpin defence systems, electric vehicles, semiconductors and AI hardware. China currently controls about 60 percent of global production and 85 percent of processing capacity, giving it enormous leverage over Western industrial and military supply chains. The G7’s diversification targets aim to reduce that dependence, turning African mineral reserves into a strategic battleground.

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