DRC Tightens Grip on Cobalt and Copper Exports Amid Great-Power Rivalry

Africa · Central

The Democratic Republic of Congo has replaced its four-month cobalt export ban with a strict quota system that slashes permitted cobalt and copper exports to less than half of recent output, a move designed to force China and Western powers to negotiate mineral access on Kinshasa’s terms.

From Blanket Ban to Calibrated Quotas

In February 2025, the DRC’s Strategic Mineral Substances Market Regulation and Control Authority, known as ARECOMS, stunned global markets by announcing a four-month suspension of cobalt exports without prior notice. The ban was a direct response to what Kinshasa called an “overabundance of supply on the international market” that had sent prices into a tailspin, hammering government revenues in a country where mineral exports account for more than 95 percent of export earnings.

On 16 October 2025, the government lifted the suspension and replaced it with a far more sophisticated instrument: binding export quotas. For the final quarter of 2025, the ceiling was set at 18,125 metric tons of cobalt, while annual quotas for 2026 and 2027 were fixed at 96,600 tons—less than half the volume the DRC shipped in 2024, when it supplied roughly 70 percent of the world’s cobalt.

A joint circular issued on 26 November 2025 by the ministries of mines and finance added sharp enforcement teeth. Exporters must now obtain a Quota Certificate from the regulator, submit to joint sampling, weighing and sealing of every shipment, and pre-pay a 10 percent royalty on quota volumes within 48 hours of filing origin and sales declarations.

The China Factor: Ownership, Refining and Leverage

No conversation about cobalt and copper exports from the DRC can begin without acknowledging China’s extraordinary dominance. According to the U.S. Army War College, Chinese state-owned enterprises and policy banks control roughly 80 percent of the DRC’s cobalt output, while a U.S. National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency report puts Chinese ownership at about 72 percent of the country’s cobalt and copper mines.

Of the ten largest cobalt mines globally, nine sit in the DRC’s Katanga region, and five are owned by Chinese companies. Major players include China Molybdenum, which operates the vast Tenke Fungurume complex, and Huayou Cobalt, active through Congo Dongfang Mining International. Downstream, Chinese refineries account for between 60 and 90 percent of global refined cobalt supply, with roughly two-thirds of that feedstock coming directly from Congolese mines.

This vertical integration—from pit to processing plant—was built over two decades through the Belt and Road Initiative, anchored by the 2007 Sicomines resource-for-infrastructure deal. That agreement pledged US$3 billion in Chinese infrastructure in exchange for mining rights near Kolwezi valued at roughly US$93 billion, a lopsided bargain that President Félix Tshisekedi renegotiated in January 2023 to secure a new commitment of about US$7 billion for infrastructure, though without increasing Congolese ownership stakes.

Western Powers Scramble for a Foothold

Washington and Brussels have watched China’s lock on Congolese minerals with growing alarm, framing access to cobalt and copper as both a climate-security and military-technology priority. In a late-February interview, President Tshisekedi signalled a clear willingness to grant American and European firms access to mining resources—especially cobalt and coltan—in exchange for peace and security support in the country’s conflict-ridden east, where M23 rebels backed by Rwanda seized the major city of Goma in early 2023.

Kinshasa has since presented Washington with a short list of high-value state-owned mining assets—spanning cobalt, copper, manganese, lithium and gold—that are not locked into long-term contracts and are available for new partners. This overture fits squarely within the dynamics explored in our pillar series Africa: The New Scramble, where mineral wealth doubles as geopolitical currency.

On the logistics front, the U.S. and European Union are backing the revitalisation of the Lobito Corridor, a rail line that would connect mines in southern DRC and northern Zambia to Angola’s Atlantic port of Lobito. The corridor promises a westward export route for cobalt and copper that is less dependent on Chinese-controlled infrastructure, though analysts caution it does not alter the fundamental reality that China still owns the vast majority of Congolese output.

Mineral Sovereignty and the Domestic Processing Push

The quota regime is not merely a price-management tool; it is the continent’s most ambitious assertion of mineral sovereignty in decades. A 10 percent “strategic quota” carve-out has been reserved for companies that invest in local processing facilities, a clear policy signal that Kinshasa wants to move beyond exporting raw ore and toward value-added domestic refining that creates jobs and builds industrial capacity.

This approach echoes lithium export restrictions in Zimbabwe and Namibia and raw-mineral bans elsewhere in Africa, but the DRC’s scale gives it unique weight. With over 60 percent of global cobalt supply and status as the world’s third-largest copper producer, Kinshasa is betting that controlling the spigot will force downstream refiners and original equipment manufacturers—largely in China, but increasingly in the West—to negotiate on terms more favourable to the host nation.

The copper sector, while not yet subject to the same export quotas, is under active review. The same regulatory authorities are examining longer-term measures—tariffs, quotas or extended bans—for copper, coltan and lithium, suggesting a widening effort to centralise state control across the entire mining sector.

What the Quota Regime Means for Markets and Supply Chains

For global battery and electric-vehicle supply chains, the new rules introduce a sharp increase in political and regulatory risk. Exporters who fail to ship their full quota allocation, or who breach tax, environmental, social and governance (ESG) or traceability conditions, risk losing future allocations or facing permanent bans, raising compliance costs across the board.

Chinese firms, structurally exposed but often able to absorb short-term losses to preserve long-term strategic control, face a different calculus than Western companies. The latter have small direct mining footprints in the DRC but significant downstream exposure via battery manufacturers and automakers, and they are simultaneously pursuing diversification in Indonesia and Australia while cautiously expanding partnerships in Congo.

The quotas also aim to correct a price collapse exacerbated by new Indonesian cobalt production, which compounded the oversupply that Kinshasa blames for depressed government revenues. By restricting volumes well below recent output levels, the DRC hopes to support prices and recapture rents lost during the period of Chinese-driven overproduction, though the effectiveness of this strategy will depend on enforcement and on whether other producers fill the gap.

The Geopolitical Chessboard and What to Watch Next

The DRC’s tightening grip on cobalt and copper exports is not simply a commodity story; it is a deliberate attempt to convert geological advantage into geopolitical leverage. President Tshisekedi is actively playing both sides, using export controls and offers of access as bargaining chips to secure not only investment but also security assistance and political support from competing great powers.

For Latin American readers, the parallels are instructive. Brazil, Chile and Argentina hold vast reserves of lithium, copper and rare earths that are equally central to the clean-energy transition, and the DRC’s experiment with quotas and strategic carve-outs may offer a template—or a cautionary tale—for resource-rich nations seeking to move up the value chain.

The key variables to watch in the coming months include whether the quota volumes prove sufficient to lift cobalt prices, how Chinese companies adjust their export and investment strategies, and whether Western governments convert their diplomatic overtures into concrete mining deals and security commitments. The answer will shape not only Congo’s fiscal future but the balance of power in critical mineral supply chains for years to come.

More: DR Congo news in English, every day from The Rio Times.

Frequently Asked Questions

Why did the DRC ban cobalt exports in 2025?

The DRC imposed a four-month cobalt export ban in February 2025 to address an oversupply on the international market that had caused prices to collapse, severely reducing government revenues. The ban was lifted in October 2025 and replaced with a strict quota system designed to manage supply and support prices over the long term.

How much of the DRC’s cobalt does China control?

Chinese state-owned enterprises and policy banks control roughly 80 percent of the DRC’s cobalt output, according to the U.S. Army War College. Chinese companies own five of the ten largest cobalt mines globally—all located in the DRC—and Chinese refineries account for between 60 and 90 percent of global refined cobalt supply.

What are the new cobalt export quotas for 2026?

The DRC has set annual cobalt export quotas at 96,600 metric tons for both 2026 and 2027, which is less than half of the country’s 2024 output. Exporters must obtain a Quota Certificate, pre-pay a 10 percent royalty within 48 hours of filing declarations, and submit to multi-agency physical inspections before customs clearance.