Chile, 2023: an unpopular government, another Constituent Assembly and economic crisis

A new year begins, and the Government of President Boric has only been in the Executive for ten months.

However, the Chilean president began January with 70% disapproval, the highest that a president has had in his first year in office.

This is explained by the policies and initiatives promoted by the Government itself: tax and pension reforms, pardons for the so-called “political prisoners”, and a total abandonment of duties in terms of public security, while Chile embarks on a new constituent process.

All in all, these guidelines will continue during 2023, a year that is feared will be characterized by a weak economy, while risk and uncertainty scenarios are opening up.

On the last business day of 2022, President Gabriel Boric announced the pardon of thirteen convicted in the context of the riots of 18-O.

The criminal record of these subjects was quickly released, of which eleven of them already had convictions prior to the 2019 revolts, and among all of them there are 52 previous arrests.

The most controversial cases are the insurgents Jorge Mateluna —who was a member of the terrorist group FPMR— and Luis Castillo Opazo —who maintained after his pardon that “insurgents do not calm down, insurgents do not rest, insurgents give their lives for the cause. You have to stand firm and fight for the strength of history.”

Although the controversy continues, given that the government spokesperson, Camila Vallejo, argued last week that there were “improperties” in the pardons by the presidency, for the different authorities this was part of their agenda, since that both Vallejo, Boric and Giorgio Jackson have indicated that pardons were a goal, demonstrating that the imprint of Democrat is only a disguise, and that the Broad Front-Communist Party government will continue to validate violence, especially in a year that It is the 50th anniversary of the 1973 Military Declaration.

In fact, the Government is already preparing what the story on the commemoration of September 11, 1973, will be for this year: install historical memory.

This is complex, because historiography, rather than approaching concrete facts, seeks to give an interpretation to historical events, opening the possibility of dubious readings and, therefore, of manipulation of the past.

Likewise, the Government seeks to push six points in the speech on the fifty years of September 11: “democracy is deepened with human rights, democracy is strengthened with intergenerational dialogue, democracy recognizes and works with citizens at a territorial and internationally, democracy is founded on a State that guarantees economic, social and cultural rights”.

All of the above must have a feminist and gender approach using pluralistic language.

But the curious thing about it is that “democracy” is talked about incessantly, a euphemism that if read in a post-Marxist key is quickly revealed.

As Ernesto Laclau and Chantall Mouffe maintain in numerous writings, the strategy of the new left should not be the dictatorship of the proletariat, obsolete for this Marxist branch, but the path should be to deepen democracy, which, in other words, means what what they call “Democratic Revolution” or “radicalization of democracy”.

This implies appealing to a horizontalized democracy, of assemblies and councils —as was the Constitutional Convention—, which understands politics as the space where there are agonistic negotiations and tensions, opening spaces for “pluralism” to reach a “populist moment”.

And there is still a risk in it, since on Wednesday, the Chilean Congress dispatched the reform law to promote the constituent process 2.0.

Thus, a new constituent moment opens. Although there is a framework of twelve constitutional bases that the new body —called the ‘Constitutional Council’— is supposed to respect, nothing bodes well for the success of this process, which considers parity and reserved seats for indigenous people in its members.

However, the dates of the constituent process have already been established:

• On February 6, the candidacies for directors are declared;
• On March 6 the Expert Commission (24 members) and the Technical Admissibility Committee (12 people) are installed;
• On May 7 there are elections for the constitutional councilors (50 seats);
• On June 7 the Constitutional Council is installed;
• On December 17, the exit plebiscite will be held in which Chileans will be asked, once again, if they want the Constitution proposal.

On the other hand, the economic aspect does not bode well for projections.

According to the World Bank, the Latin American region will grow an average of 1.3% in 2023, within the framework of an inauspicious year due to slow growth in the United States and China.

However, Chile together with Haiti are the only countries in the region that not only will not present growth, but will decrease in 2023.

This is a bad sign especially since the Chilean government led by the Frente Amplista Gabriel Boric is promoting tax reforms —which does not seek economic growth or an increase in wealth, quite the contrary— and pensions, which do not help to overcome this situation —which, under euphemisms of a “mixed system”, is installed in practice as a pay-as-you-go system.

In other words, the economic projections for Chile are not good.

Although, so far this year, the Chilean peso has been the second currency that has risen the most, the Central Bank of Chile forecasts that economic activity will contract by 2.5% in the first quarter, and would fall by 1.5 % throughout 2023.

In fact, there are experts who maintain that inflation will increase to 5% instead of the 3.6% projected by the Central Bank.

As is evident, it is expected that the year 2023 for Chile will be moved again in electoral matters, with elections of constitutional councilors and an exit plebiscite.

Likewise, in political matters, initiatives are being promoted that aim to dismantle the institutional pillars with tax and pension reforms.

The foregoing undoubtedly opens up scenarios of risk and uncertainty for Chileans, while public security problems —the greatest concern of Chileans at this time according to the CEP survey— is not a priority to be solved for the Government.

In addition, with the fulfillment of the 50 years of the Military Pronouncement that managed to save Chile from falling under the Marxist-Leninist yoke promoted by Salvador Allende, the official speeches that emanated from the Government point to a dispute over historical memory, for which reason It is possible to anticipate that the polarization in Chilean society will not diminish.

In short, 2023 is far from being an auspicious year for Chile.

It is possible that polarized discourses will increase, while the economic slowdown already directly affects the lives of Chileans, as well as public security problems.

In turn, the initiatives of the Government deepen instability and uncertainty even more, which intensifies with the constituent process since nothing is certain with it.

With information from LGI