The ‘Third World War’ Narrative: Why a Russian Thinker and NATO Are Talking Past One Another
(Analysis) Russian strategist Dmitry Trenin once made a career persuading Western audiences that Moscow could be a partner in a rules‑based order.
His latest essay for the Russian International Affairs Council—titled “The Era of Wars: World War III Has Already Begun, But Not Everyone Realises It”—declares that rapprochement is finished and that a multi‑front global conflict is already under way. ¹
At almost the same moment, NATO leaders in The Hague pledged to raise defence spending to 5 percent of GDP by 2035, celebrating the move as a bulwark against Russian aggression. ²
The symmetry is striking: each side takes the same facts—drone strikes, proxy wars, sanctions—and weaves them into incompatible stories about who is escalating and who is merely defending.
From bridge‑builder to doomsayer
Trenin’s essay traces the moment “pre‑war normality” ended: Crimea 2014 for Russia, the U.S.‑China trade war in 2017 for Beijing, and Iran’s rolling clashes with Israel and the West in 2023.
From there, he argues, the world slipped into “an undeclared but active world war” fought through two hot fronts—Eastern Europe and the Middle East—and a third looming in East Asia.
He cites the 1 June 2025 drone raid on Russia’s Engels bomber base and Israel’s July strikes on Quds officers as proof that “rules of engagement are gone.” ¹
The West, in Trenin’s telling, is not balancing power but seeking to destroy rivals outright. Economic blockades, technology bans, the targeting of scientists and generals: all are framed as evidence of “de‑humanisation” that removes moral restraints.
Compromise, he writes, is illusory; only fear—chiefly Russia’s nuclear deterrent—can keep an existential enemy at bay. ¹
NATO’s answer: deterrence with a price tag
If Trenin paints a world sliding into total war, NATO frames 2025 as a test of resolve that can still be managed by conventional means.
The The Hague Summit Declaration obliges the alliance to spend 3.5 percent of GDP on core military capabilities and another 1.5 percent on cyber resilience and infrastructure, all by 2035.²
U.S. President Donald Trump called the pledge “a big win for Western civilisation,” coupling it with Patriot missile batteries for Kyiv and a threat of 100 percent tariffs on Russian oil buyers unless peace talks advance within 50 days. ³
Yet the numbers are staggering. According to Reuters Breakingviews, matching the pledge would cost EU and UK taxpayers €660 billion in new annual outlays—money that ratings agency S&P says many states cannot raise without either higher taxes or cuts to social programmes. ⁴
Germany would have to more than double its current defence budget; Spain has already negotiated an opt‑out, labelling the target “unreasonable and counter‑productive.” ⁵
Even defence hawks are uneasy. “Five percent would be just crazy for Europeans,” says Liana Fix of the Council on Foreign Relations, noting that the pledge bundles hard‑to‑audit categories such as infrastructure and energy security “to make the maths look gentler.” ⁶
Former NATO assistant secretary‑general Camille Grand warns that without review clauses “targets risk being met on paper while real capabilities still lag.” ⁷

Escalation risk: two readings of the same events
Where Trenin sees Western‑backed drone strikes on Russian airfields as an unambiguous step toward nuclear brinkmanship, NATO officials argue they are legitimate extensions of Ukraine’s right to self‑defence.
The problem, says Julianne Smith, the U.S. ambassador to the alliance, is “signal clarity”: “When every theatre is connected digitally, the chance of a tactical raid being misread as strategic intent goes through the roof.” ⁸
Economic deterrence is equally contested. The new 5 percent goal, combined with Trump’s tariff threats, reinforces Moscow’s conviction that the West is bent on strangling its economy, a view that feeds Kremlin hard‑liners and makes de‑escalatory gestures politically toxic.
Meanwhile, European treasuries groan under the cost of dual objectives—arming Ukraine and rebuilding their own forces.
Breakingviews calculates that every euro of extra military spending now delivers less than a euro of GDP growth, giving populists fresh ammunition against “wars of choice.” ⁴
Hybrid war or world war
Is Trenin right that a world war has “already begun”? Trade, cross‑border investment and air travel have not collapsed as they did in 1914 or 1939; at $68 per barrel, oil remains both affordable and readily available.
The great‑power hotlines that survived the Cold War still function. Yet the psychological frame has shifted. By describing today’s mêlée as a world war, Moscow prepares its public for sacrifices and justifies unconventional retaliation.
By describing the same turmoil as deterrence, NATO reassures voters that extraordinary spending is precautionary, not provocative.
Those stories are hardening just as technological ambiguity—AI‑enabled drones, autonomous cyber‑weapons—reduces warning time to minutes.
The Engels raid that alarms Moscow was carried out with Ukrainian‑adapted drones costing under $200,000, aimed at aircraft worth billions. Such asymmetries tempt weaker actors to strike first and dare the stronger side to escalate.

Ways off the ladder
A handful of measures could curb the spiral without rewarding aggression.
Firewall the signalling channels. A NATO–Russia deconfliction forum covering space, cyber and strategic bomber patrols would separate nuclear tripwires from battlefield aid.
Stress‑test the 5 percent promise in daylight. Publishing country‑by‑country road‑maps and independent audits would force politicians to justify each euro and protect social budgets.
Use third‑party mediation early. Turkey, Brazil or South Africa could host talks on drone‑range limits or maritime de‑escalation, building on the Black Sea grain precedent.
Police the rhetoric. Kremlin talk of “sub‑humans” and Western references to “crushing” Russia nurture mirror‑image paranoias; leaders should keep adjectives to facts they can document.
The upshot
Trenin is right that the world is already fighting on multiple fronts at once—and that those fronts are intellectually, digitally and financially linked.
Where he over‑reads is in declaring that the line into total war has already been crossed. For now, the conflict remains a messy hybrid of proxy combat, sanctions and information warfare.
Whether it stays there depends less on military balance sheets than on narrative discipline: when each side frames escalation as the other’s default mode, the room for error narrows to zero.
World War III is not inevitable; but describing today’s crisis as if it has already begun is one reliable way to make it so.
Sources
- Trenin, “Эпоха войн…”, RIAC, 14 Jul 2025. ([russiancouncil.ru][1])
- NATO Summit Declaration, The Hague, 25 Jun 2025. ([NATO][2])
- Trump weapons pledge and tariff threat, Reuters, 14 Jul 2025. ([Reuters][3])
- Breakingviews on fiscal multipliers, 15 Jul 2025. ([Reuters][4])
- Spain opt‑out details, Reuters, 22 Jun 2025. ([Reuters][5])
- Fortune interview with Liana Fix, 25 Jun 2025. ([Fortune][6])
- ECFR podcast with Camille Grand, 25 Jun 2025. ([ECFR][7])
- CNAS summit preview featuring Julianne Smith, 24 Jun 2025. ([cnas.org][8])
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