The Deadlock of Global Governance: How China and Russia Are Reshaping International Institutions
(Op-Ed Analysis) In June 2025, as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) grappled with the Israel-Iran crisis, a familiar scene unfolded: paralysis.
China and Russia signaled vetoes to shield Tehran’s nuclear ambitions, while the United States stood ready to block censure of Israel’s strikes.
This deadlock is no anomaly but a symptom of a deeper crisis: China and Russia’s growing influence is eroding global institutions—the UN, World Health Organization (WHO), and World Bank—crippling their ability to tackle critical challenges like Iran’s nuclear program.
Western democracies must urgently reform these bodies, lest authoritarian powers reshape the international order in their image.
The Veto Trap: Obstructing Collective Security
The UNSC’s veto mechanism, designed to balance great-power interests, has become a tool for geopolitical obstruction.
Since 2007, China and Russia have jointly vetoed 23 resolutions, including 10 on Syria and three shielding Iran’s nuclear advances. The U.S., with 49 Israel-related vetoes since 1970, shares blame for this systemic paralysis.
In June 2025, three draft resolutions—led by the U.S., Algeria, and Europe—failed amid mutual veto threats, forcing Israel and the U.S. to act unilaterally against Iran’s weapons-grade uranium enrichment. This cycle undermines the UNSC’s legitimacy, leaving collective security in tatters.
China and Russia’s coordination extends beyond vetoes. Through forums like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, they promote a state-centric vision prioritizing sovereignty over accountability, aligning with allies like Iran and North Korea.
The Lowy Institute’s 2022 report notes China’s “shared future” doctrine has swayed nations like Pakistan and Syria, diluting UN action on crises.
WHO: Funding Power and Policy Sway
China’s growing financial contributions to the World Health Organization (WHO) have raised concerns about donor influence over global health governance.
Between 2014 and 2019, China’s assessed and voluntary contributions increased by 52%, reaching approximately $86 million annually.
In May 2025, Beijing pledged an additional $500 million over five years, positioning itself to potentially surpass the United States as the largest state contributor.
However, the WHO’s budget structure complicates its independence. Approximately 84% of its core budget is earmarked for specific projects, limiting flexibility and amplifying donor influence.
The WHO’s early response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including praise for China’s handling and delays in declaring a Public Health Emergency of International Concern, sowed doubts about Beijing’s sway over the agency’s messaging and decision-making.
The U.S.’s 2025 withdrawal left a $600 million gap, which China is filling, further tilting the WHO’s priorities.
World Bank: China’s Lending Shadow
China’s financial footprint in global development has expanded dramatically. While still borrowing from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), China offers parallel financing through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank.
Between 2000 and 2022, Chinese lenders committed roughly $170 billion to Africa, with Angola alone receiving $64.8 billion.
Chinese loans often carry commodity-backed terms and can outstrip World Bank concessional rates, complicating debt-relief negotiations.
The World Bank’s 2025 update notes that Chinese bilateral flows have eclipsed its own lending in much of Africa, diluting the Bank’s policy leverage.
Beijing’s opaque terms prioritize geopolitical leverage over transparency, leaving Global South nations caught between competing powers.
Case Study: The Israel-Iran Crisis of 2025
The UNSC’s paralysis during the June 2025 Israel-Iran escalation forced unilateral action. China and Russia’s veto threats blocked action against Iran’s nuclear advances, while the U.S. shielded Israel from censure.
This deadlock, rooted in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action’s failures—where China and Russia enabled Iran’s evasions—highlights how institutional gridlock emboldens rogue actors, risking wider conflict.
Reforming Global Institutions: A Path Forward
Western democracies must lead reforms to restore institutional credibility, engaging the Global South to counterbalance authoritarian influence. Proposed measures include:
| Reform Area | Proposed Action | Challenges |
|---|---|---|
| UNSC Reform | Limit vetoes to require two P5 members’ concurrence | P5 resistance; Charter amendment hurdles |
| WHO Transparency | Cap single-donor contributions at 15%; establish independent review boards | Risk of alienating donors; implementation complexity |
| World Bank Leverage | Blend concessional loans with private capital to rival China’s terms | Requires G20 coordination; debt disclosure issues |
| Alternative Forums | Strengthen G7 coalitions for issue-specific action (e.g., cybersecurity) | Consensus challenges among democracies |
The CEPA’s 2025 report underscores Russia’s opposition to UN reform, as seen in its veto of the 2024 Pact for the Future.
WHO reforms could reduce reliance on earmarked funds, while World Bank co-financing could counter China’s lending dominance.
Conclusion: Reclaiming the Global Order
The paralysis of global institutions is not solely China and Russia’s doing—Western vetoes and donor capture share the blame.
Yet, Beijing and Moscow’s coordinated obstruction, from Syria to Iran, exploits these flaws, hollowing out multilateralism.
The Global South, wooed by China’s loans and Russia’s rhetoric, is pivotal to reform but risks being sidelined without inclusive dialogue.
Western powers must confront their own shortcomings, rally coalitions, and invest in transparent, equitable governance.
Without swift action, the foundations of the rules-based order will crumble, leaving a world shaped by authoritarian will. The time to reclaim global governance is now.
Editorial responsibility: Matthias Camenzind, Editor-in-Chief · Editorial standards · Report an error
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