Supreme Court Under Strain As Brazil’s Politics Turns Judges Into Protagonists

Key Points

1. Brazil’s Supreme Court has become increasingly personalized, with individual ministers’ decisions carrying outsized political and market impact.
2. A new controversy tied to a high-profile banking dispute is intensifying doubts about self-restraint, while Congress and the Senate remain hesitant watchdogs.
3. With public trust fragmented, the 2026 election is shaping up as an informal referendum on the Court’s recent role.

Brazil’s Supreme Federal Court (STF) is facing a legitimacy test that is less about any single ruling than about how the institution now functions: as a stage where individual ministers can appear to outweigh the Court itself.

The “personalization” trend is often traced to the Mensalão corruption trial, when sharp exchanges between justices became daily television drama on TV Justiça. That period still revolved around a defined legal episode. Yet our reporting has shown that the decisive rupture came later: between 1988 and 2004 the Court issued just 36 decisions affecting congressional tenures, but from 2005 onward that number exploded to approximately 636—a 1600% increase that transformed the STF from an arbiter into a protagonist in legislative affairs.

A later milestone came after Justice Teori Zavascki’s death, when the country held its breath as the Lava Jato case was reassigned by the Court. Once again, an institutional outcome seemed to hinge on a single name, even if within formal procedure.

Today the dispute has moved beyond optics. Critics argue that ministers who “personify” the STF have used vast, hard-to-check powers in ways that intersect with a financial scandal whose full scale remains unclear.

This has left the impression that institutional force is being deployed for reasons other than safeguarding rules and democratic stability. The deeper risk, in this reading, is that the norm itself begins to look contingent on personalities.

That critique has gained traction as the Court’s own numbers tilt toward individual action: by the end of 2025, a large majority of STF decisions were reported as monocratic, reinforcing the perception that collegiality is weakening.

In parallel, Congress has kept alive proposals aimed at limiting single-justice decisions—evidence that political actors across the spectrum sense an imbalance, even if agreement on remedies is elusive.

The immediate flashpoint is a proceeding tied to Banco Master. Justice Dias Toffoli scheduled a videoconference confrontation for December 30 involving controller Daniel Vorcaro, former BRB president Paulo Henrique Costa, and Banco Central director Ailton de Aquino.

Even after the Prosecutor General’s Office urged a step back, Toffoli maintained the hearing, underlining how difficult internal “self-control” can be.

Sociologists and jurists have long described Brazil’s “supremocracy.” Now the political system is living it. With opinion more openly skeptical and dozens of impeachment petitions against ministers stuck in the Senate, expectations of external oversight are low.

That is why 2026 is increasingly framed as a plebiscite on the STF’s trajectory—and on whether Brazil has any route back to a Court that feels less like a collection of powerful individuals and more like a stable constitutional anchor. The stakes were sharpened in May 2026, when Supreme Court justices pulled pre-candidate disputes away from the country’s separate election tribunal, the TSE, weeks before two Bolsonaro-appointed justices were set to take command of that body—a move critics say further concentrates electoral oversight in a court already accused of overreach.