Congo Praises US Partnership as Critical Minerals Race Intensifies
Africa · Central
Key Facts
—Strategic Partner. The US–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in December 2025 designates the DRC a “strategic partner” of the United States.
—Cobalt Dominance. The DRC holds more than 70% of global cobalt reserves and produces roughly 70–80% of the world’s supply, essential for EV batteries and defence systems.
—Copper Output. The country produced approximately 3.3 million metric tons of copper in 2024, making it the world’s third-largest producer.
—Chinese Footprint. Chinese firms control roughly 80% of the DRC’s cobalt output and had a stake in 15 of 19 cobalt mines by 2022, built through years of infrastructure-for-resources deals.
—Project Pipeline. In early 2026 Kinshasa sent Washington a shortlist of 44 state-linked mining and hydrocarbon projects open to US investment, signalling its bargaining power in the great-power contest.
The Democratic Republic of Congo is publicly deepening its embrace of Washington as both capitals seek to reshape the critical minerals race, yet Kinshasa continues to hedge by signing fresh cooperation agreements with Beijing even after its landmark December 2025 Strategic Partnership Agreement with the United States.
A minerals-for-security bargain takes shape
In late February 2025, President Félix Tshisekedi told The New York Times he was prepared to grant American and European companies access to Congolese mining resources in exchange for peace and security in the country’s conflict-ridden east. The offer crystallised a “minerals-for-security” concept that had been circulating in diplomatic channels for months, linking access to cobalt, copper and lithium directly to US security assistance and diplomatic leverage against Rwandan-backed M23 rebels.
By March 2025, Reuters confirmed that formal negotiations were underway on a US–DRC strategic minerals partnership, with Congolese officials aiming to finalise a deal by summer. The talks combined mineral access with infrastructure development and economic cooperation, marking a sharp departure from Washington’s historical under-investment in commercial diplomacy across Central Africa.
The December 2025 Strategic Partnership Agreement
In December 2025, the DRC, United States and Rwanda signed three agreements that officials described as a milestone for peace and economic integration in the Great Lakes region. At the centre sits a far-reaching US–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement that declares the DRC a “strategic partner” of the United States and establishes a Strategic Asset Reserve designating priority mining zones for joint development.
Under the SPA, American companies receive preferential treatment in Strategic Asset Reserve projects, giving them priority access to some of the world’s richest cobalt, copper and lithium deposits. The agreement explicitly aims to secure long-term US access to critical minerals and block further Chinese expansion in the DRC’s mineral sector, aligning extraction and infrastructure projects with American industrial priorities in defence, clean energy and electric-vehicle batteries.
The security component is equally significant: Washington trades support for stability in eastern Congo for access to mining opportunities, a linkage that has drawn sharp scrutiny from civil-society groups and analysts who warn of “contested sovereignty.” A Public Citizen analysis published after the signing argues the SPA fundamentally reshapes who controls access to Congolese minerals and on whose terms, with key assets locked into long-term strategic arrangements that may prioritise geopolitics over transparency and community rights.
Washington’s wider push to rewire supply chains
In February 2026, Secretary of State Marco Rubio presided over the first Critical Minerals Ministerial in Washington, gathering representatives from 50 nations including the DRC to accelerate diversification away from Chinese-dominated supply chains. The same month, a US-hosted minerals summit sealed deals with several mineral-rich African countries, with Congo positioned as the flagship test case for whether American commercial diplomacy can challenge Beijing’s entrenched lead.
Washington’s toolkit includes offtake agreements, government-backed financing, and partnerships with trading houses such as Mercuria and state miner Gécamines. American-backed firms like Virtus Minerals, which operates two cobalt-copper mines in the DRC, and KoBold Metals—backed by investors including Jeff Bezos—have become standard-bearers for the strategy, with KoBold signing a preliminary exploration agreement on the Manono lithium deposit amid a legal dispute with Australia’s AVZ Minerals.
Yet a March 2026 Reuters investigation found that Washington is struggling to de-risk Congo’s war-zone minerals even after the December pact, as ongoing conflict, disputed licences and demanding compliance requirements deter large operators from entering high-risk areas directly. The US has instead favoured offtake and trading-based frameworks that push risk onto intermediaries and local partners, a pattern that echoes broader challenges documented in our Africa: The New Scramble coverage of great-power competition over the continent’s resources.
Beijing’s enduring lead and counter-moves
China built its position over more than 15 years through infrastructure-for-resources packages, most notably the landmark 2007 deal that pledged roughly $3 billion in infrastructure in exchange for mining rights over deposits valued at $93 billion in southern DRC. By 2022, Chinese firms had a stake in or owned 15 of 19 Congolese cobalt mines, and Chinese state-owned enterprises and policy banks now control roughly 80% of the country’s cobalt output.
Beijing is not ceding ground quietly. In March 2026, the DRC government formalised a new agreement with China to deepen mining collaboration, including geological data sharing, investment protection and commitments to process more raw materials inside the country rather than exporting unrefined ore. The deal coincided with the US strategic partnership but underscored Kinshasa’s multi-vector strategy: it courts American security guarantees while simultaneously expanding cooperation with its largest minerals customer.
Firms such as Zijin Mining have disclosed large lithium operations in the DRC, highlighting China’s lead in the battery metal as well as cobalt. Chinese policy circles frame access to Congolese minerals as central to the country’s global electronics, EV battery and semiconductor ambitions, making the DRC a priority front in the broader strategic rivalry with Washington.
Kinshasa’s balancing act: praise Washington, keep Beijing close
President Tshisekedi has consistently welcomed US engagement, arguing that the resources-for-security framework will “promote our minerals in a sovereign manner” and “facilitate local transformation, generate thousands of jobs, and establish a new economic model centred on sovereignty and national added value.” His government emphasises security guarantees in the east as a condition for opening more mineral assets to American firms, while promoting flagship US-backed infrastructure such as the Lobito Corridor—a railway and transport network across the African copper belt offering faster export routes to Atlantic ports.
In early 2026, Kinshasa sent Washington a shortlist of 44 state-linked projects—including cobalt, lithium, tin and hydrocarbons—open to US investment, a move widely interpreted as a clear signal that African governments are using mineral endowments as bargaining chips in great-power competition. This list complements the Strategic Asset Reserve zones defined by the SPA and gives American firms a menu of assets where US backing can displace or counterbalance Chinese operators.
At the same time, the DRC renegotiates rather than abandons existing Chinese deals, leveraging Washington’s concern over Chinese-controlled cobalt to seek better terms from both sides. The result is a delicate and potentially unstable equilibrium: a resource-rich nation publicly praising its new American partnership while ensuring that no single external power achieves a monopoly over its mineral wealth.
What investors and policymakers should watch next
The DRC attracted the largest volume of mineral exploration investment in Africa in 2024, and that capital inflow is set to accelerate as the SPA’s preferential terms become operational. However, persistent conflict in Ituri and the Kivu provinces, licence disputes such as the Manono legal battle, and governance risks mean that de-risking remains the central concern for Western firms evaluating entry into the market.
For Latin American readers—particularly those in Brazil, Chile and Peru, where mining is a cornerstone of national economies and Chinese investment is similarly dominant—the Congolese experiment offers a live case study in how a mineral-rich nation can attempt to rebalance external partnerships without severing ties with its largest customer. The Lobito Corridor, in particular, mirrors infrastructure-led development strategies familiar across South America’s mining belts.
The next milestones will be the operationalisation of the Strategic Asset Reserve, the resolution of the KoBold-AVZ dispute over Manono, and whether the June 2025 peace framework can deliver enough stability to unlock investment in eastern mining zones. Each will test whether the US–DRC partnership can move from signed agreements to producing mines—and whether Kinshasa can sustain its balancing act between the two great powers vying for the minerals that will power the twenty-first century.
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Frequently Asked Questions
What makes the DRC so important in the global critical minerals race?
The Democratic Republic of Congo holds more than 70% of global cobalt reserves and produces roughly 70–80% of the world’s supply, alongside being the third-largest copper producer with approximately 3.3 million metric tons in 2024. It also possesses about 60% of global coltan reserves and significant lithium deposits, making it indispensable for electric-vehicle batteries, electronics and defence systems. Control over these supply chains gives the DRC outsized leverage in the competition between Washington and Beijing for energy-transition minerals.
What did the US–DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement of December 2025 actually deliver?
The SPA declared the DRC a “strategic partner” of the United States, established a Strategic Asset Reserve with priority mining zones for joint development, and granted American companies preferential access to cobalt, copper and lithium deposits. It also linked mineral access to US security support in eastern Congo and was signed alongside trilateral accords with Rwanda aimed at stabilising the Great Lakes region. The agreement explicitly seeks to secure long-term American access to critical minerals while blocking further Chinese expansion in the Congolese mining sector.
Is China losing its dominance over Congolese minerals?
Not yet. Chinese firms still control roughly 80% of the DRC’s cobalt output and hold stakes in the majority of producing mines, supported by over 15 years of infrastructure-for-resources deals and integrated refining capacity. While the US is gaining ground through offtake agreements, government-backed financing and the SPA’s preferential terms, Beijing continues to sign new cooperation agreements with Kinshasa—including a March 2026 deal on geological data sharing and domestic processing—and remains the dominant player in operational terms.
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