Kinshasa Questions Credibility of Key American Player in DRC Minerals
Africa · Central
Key Facts
—Strategic Partnership Agreement. Signed in December 2025, the U.S.-DRC deal grants Washington preferential access to cobalt, copper, coltan and lithium in exchange for security cooperation.
—Constitutional challenge. A coalition of Congolese lawyers petitioned the Constitutional Court on 21 June 2025 to invalidate the agreement, arguing it was never submitted to parliament.
—U.S. investment envelope. The U.S. International Development Finance Corporation has already deployed around $3.8 billion in DRC under the strategic minerals framework.
—Rebel rejection. In January 2026, rebel leader Corneille Nangaa denounced the deal as fundamentally flawed and unconstitutional, warning it cannot be implemented in territories under rebel control.
—Global reserves. DRC holds more than 70 percent of global cobalt reserves and an estimated 60 percent of coltan reserves, with untapped mineral wealth valued at up to $24 trillion.
Kinshasa is mounting a multi-front challenge to the credibility and political legitimacy of the American-led push for DRC strategic minerals, questioning whether Washington’s partners, methods and intermediaries can deliver a deal that respects Congolese sovereignty and benefits its citizens.
The Architecture of a Controversial Partnership
The centrepiece of U.S. engagement is the Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in Washington in December 2025, which grants the United States preferential access to DRC’s cobalt, copper, coltan and lithium reserves in return for security cooperation and investment. A companion “Critical Minerals for Security and Peace” deal, brokered on 27 June 2025, formalised cooperation over extraction and trade of rare earth and transition minerals, explicitly designed to offset China’s entrenched dominance in Congolese mining.
The agreements sit within a broader architecture that includes a U.S.-brokered peace arrangement between DRC and Rwanda, with President Donald Trump openly stating that Washington would gain “a lot of mineral rights” from the regional critical mineral supply chains. Secretary of State Marco Rubio has since presided over the first U.S. Critical Minerals Ministerial, gathering 50 nations including DRC to build a coalition aimed at challenging China’s grip on global mineral supply chains.
Yet the deals were never submitted to the Congolese parliament, a fact that now lies at the heart of Kinshasa’s credibility crisis. Article 214 of the DRC constitution requires that international treaties with major economic, fiscal and legal implications be approved by parliament and potentially by referendum, a procedural safeguard that critics say was deliberately bypassed.
The Constitutional and Sovereignty Battle Over DRC Strategic Minerals
On 21 June 2025, a coalition of Congolese lawyers and human rights defenders filed a petition to the Constitutional Court asking it to invalidate the Washington Agreement on Strategic Minerals. The petition argues the agreement was “never submitted to the Congolese people” and that its content was never disclosed, making it impossible for citizens to know what their state has actually committed to.
A Public Citizen analysis warns that the Strategic Partnership Agreement “heavily erodes sovereignty” by subjecting Congolese resource decisions to U.S. consultation, joint committee approval and external reporting. This effectively institutionalises foreign oversight of strategic assets, a mechanism critics describe as a partial externalisation of resource governance incompatible with constitutional sovereignty.
The opacity surrounding the deals has fuelled protests in Kinshasa, particularly after President Félix Tshisekedi returned from a U.S. minerals summit where he was praised by Trump and American lawmakers. Youth activist Christopher Muyisa captured the mood by warning that the agreement will fuel more conflict because the parties “lack sincerity” and the deals prioritise geopolitics over peace.
The American Player: A Composite of State, Corporate and Security Interests
In Congolese and civil-society discourse, the “American player” is not a single corporate entity but a blend of U.S. state actors, corporate investors and security contractors whose credibility is now being questioned as one integrated whole. On the governmental side, the Trump administration, the State Department and Secretary Rubio drive the diplomatic machinery, while the International Development Finance Corporation has deployed around $3.8 billion in investment.
On the corporate front, U.S. companies are eyeing mining assets including the Rubaya coltan deposits in North Kivu, with Reuters reporting that the State Department is actively promoting deals despite investor concerns about fiscal and conflict risk. Human Rights Watch has separately flagged the risk that Washington might ease sanctions on Israeli businessman Dan Gertler to facilitate an Orion-Glencore transaction in Congo, a move that would undermine anti-corruption credibility given Gertler’s sanctions record.
The involvement of private U.S. security and mercenary firms, likely to be contracted to protect mineral assets, raises further credibility issues due to past rights abuses documented in eastern DRC. The Oakland Institute has explicitly questioned claims by U.S. officials that American firms will ensure ethical mining, citing the historical role of American companies in violence, fraud and corruption in the region.
Rebel Rejection and the Territorial Reality Check
In January 2026, Corneille Nangaa, head of a rebel alliance that includes the Rwanda-backed M23, delivered a blunt message to Washington: the U.S.-DRC minerals deal is “fundamentally flawed and unconstitutional.” Nangaa argued that the agreement was negotiated by a “regime that lacks legitimacy and is corrupt,” questioned its transparency, and highlighted procedural irregularities and constitutional violations.
More practically, Nangaa warned that a deal struck with Kinshasa cannot be implemented in territories under rebel control, directly challenging its enforceability. This territorial reality check underscores a fundamental weakness in the minerals-for-security framework: continued rebel control of key mineral zones and a lack of trust between Kinshasa and armed groups make the agreement extremely hard to implement in practice.
The U.S.-brokered DRC-Rwanda arrangements integrate mineral supply chains across borders, but critics argue they formalise routes that already existed informally, often benefiting Rwandan and regional elites. This raises uncomfortable questions about whether Washington is stabilising the region or reinforcing a political economy of conflict minerals, with eastern DRC remaining a proxy battleground for external interests.
The Great-Power Contest and China’s Entrenched Position
The credibility crisis unfolding in Kinshasa cannot be understood outside the context of the intensifying U.S.-China rivalry over critical minerals, a contest that Africa: The New Scramble tracks across the continent. China has historically outmanoeuvred the United States in DRC through state-backed financing and infrastructure-for-resources deals, with Chinese entities now estimated to control around three-quarters of Congo’s mining sector.
The landmark moment came in 2016, when U.S. miner Freeport-McMoRan sold the Tenke Fungurume copper-cobalt mine to China Molybdenum, with Chinese state-owned banks financing $2.48 billion of the $2.68 billion credit package. Washington’s current push is a direct attempt to reverse this trajectory, but the credibility questions now being raised in Kinshasa threaten to undermine that effort before it gains traction.
President Tshisekedi has tried to leverage U.S.-China competition by offering mineral access in exchange for peace and security, telling the New York Times he was prepared to give American and European companies access to DRC’s mining resources in return for stability. This strategy positions DRC’s mineral wealth as both economic gain and geopolitical leverage, but continued corruption and opacity mean Kinshasa’s leadership may be using great-power competition to consolidate domestic power rather than build transparent national development strategies.
What the Credibility Crisis Means for Investors
For international investors and professionals watching the DRC strategic minerals space, the credibility challenge creates a complex risk landscape that extends well beyond standard political risk calculations. The constitutional petition before the Constitutional Court raises the spectre that future governments or courts could invalidate or renegotiate agreements, undermining contract sanctity and investor confidence in projects with production horizons targeting 2028 to 2035.
The association with controversial intermediaries adds another layer of reputational risk. Human Rights Watch’s warning about potential sanctions relief for Dan Gertler, combined with persistent reports of non-transparent deals involving both Western and Chinese firms, erodes trust in any new partnership and feeds a narrative that the U.S. approach is not fundamentally different from past extractive arrangements.
For Latin American readers familiar with resource nationalism debates in their own region, the DRC case offers a stark parallel: a mineral-rich nation caught between great powers, where the promise of investment and security competes with deep-seated concerns about sovereignty, elite capture and the distribution of benefits. The outcome of Kinshasa’s credibility challenge will signal whether the new U.S. minerals regime represents a genuine departure or simply another chapter in the long history of Congolese resources serving external strategic priorities.
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Frequently Asked Questions
What is the U.S.-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement on critical minerals?
The Strategic Partnership Agreement, signed in Washington in December 2025, grants the United States preferential access to DRC’s cobalt, copper, coltan and lithium reserves in exchange for security cooperation and investment. The deal creates co-management structures and infrastructure corridors aligned with U.S. interests, but was never submitted to the Congolese parliament, raising constitutional and sovereignty concerns that are now being challenged in court.
Why is Kinshasa questioning the credibility of the American player in DRC minerals?
Kinshasa’s challenge centres on four main issues: the deals were not ratified by parliament as required by Article 214 of the constitution, creating legal fragility; the potential easing of sanctions on controversial businessman Dan Gertler undermines anti-corruption credibility; the involvement of private security firms with past rights abuses raises human-rights concerns; and the perception that peace and security are being conditioned on granting extensive mineral rights to a foreign power resembles earlier episodes of Western resource extraction.
How much are DRC’s strategic minerals worth and who controls them?
DRC holds more than 70 percent of global cobalt reserves and an estimated 60 percent of coltan reserves, with untapped mineral wealth valued at up to $24 trillion. Chinese entities currently control around three-quarters of Congo’s mining sector, a position built through state-backed financing and infrastructure-for-resources deals, while the U.S. is now seeking to gain preferential access through the minerals-for-security framework backed by $3.8 billion in DFC investment.
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