Noboa’s Ecuador: Security Crackdown and Economic Opening After Correísmo’s Fall

Ecuador’s political landscape shifted after Daniel Noboa’s clear victory over correísmo, the movement tied to former President Rafael Correa.

Noboa’s government now faces the task of delivering on promises of greater security, institutional order, and a more open economic model. The country’s future depends on whether these plans can address the deep challenges that have defined recent years.

Noboa’s campaign and early presidency focused on combating Ecuador’s security crisis. Since 2023, he has ruled under a near-constant state of emergency, declaring an “internal armed conflict” and deploying the military to streets and prisons.

This approach, inspired by El Salvador’s tough tactics, initially won public approval. In a nationwide referendum in April 2024, Ecuadorians supported nine out of eleven security proposals, including tougher penalties for organized crime and military control over prisons.

However, the public rejected Noboa’s economic reform measures, such as international arbitration and hourly work contracts. Despite these efforts, violence remains high.

In January 2025, Ecuador recorded its most violent month, with 781 homicides. Criminal organizations continue to control key ports and prisons. Human rights groups have raised concerns about arbitrary detentions and excessive force.

Critics warn that a militarized response could undermine democracy and worsen cycles of violence, especially if it fails to address the social and economic roots of crime.

Ecuador’s Security and Economic Challenges

Noboa’s security strategy relies on expanding prison capacity, increasing police and military presence, and pursuing international cooperation. He has pursued intelligence-sharing and border security partnerships with neighboring countries and the United States.

He has even proposed hosting foreign military forces to strengthen regional security. This aligns with Washington’s priorities, as Ecuador’s location makes it central to regional drug trafficking routes.

However, the government’s reliance on emergency powers and foreign security advisors, including controversial figures from private military companies, has sparked debate about accountability and sovereignty.

Economically, Ecuador faces recession and instability. The economy contracted in 2024, and blackouts lasting up to fourteen hours exposed years of underinvestment in infrastructure.

Noboa’s administration raised the VAT to 15% to address a growing fiscal deficit, securing $2.5 billion in IMF funding. Yet, these measures have not reversed falling investment or rising unemployment, and the public remains skeptical of further reforms.

Ecuador’s dollarized economy offers some stability, but dependence on oil and agricultural exports leaves it exposed to external shocks and trade disputes. Noboa’s political capital depends on his ability to deliver results.

He governs with a fragmented legislature, where the opposition Citizen Revolution party holds a narrow majority. This forces him to seek alliances or govern by decree, a trend seen elsewhere in the region.

Investors responded positively to his win, but Ecuador’s country risk remains high, and the business climate is uncertain. To succeed, Noboa must balance tough security measures with institutional reforms and economic openness.

Sustainable progress will require strengthening the rule of law, professionalizing law enforcement, and addressing poverty and youth unemployment. The coming years will test whether Ecuador can move beyond crisis management and build a more stable, open, and secure society.