Coronavirus and Presidentialism: Potential Effects on Latin American Governments

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL – Although the spread of the novel coronavirus in Latin America and the response of the countries are diverse, a common approach to the strategy pursued by the various governments is evident. In particular, there is a strong emphasis on presidentialism.

Presidents have monopolized the administration of the agenda, which in today’s uncertain moment has provided security and leadership (with a few exceptions). Leaders are investing much of their political capital, prioritizing the new health agenda during the coronavirus threat.

What characterizes the Latin American case is the fact that this commitment to centralize the discourse on the presidential figurehead is made at the expense of state structures that, from an inefficient operation in some cases, endanger the presidential system. Political developments will be important to observe should some of the countries have their state institutions overloaded, as was the case in Italy.

It is important to note that, although there is a clear inclination towards increased presidentialism, this does not imply that all countries will follow the same formula. In some cases, social leadership capacity and strategic decision-making are prioritized, but in others, solutions more concerned with sustaining the economy are noted, which leads them to downplay the coronavirus. That said, an analysis of each case’s communication strategy in the context of the pandemic is worth exploring:

– Alberto Fernández, in Argentina: He is committed to a centralized discourse aimed at uniting Argentinians against the coronavirus. “I assure you that I will take the lead to guarantee what we have proposed”. He seeks consensus with governors, mayors and legislators from all political sectors.

– Sebastián Piñera, in Chile: He took the initiative and leadership in the fight against the pandemic, albeit in a tone that points to a reassessment of Chilean infrastructure and institutions, saying that “Chile is much better prepared than Italy to face the coronavirus”.

– Iván Duque, in Colombia: He invested in quick actions and a simple speech, speaking of this threat as “the moment to gather all of our strength, our solidarity and assert the resilience that has always marked us and, above all, to have great faith in who we are as a nation”.

– Martín Vizcarra, in Peru: He has focused on daily press conferences in which he seeks to convey confidence, security and leadership, but also on Peruvians’ closeness and unity, which can be seen in statements like “To speak about health means all Peruvians are committed and united in fighting the coronavirus, it is the government’s job to provide the measures and guidelines, but the job of fighting it is everyone’s”.

– Andrés Manuel López Obrador, in Mexico: Although there is centralization in his role, he initially decided to downplay the risk of the coronavirus, which can be observed in statements such as: “There are those who say that because of the coronavirus we shouldn’t hug. But we must hug, nothing happens; like this. No confrontation, no procedures”. Although the passing of time has forced this position to change, he continues to show a milder stance than the others. His new messages are statements like, “It’s best to stay home. We’re going to endure this, we’re going to keep this isolation that’s going to help us greatly”.

Impact on approval

As a global overview of the perception of the presidents in the region, the Mitofsky survey is noteworthy, conducted between March 22nd and 25th in several Latin American countries, which enables assessing how the coronavirus affects presidential approval.

In this respect, it is noted that in some cases, such as Argentina and Peru, the emergence of the coronavirus has translated into an improvement in the presidential image. This improvement is, at least in the first instance, related to what, in theory, is known as the Rally Around the Flag phenomenon, associated with the presence of a common cause that unites the population under one leadership (in this case, the common cause is the coronavirus and the leadership is the presidential one).

However, this phenomenon is not widespread, because there are also cases of deterioration of the presidential image in times of coronavirus, as occurs in the Mexican case, where the performance of López Obrador is approved by about 48 percent of the population, which would be his worst rating since he began his term in office.

This proves that the way in which different governments approach the pandemic has a direct impact on the image of their leadership. In this sense, one can see how, according to Mitofsky’s study, the trust people have in the government in each country is reproduced almost identically to the approval of the presidential figure in the context of the coronavirus.

The paradox of greater and better state

Just as no government in Latin America is immune to the pandemic, neither are the politics and debates regaining strength in the region.

In addition to the consideration that, given the current context where daily political disputes are minimized, as partially observed in the Argentine case between kirchnerists and anti-kirchnerists, it is noteworthy that the paradoxical need in the region to have a bigger and better state is amplified.

Speaking of a larger state implies consolidating its role in sectors it has not reached to date, or has done so inefficiently, and this concerns historically neglected sectors in the region, such as health infrastructure, and vulnerable population groups.

However, discussing a better state raises a question for politics itself, surrounding the transparency with which one works and particularly in relation to the costs that politics generates for society.

Post-Pandemic

As long as the pandemic remains a risk, the main assessment factor for a good or bad management will be the health aspect: that is, how well or badly the government works to protect its inhabitants from the spread of the novel coronavirus.

In this context, it seems that the main indicator has to do with the number of confirmed infections and the number of deaths in the country, which, in cases where these indicators are out of control, as in Ecuador, it is probably difficult to contain the deterioration of the presidential and government image.

Now, it is also true that the coronavirus will not last forever. And on that front lies the question of what will happen in the image of Latin American politics, when the economy is the benchmark for better or worse management. The region will face strong economic repercussions, which will have both internal and external factors.

In cases like Colombia and Chile, the link between society and politics appears to be critical, crossed by social protests and challenges to the national political and economic systems.

In this context, what would happen if these presidents, so engaged with the presidential leadership, were to suddenly frustrate the expectations generated in society regarding their pledge to overcome the crisis together?

That is when the fragility of institutions in Latin American countries, marked by inefficiency and corruption, will most likely become evident once again (considering only the controversy in Argentina regarding the claim of millionaire purchases at excessive prices should suffice).

While in principle, the investment in presidentialism seen in Latin America is appropriate in the management of the crisis, the truth is that, in the face of a scenario of uncontrolled healthcare, firstly, or economic, secondly, the strategy poses great risks for the region’s leaders.

This scenario becomes even more relevant if we consider that 2021 will be an electoral year in countries such as Mexico and Argentina, which will hold parliamentary elections, and in cases such as Peru and Chile, where there will be presidential elections. The way each country will emerge from the crisis triggered by the coronavirus will undoubtedly shape the future.