1UN/AfDB/AU Joint Report: Africa Could Lose 0.2 Percentage Points of GDP Growth If Conflict Exceeds Six Months — Fertiliser Shortages May Hit Harder Than Oil Prices
Today’s Africa intelligence brief leads with the most authoritative continental economic assessment since the crisis began. A joint report by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the African Development Bank, and the African Union — presented at the ECA ministerial conference in Tangier — warns that African economies could lose 0.2 percentage points of GDP growth in 2026 if the Middle East conflict extends beyond six months. The report did not quantify the likely inflation impact but warned the conflict “could quickly turn into a cost-of-living crisis across Africa through higher fuel and food prices.” The critical finding: fertiliser shortages may inflict more damage than oil prices alone.
The fertiliser dimension transforms the risk calculus. Gulf liquefied natural gas disruption threatens ammonia and urea production — the feedstocks for the fertilisers that African agriculture depends on — during the crucial March-to-May planting season. The Persian Gulf region accounts for roughly 30-35% of global urea exports and 20-30% of ammonia exports. Up to 30% of internationally traded fertilisers normally transit the Strait of Hormuz. For African farmers preparing fields right now, the question is not the price of diesel for their tractors — it is whether fertiliser will be available at all. Sudan, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa, already facing conflict-driven food insecurity, are most exposed to humanitarian delivery cost increases.
The report also identified an unexpected silver lining in the disruption: rerouted global transport is increasing traffic through African ports. Maputo in Mozambique, Durban in South Africa, Walvis Bay in Namibia, and Mauritius are all seeing increased shipping volumes. Kenya is emerging as a logistics hub through Lamu Port and Nairobi, while Ethiopian Airlines’ role as an emergency air bridge linking Asia, Africa, and Europe is strengthening Ethiopia’s position as a continental connectivity node. The crisis is simultaneously threatening African economies through higher costs and benefiting specific nodes through redirected trade flows.
For Latin American investors, the UN/AfDB/AU report delivers a direct signal: the African agricultural sector — which Latin American fertiliser producers and food exporters compete with — faces a supply crisis that Latin American producers do not. Brazil’s fertiliser imports come primarily from Russia and Belarus via Atlantic routes, not Hormuz. If African agriculture loses a planting season to fertiliser shortages while Latin American agriculture does not, the competitive dynamic shifts in favour of Western Hemisphere food producers. Simultaneously, the port traffic rerouting creates logistics opportunities: Maputo’s increased traffic benefits South African and Mozambican port operators, some of which have Latin American investors. As our previous Africa intelligence brief noted, the IMF declared Hormuz the “largest oil disruption in history” — this report quantifies what that means for Africa’s food security, not just its energy supply.
2Mozambique Fully Repays $630 Million IMF Debt — Clears Path for New Programme Under President Chapo as Gas Projects and Instability Compete for the Country’s Future
Mozambique has fully repaid its outstanding debt of $630.1 million to the International Monetary Fund — becoming the only country among 85 listed to reduce its IMF balance to zero. The government cleared the amount that stood at the start of the month, eliminating arrears that had complicated its relationship with the Fund since the hidden debt scandal of 2016 and the partial suspension of the Extended Credit Facility programme in April 2025. The debt clearance is seen as a decisive step toward restoring the financial cooperation that Mozambique needs to navigate its dual crisis of energy opportunity and governance instability.
The timing is strategic. President Daniel Chapo, who took office amid contested elections and ongoing social unrest, needs IMF support to stabilise the economy while the country’s flagship gas projects — TotalEnergies’ $20 billion Mozambique LNG and ENI’s Coral FLNG — face the World Bank instability warnings that this brief covered earlier this week. The previous $468 million Extended Credit Facility programme had been partially disbursed before its April 2025 suspension. Clearing the debt signals to the Fund that Maputo is serious about restoring credibility — even as Human Rights Watch reports link the navy to fishermen killings and the ISIS insurgency in Cabo Delgado continues to threaten northern provinces.
The Hormuz crisis adds an unexpected dimension. Mozambique is one of the “few countries” that could benefit from higher energy prices, according to the UN/AfDB/AU report (Story 1). As an LNG exporter, Mozambique’s gas becomes more valuable as Gulf supplies are disrupted. Rerouted shipping is already increasing traffic through the Port of Maputo. If Mozambique can simultaneously clear its IMF debts, secure a new programme, maintain gas production despite instability, and capture rerouted trade — it could emerge from the crisis in a stronger fiscal position than it entered. That is a large number of conditions for a country whose governance track record includes a $2 billion hidden debt scandal.
For Latin American investors with African exposure, Mozambique’s IMF debt clearance is a credibility signal worth tracking. Brazil’s Vale and Petrobras have both evaluated Mozambican opportunities. The parallel with Latin American debt management is instructive: when Argentina cleared its IMF arrears in 2006, it gained fiscal freedom but lost market access for a decade. Mozambique is attempting the opposite — clearing debts to gain access, not independence. The test is whether President Chapo can convert IMF reengagement into the governance reforms that the gas projects require and the international community demands. As our previous Mozambique coverage noted, the gap between resource potential and governance reality is the country’s defining challenge — and the IMF debt clearance is an attempt to narrow that gap.
3South Africa Day 2: Army Hits Mitchells Plain Streets After Shooting — Cape Town Urges Water Saving as Dam Levels Drop, Fuel Hike Biting Across the Economy
South African soldiers deployed to the streets of Mitchells Plain on the Cape Flats — one day after a shooting in the area — marking the first operational engagement of the year-long military deployment that President Ramaphosa authorised in February. The 2,200-strong force is now active in five provinces, targeting gang violence and illegal mining. Mitchells Plain, where 90% of South Africa’s gang-related killings occur, is the frontline. The deployment arrived as Cape Town’s City Council issued a separate urgent appeal to residents to conserve water, with dam levels dropping to concerning levels — raising the spectre of a dual infrastructure crisis in Africa’s most tourism-dependent city.
The fuel hike is now operational reality. Petrol at R22.53 per litre on the coast (R23.36 inland), diesel at R25.35 (coast) — even after the R3/litre temporary tax reprieve. The government confirmed the reprieve costs R6 billion per month and will be “re-evaluated monthly.” Treasury stated it will recoup the foregone revenue within the fiscal framework, meaning the relief is effectively a deferred tax increase. Informal fuel rationing — 35-litre caps per customer at some stations — is occurring despite official assurances that there is no national shortage. The SA Petroleum Retailers Association attributes the queues to distribution strain from panic buying rather than supply failure.
Easter travel peaks today, with the Border Management Authority mobilising across 71 ports of entry. The convergence of holiday travel, record fuel prices, army deployment, and water scarcity creates a stress test for South Africa’s governance capacity. The Mail & Guardian described the fuel situation as a “policy paralysis” — arguing that the government’s failure to reform the fuel levy structure since promising to do so after the 2022 Ukraine-driven spike means South Africans are now absorbing a shock that structural reform could have cushioned. The April 6 Trump deadline and South Africa’s mid-April strategic fuel reserve expiry remain the next critical dates.
For Latin American investors, South Africa’s April 2 represents the compound risk that energy-dependent, governance-constrained economies face during global shocks. Brazil faced a similar convergence during the 2022 fuel crisis — and responded with fuel tax cuts, Petrobras pricing adjustments, and targeted transfers. South Africa’s response (R3 reprieve, army deployment, water appeals) is less structurally coherent. The JSE’s trajectory, the rand’s weakness at R17, and the Motsepe 2027 ANC leadership narrative all depend on whether the government can manage multiple simultaneous crises without a structural economic response. The Dangote refinery’s supply discussions with Pretoria — a 12-month contract under negotiation — represent the kind of structural solution that temporary reprieves cannot substitute. As our previous coverage tracked, the April 1 hike was the beginning, not the peak.
4Somalia: New Northeastern State Detains Journalist for Criticising President — Press Freedom Erosion Extends from Sahel to Horn of Africa
The Committee to Protect Journalists reported that Somalia’s newly created northeastern state has detained a journalist for criticising the president. The detention extends the pattern of press freedom erosion that this brief has tracked across the continent — from the Sahel juntas’ systematic crackdown (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger) to now the Horn of Africa. When governments silence journalists, the information asymmetry between rulers and citizens, investors and markets, donors and recipients widens to the point where accountability becomes impossible.
Somalia’s press freedom situation is particularly consequential because the country sits at the intersection of multiple international interests. The US maintains counterterrorism operations in Somalia. The African Union’s transition mission (ATMIS) is handing security responsibilities to Somali forces. Gulf states compete for influence through port investments and military bases. Turkey has built the largest overseas military base in Mogadishu. When a journalist is detained for criticising leadership in this environment, every stakeholder’s ability to assess conditions on the ground is degraded. The detention also comes as Somalia’s federal structure continues to fragment, with new states being created that lack the institutional capacity — or inclination — to protect press freedom.
For Latin American investors and policymakers tracking African governance trends, the Somalia detention connects to a continental pattern. The International Press Institute’s warning about Sahel press freedom collapse, which this brief covered on April 1, described a region where $50+ billion in mineral assets operate in an “information black hole.” Somalia’s detention adds the Horn of Africa to that map. When African governments detain journalists during an energy crisis that is raising costs and straining governance capacity, they are removing the early-warning system that investors, donors, and citizens depend on. The correlation between press freedom and investment risk is well-established: countries that silence reporters produce surprises that markets cannot price.
5Liberia: Mounting Resistance to President Boakai’s Pick for Electoral Commission Chair — Governance Test for West Africa’s Oldest Republic
Political tensions are rising in Liberia as President Joseph Boakai faces mounting resistance to his nominee for chairperson of the National Elections Commission. The opposition and civil society groups argue that the appointment process lacks transparency and risks politicising the body responsible for overseeing Liberia’s elections. The controversy arrives as Liberian journalist Rodney Sieh has urged a national apology over the murder of former leaders, warning that “Liberia is repeating the errors that fueled conflict” — a reference to the civil wars of 1989-2003 that killed an estimated 250,000 people.
The electoral commission appointment matters beyond Liberia’s borders. West Africa’s governance trajectory is defined by the tension between democratic consolidation (Liberia, Ghana, Senegal) and authoritarian regression (the Sahel juntas, Guinea). When Liberia — the region’s oldest republic, founded in 1847 — struggles to appoint an independent electoral commission chair, it signals that even West Africa’s democratic anchors face institutional pressures. The controversy also comes as ECOWAS continues to restructure following the departure of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, making the remaining democratic members’ governance quality more consequential for the bloc’s credibility.
For Latin American investors tracking West African governance, Liberia’s electoral commission controversy is a leading indicator. Liberia’s cocoa sector is growing — changing lives in rural areas but also destroying Grand Gedeh’s largest forest, according to reporting this week. The tension between economic development (cocoa expansion, mining concessions) and governance quality (independent electoral institutions, press freedom, rule of law) defines the investment environment. When the body that oversees elections is contested, every subsequent election’s legitimacy is in question — and with it, the regulatory stability that foreign investors require. West African cocoa, mining, and forestry investments depend on the same governance infrastructure that Boakai’s appointment is testing.