U.S. Modifies Venezuela Sanctions to Let Caracas Pay Maduro Lawyers

The Trump administration’s most prominent foreign-leader prosecution can now proceed. The constitutional impasse that had threatened to derail it has been resolved by the Justice Department itself — and the resolution required Washington to relax sanctions it had imposed on the very government that captured Maduro from.

The Rio Times, the Latin American financial news outlet, reports that the United States has agreed to modify Venezuela sanctions to allow the Venezuelan government to pay the defense lawyers representing Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores in their federal narcotrafficking trial in New York. The court filing on Friday April 25 ends a weeks-long constitutional standoff that had threatened to derail one of the most prominent prosecutions of a foreign head of state in recent US legal history.

“The amended licenses authorize defense counsel to receive payments from the Government of Venezuela under certain conditions,” prosecutors and defense lawyers told Judge Alvin Hellerstein, with payments restricted to Venezuelan government funds available after March 5, 2026. The Department of Justice’s filing makes the defense’s pending motion to dismiss “moot.”

How the Venezuela sanctions impasse blocked Maduro’s defense

Maduro and Flores were captured from their Caracas home by US special forces on January 3, 2026, and transported to New York to face charges including narcoterrorism conspiracy, drug trafficking, and weapons-related offenses. Both have pleaded not guilty and remain jailed in Brooklyn pending trial.

Maduro’s attorney Barry Pollack filed a motion in February asking Hellerstein to dismiss the case because US sanctions blocked the Venezuelan government from covering legal fees. Pollack argued the prohibition violated Maduro’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choice — a constitutional protection that applies to all criminal defendants in US courts regardless of citizenship.

The Office of Foreign Assets Control had earlier in the case granted a license permitting Caracas to pay defense fees, then revoked it within hours. Prosecutors described the reversal as an “administrative error” and argued that Maduro and Flores could access personal funds in Venezuela to cover their costs. Pollack countered that they could not afford lawyers on their own.

Hellerstein’s pressure on the government’s position

Hellerstein, a Clinton appointee with a long-standing Manhattan SDNY tenure, made clear during the March 26 hearing that he was skeptical of the government’s blocking of payments. “The defendant is here, Flores is here. They present no further national security threat,” Hellerstein said.

“The right that’s implicated, paramount over other rights, is the right to constitutional counsel,” Hellerstein continued. He also noted that the United States had already relaxed sanctions on Venezuela since Maduro’s ouster, undermining the prosecution’s broader argument that the constraints reflected current national security policy.

Prosecutor Kyle Wirshba had pushed back on the constitutional reading. He argued the sanctions reflected legitimate national security and foreign policy interests, and that under separation-of-powers principles, the judiciary could not order the Treasury Department to modify sanctions — that authority resides with the executive branch.

Why the DOJ modified Venezuela sanctions now

The Justice Department’s resolution sidesteps the constitutional question by removing the underlying conflict. With OFAC’s amended licenses authorising Caracas payments to defense counsel, Pollack’s motion to dismiss has no remaining legal basis.

The decision also reflects the broader recalibration of US-Venezuela relations since Maduro’s January removal. The Trump administration formally recognised Delcy Rodríguez as Venezuela’s leader in March, and on April 1 the US Treasury lifted sanctions specifically on Rodríguez herself — a major shift in the long-standing US sanctions regime against the country.

If the prosecution’s previous argument — that sanctions reflected current foreign policy — was already weakening when sanctions on Rodríguez were lifted, modifying licenses for defense payments is a smaller and more targeted accommodation. It avoids further erosion of the prosecution’s broader case while removing a procedural risk to the trial itself.

What the trial now looks like

With the funding question resolved, the prosecution can proceed on the merits. The charges against Maduro stem in significant part from the 2020 indictment that the first Trump administration brought against him, accusing the Venezuelan leader of leading the “Cártel de los Soles” alongside senior officials.

Maduro has rejected the US charges as a pretext for seizing Venezuela’s natural resources. Trump has repeatedly stated his interest in foreign companies accessing Venezuela’s oil reserves, the largest proven crude reserves in the world.

The trial’s broader political question is whether a Venezuelan government that helped facilitate Maduro‘s removal — and that has now been cleared of US sanctions on its interim president — will choose to actively cooperate with the prosecution, remain neutral, or use defense funding as a backstop for a former leader the new government has not formally renounced.

What to watch after the Venezuela sanctions modification

Three variables now define the case trajectory. The first is whether Caracas actually transfers the funds. Authorising payment via amended licenses is a procedural fix; the Rodríguez government still has to make the political decision to fund the defense of the predecessor it replaced.

The second is the trial schedule. With the constitutional motion off the table, scheduling can resume. The Maduro and Flores prosecutions are now moving toward concrete trial dates rather than procedural disputes.

The third is the wider US-Venezuela sanctions framework. The Rodríguez sanctions lift on April 1, the legal-fee modification on April 25, and the broader recalibration around interim governance suggest a sanctions regime that is being unwound piece by piece rather than en bloc. Each individual decision is a signal of where the policy is heading.

For investors and observers tracking the US-Venezuela transition, this week’s modification confirms a pragmatic-resolution pattern. The Trump administration is willing to make sanctions concessions when they serve a defined operational objective — in this case, keeping the prosecution alive — even where the concession marginally reduces the broader pressure framework. The pattern is the most consistent signal yet of how this administration intends to manage the Venezuela file.

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