Key Points
—Haitian civilians barricaded roads in Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite and Pont-Sondé on April 19–20 to block the departure of Kenyan police officers, forcing helicopter evacuations after ground movement toward Saint-Marc was deemed unsafe.
—A fourth contingent of 150 Kenyan officers landed at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on April 21, completing the post-April 15 drawdown of the Kenya-led Multinational Security Support mission after roughly 22 months on the ground and three Kenyan officers killed in the line of duty.
—The new UN-backed Gang Suppression Force, authorised by Security Council Resolution 2793 in September 2025, is meant to reach 5,550 personnel by October under Chadian and South African leadership, but only a first Chadian contingent has arrived and the full force generation remains incomplete.
The Haiti Kenyan police exit has produced an uncomfortable signal that the communities most exposed to gang violence do not trust the Chad-led force that is supposed to replace Nairobi’s officers.
The Rio Times, the Latin American financial news outlet, reports that the Haiti Kenyan police exit has turned visibly fragile in its final days. On Sunday, April 19, and Monday, April 20, civilians in Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite and Pont-Sondé barricaded the roads connecting to Saint-Marc in an effort to physically prevent Kenyan officers from leaving their deployment areas. Amateur video carried by Kenya’s Citizen Digital showed convoys blocked by crowds, and the Multinational Security Support mission was forced to evacuate officers by helicopter after ground movement was assessed as unsafe.
The precise geography matters. Pont-Sondé and Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite sit in the upper Artibonite corridor where the Gran Grif gang had occupied Haitian territory for nearly two years before being pushed back in a December 2024 joint Haitian National Police and MSS operation. Those communities have now seen two years of relative calm that they credit directly to the Kenyan-led presence.
The Haiti Kenyan police exit: what has actually happened on the ground
Kenya first deployed to Haiti in June 2024 under UN Security Council authorisation. The Kenyan contingent peaked at roughly 800 officers and ultimately represented the vast majority of the 970 personnel who actually deployed against a 2,500-officer MSS design. Over 22 months, Kenyan forces secured Port-au-Prince’s airport, hospitals and main roads, reopened the Liancourt and Petite-Rivière police stations, and trained more than 2,000 Haitian National Police officers.
Three Kenyan officers were killed in the line of duty, beginning with Administration Police Constable Benedict Kabiru in a March 2025 ambush in Pont-Sondé. A second officer died alongside a civilian in a May 2025 armoured-vehicle accident on the Kenscoff–Pétion-Ville road. A third was killed in a September 2025 gang incident after an HNP vehicle was immobilised in a deliberately dug ditch on the Carrefour Paye–Savien supply route.
The drawdown has been phased, with a third contingent of 208 officers returning to Nairobi on March 17. A fourth contingent of 150 arrived at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport on April 21, received by Inspector General Douglas Kanja and National Security Adviser Joseph Boinett. A final group of roughly 200 officers is due to leave by April 30.
Why Kenya is leaving: the GSF leadership dispute
The formal explanation for the Haiti Kenyan police exit is the September 2025 UN Security Council Resolution 2793, which authorised the transition of the MSS into a new Gang Suppression Force with a 5,550-personnel ceiling and a harder counter-gang mandate. Unlike the MSS, the GSF is mandated to conduct offensive operations to “neutralise, isolate and deter” armed groups, either independently or alongside the Haitian police.
The substantive reason is a leadership dispute. Kenya declined to continue leading the successor force after failing to secure command assurances it considered adequate. South African UN official Jack Christofides was named Special Representative for the GSF late last year, replacing Kenya’s Godfrey Otunge at the top of the mission’s political structure.
The operational question is whether the GSF can generate the 5,550 personnel authorised by the Council. A first Chadian police contingent arrived in early April, with additional Chadian troops training in the United States, according to Dominican Republic Foreign Minister Roberto Álvarez. Kenya retains roughly US$35 million in outstanding reimbursements for the MSS period, and the funding architecture for the GSF continues to rely on voluntary member-state contributions.
The Caribbean context: gangs, drone strikes, and a Dominican brokerage
The Haiti Kenyan police exit lands at a moment of extraordinary instability for the Caribbean basin. Gangs still control an estimated 85% of Port-au-Prince, more than 5,600 people were killed in gang-related violence in 2024 and more than a million Haitians are internally displaced. Haitian Prime Minister Alix Didier Fils-Aimé has contracted the US private military firm Vectus Global, led by Erik Prince, to conduct drone strikes against gang leadership, a parallel track that UN reporting says produced at least 1,243 deaths in 141 drone operations between March 2025 and January 2026.
The Dominican Republic has become the de facto regional broker. Álvarez hosted a Dajabón-based meeting with US diplomatic representatives in March to coordinate the MSS-to-GSF transition, and Santo Domingo has maintained the tightest border regime with Haiti of any country in the region. The Dominican migration response also covers the Trump administration’s decision to end Temporary Protected Status for Haitians, a measure that could affect roughly 130,000 Haitian children currently in the US.
For the wider Latin America region, the Haiti transition is the most serious test of multilateral security architecture since the 2004 MINUSTAH deployment. Jamaica and Guatemala contributed small MSS contingents alongside Kenya, and El Salvador has indicated it will participate in the GSF alongside the Chadian force, adding a regional counterweight to the African leadership structure.
What the civilian blockades say about the Haiti Kenyan police exit
The April 19–20 blockades were strikingly specific. Civilians in Petite-Rivière de l’Artibonite and Pont-Sondé were not protesting the GSF in principle; they were protesting the Kenyan exit before a credible replacement had arrived on their stretch of the Artibonite corridor. In conversations with Haitian Times and Citizen Digital, witnesses described fear of a return to Gran Grif control of the very towns that were retaken in December 2024.
The political reading is mixed. Haiti’s capital saw celebration in the days before the fourth-contingent departure, interpreted by some observers as support for a tougher GSF mandate and by others as relief at the end of a foreign presence that produced mixed results. The Artibonite reaction suggests that whatever the national political mood, the communities closest to the gang frontline weigh continuity of protection higher than any abstraction about sovereignty or governance.
The benchmark to watch is October 2026, when the GSF is meant to be fully deployed at its 5,550-personnel ceiling and its initial 12-month UN mandate expires. If force generation continues to lag, the Artibonite blockades are likely to look less like an isolated moment and more like a preview of the political cost of an incomplete security transition in the Caribbean.
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