Africa Intelligence Brief for Monday, February 9, 2026

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What happened: In a letter dated February 7, Ethiopian Foreign Minister Gedion Timothewos demanded that Eritrea “immediately withdraw its troops from Ethiopian territory and cease all forms of collaboration with rebel groups.”

This is part of The Rio Times’ coverage of African business and economic developments for the global financial community.

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He accused Eritrean forces of occupying Ethiopian territory along their shared border and conducting joint military operations with insurgents along Ethiopia’s northwestern frontier, calling the incursions “not just provocations but acts of outright aggression.”

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Ethiopia says Eritrea is “actively preparing for war” and funding armed groups fighting federal forces. Eritrea has not publicly responded but previously denied similar accusations.

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So what: This is the most direct confrontation between Addis Ababa and Asmara since they cooperated during the Tigray war (2020–2022). The alliance collapsed after Eritrea was excluded from the Pretoria Peace Accord. PM Abiy publicly acknowledged Eritrean atrocities in Tigray in January 2026, shattering any residual diplomatic goodwill.

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The underlying flashpoint is the Assab port: landlocked Ethiopia views Red Sea access as an existential interest, while Eritrea sees it as a sovereignty red line.

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For investors: any military escalation in the Horn would disrupt the Ethio-Djibouti corridor that handles over 90% of Ethiopia’s trade. Watch for troop movements along the Tigray-Eritrea border in the coming days.

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What happened: President Ramaphosa informed UN Secretary-General Guterres on February 8 that South Africa will withdraw its 700+ troops from MONUSCO, the UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC.

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The Presidency cited the need to “consolidate and realign the resources” of the South African National Defence Force after 27 years of peacekeeping support.

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South Africa ranks among MONUSCO’s top ten troop contributors. The withdrawal will be completed before the end of 2026. MONUSCO expressed “deep gratitude” and pledged an orderly transition.

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So what: This follows Pretoria’s repatriation of SADC troops from eastern DRC last year, after 17 South African soldiers were killed in escalating conflict with M23. Domestic political pressure—including heated parliamentary questioning of defence officials—made continued deployment untenable.

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The withdrawal compounds the DRC’s security challenges at a moment when M23 controls vast swathes of eastern territory and is expanding its operational reach.

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Coming the same week as the China trade deal and Afreximbank accession, it signals Pretoria is fundamentally recalibrating—reducing military commitments abroad while building new economic partnerships. The question is whether MONUSCO, already overstretched with roughly 11,000 personnel, can absorb the gap.

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What happened: DRC President Tshisekedi spent the week in Washington, meeting Secretary of State Rubio, Senate Foreign Relations Committee leaders Risch and Shaheen, House Foreign Affairs Committee chair Mast, and US business leaders at the US Chamber of Commerce.

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The inaugural Joint Steering Committee of the US-DRC Strategic Partnership Agreement (signed December 4, 2025) held its first meeting.

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The DRC designated its initial list of Strategic Asset Reserves for US investment. Separately, opposition leader Martin Fayulu met Tshisekedi at the National Prayer Breakfast—a rare encounter signalling possible political détente.

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So what: Congo is emerging as the centrepiece of Washington’s counter-China minerals strategy. With over 70% of global cobalt and roughly 10% of copper, Kinshasa has leverage.

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Tshisekedi explicitly told investors at the Chamber of Commerce that the DRC wants manufacturing and processing—not just raw extraction. The Fayulu meeting is arguably just as significant: a credible national dialogue could reduce the political risk premium that has deterred investors for years.

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For markets: cobalt is up over 2% this week on the back of the Orion CMC-Glencore MOU and the Washington diplomacy. The Lobito Corridor and Glencore stakes are the deals to watch.

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What happened: The AFC/M23 rebel coalition claimed responsibility for a drone attack on Kisangani Bangoka International Airport, nearly 350 miles from the front lines.

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The attack, using Turkish-made Yiha III loitering munitions between January 31 and February 1, targeted what rebels said was a military drone command centre.

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The FARDC claimed to have neutralised eight drones before they reached their target. No casualties were reported. The AU condemned the strike, warning against extending hostilities to major urban centres far from the conflict zone.

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So what: Kisangani is the DRC’s fourth largest city and—since the fall of Goma—the main forward base for the Congolese army’s air operations against M23, including Chinese-made CH-4 and Turkish-made Bayraktar drones.

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M23’s ability to strike deep into Congolese territory represents a fundamental shift. Analysts at the Ebuteli Institute called it “quite new.” M23 leadership warned they would target “every threat at its point of origin,” effectively declaring air bases legitimate targets.

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The timing—during Tshisekedi’s Washington visit—was deliberately provocative. Analysts warn the next targets could be Kindu airbase or even Bujumbura, which would risk a regional war.

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What happened: Somalia and Saudi Arabia signed a military cooperation MOU on February 9 at the World Defense Show in Riyadh. Somali Defence Minister Ahmed Moallim Fiqi and Saudi counterpart Prince Khalid bin Salman formalised expanded defence ties covering training, equipment, intelligence-sharing, and counterterrorism cooperation.

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The deal aims to enhance Red Sea and Gulf of Aden maritime security. Bloomberg reported Saudi Arabia is also finalising a broader military coalition involving Egypt.

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So what: This deal sits at the intersection of three geopolitical shifts: Saudi Arabia’s deepening rivalry with the UAE, Israel’s recognition of Somaliland in December, and Mogadishu’s urgent need for military partners as it fights al-Shabaab while confronting the Somaliland sovereignty challenge.

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Somalia recently cancelled all security and port agreements with the UAE, citing sovereignty violations. Riyadh is essentially replacing Abu Dhabi as Mogadishu’s primary Gulf security partner.

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For the Horn: a Saudi-Somalia-Egypt axis would reshape Red Sea security dynamics, directly competing with the UAE-Israel-Somaliland alignment. Turkey and Pakistan are potential additions.

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What happened: Human Rights Watch reported on February 9 that a Nigerien military drone strike killed at least 17 civilians, including four children, and injured 13 others at a crowded market in Kokoloko village, Tillabéri region, on January 6. Three Islamist fighters were also killed.

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Witnesses said a military drone circled the village before dropping munitions on the market while hundreds were gathered. The strike used Turkish-made drones acquired by the junta since 2022. Nearly all of Kokoloko’s 1,200 residents fled after the attack. The junta has not commented.

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So what: This is the second reported mass-casualty market strike by Niger’s military in six months—the September 2025 strike on Injar killed over 30 civilians.

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HRW says the Kokoloko attack violated laws-of-war prohibitions on indiscriminate strikes and may constitute a war crime. The Tillabéri region recorded the highest civilian fatalities from conflict in the central Sahel in 2025.

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The junta is fighting IS Sahel and JNIM across the region but its air campaign is generating significant civilian casualties. The Islamic State’s brazen January 28 attack on Niamey’s international airport underscored how the security situation is deteriorating despite the military’s aerial capabilities.

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What happened: Mozambique’s devastating floods, ongoing since mid-December, have now killed over 150 people, affected more than 800,000, and displaced nearly 400,000 across seven provinces, according to OCHA and UNHCR.

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Gaza Province is the epicentre, with Xai-Xai largely submerged. Over 85,000 people are sheltered in 116 accommodation centres.

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Roughly 60,000 hectares of farmland and 58,000 head of livestock have been destroyed. The UN launched a $187 million humanitarian response plan. Roads are being restored, but the cyclone season adds continued risk.

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So what: The flooding—considered the worst since 2000—compounds an already fragile situation in Mozambique, which endured political unrest following disputed October 2024 elections and ongoing insurgency in the north.

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UNICEF warned that four in ten children already faced chronic malnutrition before the floods. The disaster mirrors Morocco’s Gharb flooding from last week: across the continent, aging dam infrastructure and shifting rainfall patterns are overwhelming national response capabilities.

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The agricultural destruction is particularly concerning—spring planting disruptions will likely push food prices higher in a country where the average age is 17 and poverty rates already exceed 60%.

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What happened: Nigeria’s Senate passed the Electoral Act Amendment Bill on February 4 following a marathon 4.5-hour session, sparking widespread confusion and public anger over whether mandatory electronic transmission of election results was rejected.

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Opposition parties accused the APC-led Senate of sabotaging electoral transparency. Senate President Akpabio and minority leader Abaribe both clarified that the Senate retained electronic “transmission”—stronger than the 2022 Act’s vague “transfer” language.

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A conference committee will now reconcile the Senate and House versions. Civil society protests continue.

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So what: The confusion is itself the story. The fact that it took days of press conferences to clarify what the Senate actually passed reveals deep institutional trust deficits.

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The 2023 elections were heavily litigated, and the Supreme Court ruled that electronically transmitted results had no legal backing under the old Act. This amendment is supposed to fix that ahead of 2027 elections.

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For investors and governance watchers: Nigeria’s democratic credibility hangs on the conference committee outcome. If the final bill mandates real-time electronic transmission via the IReV portal with clear legal standing, it’s a genuine reform. If the language remains ambiguous, expect renewed protest energy and electoral uncertainty.

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What happened: King Charles III and Queen Camilla have invited Nigerian President Bola Tinubu for a state visit to the UK on March 18–19, 2026, to be hosted at Windsor Castle.

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This will be the first state visit by a Nigerian head of state since General Ibrahim Babangida met Queen Elizabeth II in 1989—a gap of 37 years. Unlike regular official trips, state visits involve full royal protocol and are used to strengthen key diplomatic partnerships.

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So what: The timing is notable. Washington has strained relations with Abuja—Trump accused Nigeria of failing to protect Christians and launched airstrikes on Nigerian soil in December 2025. London is stepping into the vacuum.

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For the UK, Nigeria is its largest trade partner in Africa and a critical diaspora link. For Tinubu, the visit offers prestige at a moment when domestic security failures (170 dead in Kwara, electoral reform backlash) are eroding his mandate.

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Post-Brexit Britain has been actively courting African partnerships. This visit could yield trade deals and security commitments that give Tinubu diplomatic wins ahead of a difficult 2027 election cycle.

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What happened: Islamic State released video this week of its January 28 complex attack on Niamey’s Diori Hamani International Airport and Air Base 101. The assault used one-way attack drones, mortars, vehicle-borne IEDs, and heavily armed fighters on motorcycles.

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Attackers burned military aircraft, hangars, and at least one reconnaissance drone. Local sources report three Russian soldiers and 24 Nigerien troops were killed. IS fighters also shot at civilian aircraft.

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Separately, 36 Nigerien soldiers were killed near the Niger–Burkina Faso border in a coordinated JNIM attack during the same week.

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So what: This was the closest-ever jihadist attack to the Nigerien capital and one of IS’s boldest operations globally. The video contradicts the junta’s narrative that the attack was repelled. IS demonstrated freedom of movement inside Niamey itself.

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The attack targeted the very air assets—including Turkish-made drones—that have been the junta’s primary counterinsurgency tool. Evidence suggests coordination between IS Sahel Province and IS West Africa Province, with possible Hausa and Kanuri speakers identified in the footage.

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Niger’s military rulers, who seized power promising security, face a credibility crisis. Russian mercenaries present on the base could not prevent the breach.

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