The Numbers That Don’t Add Up — Until They Do
On paper, Operation Epic Fury has been devastating. Since February 28, U.S. forces have struck more than 5,500 targets across Iran, destroyed over 60 ships including every Jamaran-class corvette, every Soleimani-class guided-missile catamaran, Iran’s only drone carrier Shahid Bagheri, and the forward base ship IRIS Makran. CENTCOM commander Admiral Brad Cooper announced on March 11 that an entire class of Iranian warships had been eliminated. A U.S. submarine sank an Iranian vessel with a torpedo — the first such action since World War II. President Trump declared Iran’s navy effectively finished. This is part of The Rio Times’ comprehensive coverage of Latin American financial markets and global developments affecting them.
Yet no commercial tankers are transiting the Strait of Hormuz. Maersk, CMA CGM, Hapag-Lloyd, and MSC have all suspended operations. Protection and indemnity insurance has been withdrawn. Over 400 oil tankers sit anchored outside the strait. Iraqi oil production has collapsed 70% to 1.3 million barrels per day. The strait — described by U.S. intelligence sources as “Death Valley” — remains under effective Iranian control. The apparent contradiction between overwhelming American military superiority and Iran‘s continued stranglehold on the world’s most important energy chokepoint is, in fact, the central lesson of the entire conflict.
Iran Strait of Hormuz Control Through Asymmetric Means
The explanation lies in what the U.S. has not destroyed. According to CNN, citing intelligence sources, Iran retains 80–90% of its small boats and minelayers — the vessels that actually matter for strait denial. The IRGC’s main small craft fleet has “largely remained intact,” confirmed Farzin Nadimi of the Washington Institute. Iran’s arsenal includes an estimated 2,000 to 6,000 naval mines, largely produced by Iran, China, and Russia. Only a few dozen have been laid so far, but even limited mining has been enough to collapse the insurance market: without coverage, commercial ships simply cannot sail.
This is the fundamental asymmetry. The U.S. destroyed Iran’s ability to fight a conventional naval war — warships against warships — but Iran was never planning to fight one. The IRGC’s strategy deploys a gauntlet of dispersed minelayers, explosive-laden suicide boats, shore-based anti-ship missile batteries, and one-way attack drones. Each component is small, cheap, and expendable. Destroying a $40,000 speedboat loaded with explosives requires the same Tomahawk missile that costs $2 million. And a single mine costing a few thousand dollars can close a shipping lane that moves $5 billion worth of crude per day.
The Minesweeping Gap
Compounding the problem is a critical American capability gap. The U.S. Navy decommissioned the last of its four dedicated minesweepers in the Persian Gulf in September 2025, transferring responsibility to littoral combat ships — vessels with a troubled history that critics have called “Little Crappy Ships.” Mine clearance is inherently slow, dangerous, and labor-intensive: a single mine can take days to locate and neutralize, while Iran can lay dozens per night using small craft that blend into civilian fishing fleets. The 1980s Tanker War precedent is instructive — Iran mined the strait then too, and one of those mines struck the USS Samuel B. Roberts, nearly sinking a U.S. warship.
The economic consequences are already severe. Nearly 15 million barrels per day of crude production plus 4.5 million barrels of refined fuels are stranded in the Gulf. The IEA announced a record 400-million-barrel emergency reserve release on March 11 — the largest in the agency’s history. Oil prices have been gyrating between $80 and $120 per barrel in single sessions. Iraq and Kuwait, which have no alternative export routes, face existential fiscal pressure. Saudi Arabia has warned Tehran it will retaliate if its own infrastructure is targeted. The UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding an end to threats against maritime routes, co-sponsored by 135 countries, with China and Russia abstaining. The paradox of Hormuz reveals a structural truth about modern warfare: you can destroy a nation’s navy and still not control a 33-kilometer-wide stretch of water.