Trump Tells Brazil and Paraguay to Bring Venezuela Back Into Mercosur
Key Facts
—The message: US president Donald Trump sent a private message to Paraguayan president Santiago Peña Palacios asking him to initiate Mercosur discussions on Venezuela’s return to the bloc, according to diplomatic sources cited by PlatôBR.
—The opening: Venezuela has been suspended from Mercosur since 2016 under the Ushuaia Protocol’s democratic clause. The arrest of Nicolás Maduro by the United States in January 2026, and recognition of the Delcy Rodríguez government by Brazil and Paraguay, has reopened the diplomatic file.
—The agreement so far: Lula has signalled agreement to Peña over the possibility of return during a meeting on March 22 at the 15th UN Convention to Combat Desertification (COP15). The formal invitation must come from Paraguay, which currently holds the bloc’s rotating presidency.
—The blocker: Argentina, under president Javier Milei, is opposed. “Argentina does not want this return and will try to hold off as long as possible,” an Itamaraty source told PlatôBR. All five Mercosur founders (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay, Bolivia) must agree for Venezuela to be reinstated.
—The next step: A formal invitation to the Mercosur summit in Asunción on July 30, 2026, can be issued before full reinstatement. Diplomatic sources describe the move as a “consistent rumour” still in backchannel discussions.
Three months after Nicolás Maduro was flown from Caracas to a Manhattan court and Delcy Rodríguez took the Venezuelan presidency, the United States has begun rewriting the South American regional architecture from the back-channels. Washington wants the country it has just defeated reintegrated. Brasília agrees. Asunción is moving. Buenos Aires is the obstacle.
What Trump said and to whom
The PlatôBR report, citing diplomatic sources, places the Trump message to Peña before the public emergence of the Paraguayan consultation with Brazil. The Rio Times, the Latin American financial news outlet, reports that the operational sequence matters: Washington asked Asunción to open the file, Asunción consulted Brasília, and Lula signalled openness during the March 22 bilateral meeting at the COP15 desertification conference. The formal initiative remains in Peña’s hands as bloc-rotation president, but the political clearance came from the White House first.
The Itamaraty assessment captured by PlatôBR is direct on the obstacle. “Argentina does not want this return and will try to hold off as long as possible,” a Brazilian diplomat told the outlet. The Milei administration has aligned with Washington across most regional questions, but on Mercosur expansion it remains the most reticent member.
Why Venezuela was suspended in the first place
Venezuela joined Mercosur as a full member in 2012 under Hugo Chávez. By December 2016 the country had been suspended for failing to incorporate the bloc’s free-trade and tariff regulations. In August 2017, the four founding members (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay) invoked the Ushuaia Protocol’s democratic clause, citing the rupture of constitutional order under Maduro. Venezuela also accumulated debt to Mercosur bodies through PDVSA loans during its membership. Maduro’s transfer to US custody and the constitutional reorganisation under Delcy Rodríguez has reopened the question.
The Mercosur position map
| Country | Position on Venezuela return |
|---|---|
| Brazil (Lula) | In favour; Lula agreed at March 22 meeting |
| Paraguay (Peña) | In favour; US-aligned, holding rotating presidency |
| Argentina (Milei) | Opposed; “will hold off as long as possible” |
| Uruguay | Pending official position |
| Bolivia | Pending official position |
| Venezuela (Rodríguez) | Recognised by Brazil and Paraguay |
| Mercosur summit (Asunción) | July 30, 2026 |
| Suspension period | 2016-present |
The Washington logic
The Trump position on Venezuela is regime change followed by normalisation. The Maduro arrest delivered the regime-change leg; the Mercosur reintegration delivers normalisation. Washington benefits in three ways. It legitimises the Delcy Rodríguez transition without requiring election certification by the OAS. It re-anchors Venezuelan oil and mining flows inside a regional framework Washington increasingly influences through Paraguay and the Milei administration. And it removes the diplomatic isolation argument Caracas previously used to refuse reform.
The Lula calculus is parallel but distinct. Brazilian diplomacy has long argued that isolating Venezuela failed to produce reform and re-engagement is the only available lever. The political cost is real: Lula links Brazilian leadership capital to Caracas’s rehabilitation in a context where most observers view the Delcy Rodríguez transition with scepticism. The benefits include bilateral trade restoration, energy-sector coordination, and Brazilian influence over post-Maduro Venezuelan economic reconstruction.
What investors and analysts watch
- July 30 Asunción summit. Whether Peña formally invites Venezuela. The invitation itself is symbolic; full reinstatement requires unanimous consent.
- Argentina’s holding pattern. How long Milei can sustain the opposition position given his broader US alignment.
- PDVSA debt. The Mercosur financial entanglement remains unresolved; reintegration discussions must address legacy obligations.
- Mercosur-EU agreement. Venezuela’s reentry complicates the long-pending European ratification path, particularly with Brussels watchful of regional democratic standards.
Connected Coverage
The Alex Saab deportation context sits in our Saab deportation readout. Lula’s Washington Post interview is in our WaPo interview analysis. The UBS read on Brazil sits in our UBS Bassan analysis. The Brazil mafia threat sits in our mafia threat analysis.
Reported by The Rio Times — Latin American financial news. Filed May 18, 2026.
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