U.S. Financing Targets Brazil’s Rare Earths, Even Without A Bilateral Deal

Key Points

1. Two projects in Goiás secured U.S. public financing before any Brazil–U.S. minerals pact.
2. The real prize is not the mine, but the ability to refine and “separate” rare earths into usable materials.
3. Brazil has giant reserves, but risks exporting low-value concentrate while others capture the high-tech step.

The newest signal in Brazil’s rare-earth race was not a government announcement. It was Serra Verde saying it reshaped a contract with Chinese customers so part of its output can be redirected to Western buyers as non-Chinese processing options emerge.

Serra Verde matters because it is currently the only rare-earth producer operating in Brazil. The U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) approved up to $465 million to fund an expansion of its Pela Ema mine in Minaçu, northern Goiás.

Serra Verde says the goal is about 5,000 tonnes of oxide contained in rare-earth concentrate by early 2027, rising to 10,000 tonnes by 2030. A second DFC deal shows where the next fight is headed.

In September, DFC committed up to $5 million for Aclara’s Carina project in Goiás, using financing that can later convert into equity.

In October, Aclara announced a $277 million heavy rare-earth separation plant in Louisiana, aiming for 2028 and claiming it could supply more than 75% of U.S. demand for certain heavy rare earths used in electric-vehicle motors.

The story behind these moves: rare earths are 17 elements, and the hard part is processing. Mining produces a mixed concentrate.

Separation and refining turn it into specific oxides that manufacturers need for high-performance magnets and advanced electronics.

China dominates the choke point, with about 60% of global mining and roughly 90% of refining capacity, which is why Washington is financing supply chains that bypass China.

Brazil’s leverage is real but fragile. The country holds roughly 21 million tonnes of reserves, now widely ranked second globally after China.

Yet if Brazil exports mainly concentrate, the highest-margin jobs and know-how sit abroad. The practical question is whether Brazil can make domestic refining competitive before the value-added stage is locked in elsewhere.