Africa Intelligence Brief for Friday, February 27, 2026

What matters today

Critical

Tense

Tense

Watching

GEOPOLITICS DRC signs $1.2B health partnership with US — $900M US funding + $300M DRC co-investment over 2026–2031; targets HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria, maternal health; 19th African country to sign under America First Global Health Strategy; Africa CDC Director-General Kaseya raises “huge concerns” over pathogen data-sharing clauses on same day; Zimbabwe rejected $367M deal citing “asymmetrical” terms and data sovereignty; Zambia pushed back on $1B+ deal linked to copper/cobalt mining access; Kenya’s $1.6B deal suspended by High Court

ENERGY Eskom cuts ferrochrome tariff 29% to 62c/kWh — Samancor Chrome and Glencore-Merafe joint venture receive tariff slash from interim 87.74c/kWh; averts thousands of retrenchments at last minute ahead of Feb 28 deadline; 24 SA furnaces eligible for new rate (only 4 currently operating, down from 59 historically); 900%+ tariff increase since 2008 destroyed SA’s ferrochrome dominance; Electricity Minister Ramokgopa signals broader smelter relief; government funds shortfall to protect standard tariff customers

DEFENSE Ramaphosa takes direct control of Iran naval exercise probe — Presidential panel led by Justice Ngoepe replaces stalled SANDF board of inquiry; investigating why navy ignored commander-in-chief’s order to exclude Iran from Chinese-led Exercise Will of Peace in SA waters (January 2026); panel can summon any defence force member and access classified documents; one-month deadline; navy chief Vice-Admiral Lobese expected to be centre of investigation; probe sensitive given US criticism of Iran’s participation

POLITICS Zimbabwe constitutional amendment crisis escalates — Amendment Bill No. 3 gazetted Feb 16; extends presidential/parliamentary terms from 5 to 7 years; shifts presidential election from popular vote to parliamentary ballot; would keep Mnangagwa in power to 2030; Zanu-PF Treasurer Chinamasa publicly told Mnangagwa his “views do not matter” on the extension; churches warn of “constitutional coup”; VP Chiwenga faction opposes; legal experts say referendum required; opposition halls torched

BUSINESS Nigeria extends raw shea nut export ban one year to Feb 2027 — Tinubu orders all existing waivers withdrawn; surplus must route through Nigerian Commodity Exchange framework; Nigeria produces ~40% of global shea but holds only 1% of $6.5B market; processed butter commands 10–20x raw nut price; government targets $300M annual revenues short-term; Livelihood Finance Mechanism to pilot production support

POLITICS Uganda Supreme Court confirms Museveni re-election — Unanimous 9-justice panel grants withdrawal of only election petition; candidate Kasibante cited financial constraints and lack of evidence for forensic audit; Museveni won Jan 15 election with 71.65% (7.95M votes); Kyagulanyi second with 24.72%; fifth presidential petition withdrawn since 1995 constitution; each party bears own costs

1. US–Africa Health Diplomacy Splits the Continent

What happened: The DRC signed a $1.2 billion health partnership with the United States on Feb 26 — $900M in US funding and $300M in Congolese domestic co-investment over five years. On the same day, Africa CDC Director-General Jean Kaseya warned of “huge concerns regarding data, regarding pathogen sharing” in US bilateral health MOUs. Zimbabwe rejected a $367M deal, calling it “asymmetrical” and citing demands for biological data without guaranteed access to resulting medical innovations. Zambia pushed back on its $1B+ agreement after provisions linking health funding to copper and cobalt mining access emerged. Kenya’s $1.6B MOU remains frozen by the High Court. The US has now signed 19 bilateral health MOUs representing $19.8B — $12.2B in US assistance and $7.5B in co-investment. The State Department said it would begin “winding down” health assistance to Zimbabwe.So what: The continent is splitting into two camps on the most consequential restructuring of US health assistance since PEPFAR was created. Countries signing — DRC, Nigeria, Uganda and 16 others — gain predictable multi-year funding but accept pathogen data-sharing obligations whose commercial implications are undefined. Countries refusing — Zimbabwe, Zambia and effectively Kenya — protect data sovereignty but face the immediate loss of programmes that in Zimbabwe’s case support 1.2 million people on HIV treatment. The linking of health funding to mineral access in Zambia’s case is the sharpest illustration of the Trump administration’s transactional approach. Africa CDC’s public intervention signals that the African Union is positioning itself as a mediating voice, but it lacks the funding to replace American support. The real test: whether Zambia and Zimbabwe can mobilise domestic and alternative financing before programme interruptions become humanitarian crises.

2. Eskom’s Ferrochrome Tariff Cut: Last-Minute Industrial Lifeline

What happened: Eskom announced a 29% reduction in electricity tariffs for Samancor Chrome and the Glencore-Merafe joint venture on Feb 27, cutting rates to 62 South African cents per kilowatt-hour from the interim 87.74c/kWh approved in January. The decision came one day before the Feb 28 deadline after which Glencore would have resumed retrenchment processes at its three remaining smelters. South Africa holds approximately 80% of the world’s known chrome reserves but has lost its position as the world’s top ferrochrome processor to China due to electricity costs that have surged over 900% since 2008. Only 4 of 59 historical furnaces are currently operating. The new tariff could enable 24 furnaces to restart. Electricity Minister Ramokgopa indicated broader smelter relief is under consideration. The government will fund the tariff shortfall to protect standard consumers.So what: This is the most significant industrial policy intervention in South Africa in years, and it arrives at the intersection of energy reform and beneficiation politics. The 62c tariff — built on a model where surplus coal produces surplus power wheeled to smelters — essentially creates a virtual independent power producer within the Eskom framework. If 24 furnaces restart, South Africa begins to reclaim ferrochrome processing from China using its own raw materials and surplus energy. The precedent is explosive: steel, aluminium and every other energy-intensive industry will now demand equivalent treatment. Eskom CEO Dan Marokane faces a balance sheet squeeze. But the broader signal — that the GNU is prepared to use industrial energy pricing as a competitive weapon — may be the most consequential domestic policy development since the budget.

3. Ramaphosa Escalates Iran Naval Probe: A Command Authority Test

What happened: President Ramaphosa transferred the investigation into Iran’s participation in Exercise Will of Peace from the Defence Ministry to the Presidency on Feb 26. Justice Bernard Ngoepe will chair a four-person panel including two additional judges and a rear admiral. The probe relates to the alleged failure by SANDF commanders to comply with Ramaphosa‘s direct instruction to exclude the Iranian navy from the Chinese-led exercise in South African waters in January 2026. The panel can summon any defence force member and access classified documents. It has one month to report. The move came after the SANDF’s own board of inquiry failed to produce results more than a month after being given seven days. Vice-Admiral Monde Lobese is reported to be the central figure under investigation. The US had condemned Iran’s participation.So what: This is about something far larger than a naval exercise. Ramaphosa is asserting civilian command authority over a military that appears to have defied a direct presidential order — a constitutional crisis in miniature. The diplomatic stakes are equally serious: Iran’s participation further strained relations with Washington at a time when the Afrikaner refugee programme, AGOA uncertainty and South Africa’s exclusion from key US diplomatic events are already fraying bilateral ties. By moving the probe to the Presidency, Ramaphosa signals that he views the SANDF’s conduct as a potential national security threat, not merely an administrative lapse. The question is whether the investigation produces accountability or becomes another inquiry that generates a confidential report and no consequences.

4. Zimbabwe’s Constitutional Amendment: From Power Grab to Crisis

What happened: Zimbabwe gazetted Constitutional Amendment Bill No. 3 on Feb 16, proposing to extend presidential and parliamentary terms from five to seven years and replace direct presidential elections with a parliamentary ballot. If applied to the current cycle, the changes would keep President Mnangagwa in power until 2030 rather than requiring him to step down in 2028. Zanu-PF Treasurer Patrick Chinamasa publicly told Mnangagwa his personal views on the extension “do not matter anymore.” Churches issued a “Hands Off the Constitution” warning. Opposition meeting venues have been torched. The bill also allows the president to appoint 10 additional senators and permits traditional leaders to participate in politics. Legal experts say any amendment benefiting a sitting president requires a national referendum under the 2013 Constitution. VP Constantino Chiwenga’s faction is reportedly bitterly opposed.So what: Zimbabwe now faces simultaneous constitutional, economic and health crises. The mineral export ban, the rejected US health deal and the constitutional amendment are all connected by a single thread: a regime that is consolidating control over every lever of sovereignty while economic conditions deteriorate. The shift from popular election to parliamentary selection of the president would eliminate the one remaining mechanism by which Zimbabweans can directly reject their leader. The Chiwenga–Mnangagwa factional split makes the outcome unpredictable: if Chiwenga controls enough military and party loyalty to block the amendment, the succession crisis could become a governance crisis. International attention is fragmented: Washington is focused on mineral access, not democratic backsliding. South Africa is preoccupied with its own challenges. The Zimbabwean opposition is fragmented and infiltrated. The churches may be the last institutional check.

5. Tongaat Hulett Liquidation Hearing Stalls as Sugar Crisis Deepens

What happened: The Durban High Court hearing on Tongaat Hulett’s provisional liquidation could not proceed on Feb 27 as several intervening parties, arguing the 134-year-old company can still be rescued, needed time to file opposing papers. Judge Sanele Hlatshwayo set filing deadlines through mid-March and will consult with the Judge President on a hearing date. The liquidation application follows the collapse of the Vision Group’s rescue plan after failing to secure IDC funding and receiving a R11.7 billion demand. AmaZulu King Misuzulu met Vision’s leadership on Feb 26 to discuss saving the company. KwaZulu-Natal’s 27,000 small-scale farmers face the prospect of four million tonnes of cane rotting in fields if mills close, threatening an estimated one million livelihoods. Tongaat accounts for 27% of South Africa’s sugar production and 40% of its refining capacity.So what: Tongaat Hulett has become a test case for whether South Africa‘s legal and financial system can prevent the collapse of a systemically important agricultural employer. The intervention of the Zulu King adds a political and cultural dimension. The sugar industry’s vulnerability — low-cost imports flooding the market, a single company controlling refining capacity — is a structural problem that liquidation will not solve but will catastrophically expose. The filing delays suggest there are parties with viable rescue proposals, but the complexity of the debt structure (R12B accounting fraud legacy, SCA levy rulings, IDC funding gaps) makes any rescue fragile. For the GNU, a Tongaat collapse in KwaZulu-Natal — a province still scarred by the 2021 unrest — would be a socioeconomic disaster with political consequences.

6. Nigeria’s Shea Ban and Africa’s Value-Addition Wave

What happened: President Tinubu extended the ban on raw shea nut exports for one year from Feb 26, 2026 to Feb 25, 2027, withdrawing all previously granted waivers and requiring surplus production to be exported through the Nigerian Commodity Exchange framework. Nigeria produces approximately 40% of global shea output but captures only about 1% of the $6.5 billion global shea market. Processed shea butter commands 10–20 times the price of raw nuts. The government has set a short-term target of $300 million in annual revenues from value-added shea products and aims for a tenfold increase by 2027. A Livelihood Finance Mechanism will pilot production support, and the Federal Ministry of Finance will open a dedicated funding window.So what: Nigeria’s shea ban, like Zimbabwe’s mineral export ban, reflects Africa’s growing refusal to be a raw-materials exporter. The economics are compelling: a ten-to-twenty-fold price differential between raw and processed output. But the policy has generated sharp divisions among Nigerian exporters, with some warning of foreign exchange losses and supply chain disruptions. The critical question — as with every African beneficiation push — is whether domestic processing capacity actually exists to absorb the supply and whether the infrastructure and quality standards needed for global markets can be built within the ban period. If Nigeria succeeds, it creates a template for other agricultural commodities. If it fails, it creates a domestic supply glut that destroys value for producers.

Africa Intelligence Brief for Friday, February 27, 2026