SCO 2025: Can Xi’s Eurasian Bloc Deliver What the Global South Wants?

A Summit of Scale and Optics

The 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit, held in Tianjin on August 31–September 1, 2025, was unprecedented in size. More than 20 leaders and heads of ten international organizations attended.

Alongside the eight core members—China, Russia, India, Pakistan, and four Central Asian states—newer members Iran (2023) and Belarus (2024) joined.

Guests from Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Nepal, and the Maldives reflected Beijing’s effort to broaden the forum beyond its Eurasian roots.

Chinese President Xi Jinping dominated the proceedings. He urged members to “oppose hegemonism” and reject Cold War thinking, a clear reference to U.S. power.

Xi announced proposals for an SCO Development Bank, ¥2 billion ($280 million) in grants, and ¥10 billion in concessional loans through a banking consortium.

He also offered to establish an AI cooperation center and invited SCO partners to join China’s planned lunar research station.

Russian President Vladimir Putin, facing Western sanctions and isolation, was treated as guest of honor. He praised rising use of national currencies in trade and framed the SCO as a nucleus of Eurasian stability.

Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, who skipped the 2024 meeting, played a central role this time. Modi and Xi held their first face-to-face meeting in years, declaring their countries “development partners, not rivals.”

In a heavily choreographed moment, Modi and Putin entered together to greet Xi, signaling an unlikely show of unity.

The optics were powerful: three leaders with centuries of rivalry standing together, presenting the SCO as a platform for the Global South to counterbalance the West.

Old Rivalries Under a New Banner

The SCO’s strength is also its weakness: it includes adversaries who have often been on opposite sides of history.

• China and India fought a border war in 1962 and clashed again in the Himalayas in 2020. New Delhi resents Beijing’s ties with Pakistan and its Belt and Road projects near Indian borders. Beijing distrusts India’s role in the U.S.-led Quad alliance. Their Tianjin rapprochement, while notable, may reflect temporary pressure from U.S. tariffs rather than a lasting partnership.
• China and Russia are closer than at any time since the 1950s, united by U.S. rivalry. Yet Russia’s junior role—its economy now dependent on Chinese markets and technology—sits uneasily with Moscow’s historic ambitions.
• India and Pakistan both joined in 2017, importing their rivalry into the SCO. New Delhi regularly demands stronger condemnations of Pakistan-based militant groups, while Islamabad resists.
• Central Asian states, historically tied to Moscow, now balance between Russian security ties and Chinese economic influence. They seek investment but remain wary of overdependence.

These rivalries complicate decision-making. Consensus rules mean divisive issues—Ukraine, Gaza, or terrorism—often yield watered-down statements. Analysts note that the SCO remains “an organisation looking for an identity,” more stage than engine.

“The SCO’s value proposition is not NATO-style security but economic sovereignty.”

“Symbolism matters: Xi, Putin and Modi together signal that the Global South has a stage of its own.”

Can SCO Markets Rival the West?

On paper, the SCO is formidable. Its members account for about 43 percent of the world’s population and roughly 23 percent of global GDP. China and India together anchor a market of more than 2.8 billion people.

Yet consumer clout is uneven. China’s GDP per capita is around US$12,000, India’s about US$2,500, compared with roughly $65,000 in the United States. Western markets remain richer and more integrated.

SCO countries also trade more with the West than with each other. China’s trade with SCO partners reached $512 billion in 2024, but most flows remain hub-and-spoke, with Beijing at the center. India’s trade deficit with China stood at $99 billion last year, underscoring imbalances.

Long-term projections, however, are striking. By 2030, Asia is expected to host around 70 percent of the world’s middle-class population. India could surpass both China and the U.S. in middle-class consumption.

For the SCO, the real opportunity lies in gradually shifting from dependence on Western demand to building internal consumer power.

West vs. the Rest—or Just Multipolarity?

The Tianjin choreography suggested a new geopolitical divide. Xi and Putin pitched the SCO as a counterweight to U.S. “hegemonism,” while tariff and technology pressures on several members pushed some states closer together. Across Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America, countries are courted by both camps.

But today’s landscape is less Cold War binary and more multipolar. India still cooperates with the West in defense and technology. Southeast Asian states attend SCO events while strengthening U.S. security ties.

Many African governments welcome Chinese finance yet also seek Western aid. Most countries prefer hedging, not alignment.

The SCO’s real value may be in offering Global South governments an alternative narrative: development finance without political conditions, trade without dollar dominance, and cooperation without lectures. For leaders weary of Western sanctions and conditionality, that message resonates.

What Would Make SCO Deliver?

For the SCO to become more than a talking shop, five tests stand out:

The Verdict

The SCO today is more symbol than substance: a platform for photo-ops and shared grievances against the U.S.-led order. But symbolism matters. The image of Xi flanked by Putin and Modi sends a signal that the Global South has a stage of its own.

Whether the SCO becomes what many countries want—an economic and political counterweight to the West—depends on whether it can turn scale into integration and rivalry into cooperation.

The Tianjin summit showed the capacity to convene. The next few years will reveal whether it has the capacity to deliver.

For now, the SCO offers the Global South bargaining power rather than a full alternative. It is not yet “West versus the Rest,” but it is slowly reshaping how the Rest negotiates with the West.