This is part of The Rio Times’ daily coverage of Latin American markets and financial news.
Raízen reported a net loss of R$ 15.65 billion (~$2.7B) in the third quarter of crop year 2025/26, a six-fold increase from the R$ 2.57 billion (~$443M) loss in the same period last year. The staggering figure was inflated by a non-cash provision of R$ 11.1 billion (~$1.9B) for asset impairment — a write-down the company said was required by accounting standards following the credit rating downgrades that stripped it of investment grade status.
Even stripping out the impairment, the underlying loss was R$ 4.5 billion (~$776M) — a sharp deterioration from the prior quarter’s R$ 2.3 billion (~$397M) loss and the Q1 loss of R$ 1.8 billion (~$310M). Net revenue fell 9.7% year-on-year to R$ 60.4 billion (~$10.4B), pressured by weaker sugar and ethanol prices and reduced agricultural productivity across the company’s sprawling operations.
The reported EBITDA swung to negative R$ 4.4 billion (~$-759M), from positive R$ 2.55 billion (~$440M) a year ago, as the impairment charges wiped out operating profitability. On an adjusted basis — the measure Raízen uses to strip out non-recurring items — EBITDA declined a more moderate 3.3% to R$ 3.15 billion (~$543M), suggesting the core operations are still generating cash, albeit at a level wholly insufficient to service the company’s debt load.
The single largest driver of the headline loss was the non-cash provision for asset impairment. Raízen stated this was required after the credit rating downgrades raised its cost of capital assumptions, effectively reducing the present value of future cash flows from its asset base. In practical terms, the company acknowledged that a significant portion of its invested capital — across ethanol plants, cane fields, and expansion projects — is no longer expected to generate returns that justify its carrying value on the balance sheet. This is the market’s verdict being formalized in the accounts.
Cane crushing collapsed 23% year-on-year to 10.6 million tonnes, with sugar production falling 17% to 1.5 million tonnes. The operational decline reflects drought-damaged yields in São Paulo state and the ongoing impact of the asset sales program that has shrunk Raízen’s mill footprint. Ethanol sales volumes dropped to 778,000 cubic meters from 895,000, though sugar sales rose 14% to 1.33 million tonnes as the company accelerated shipments to generate cash.
Net debt reached R$ 55.3 billion (~$9.5B) at the end of December, up 43% from R$ 38.6 billion (~$6.7B) a year earlier and up from R$ 53.4 billion (~$9.2B) at the end of Q2. Gross debt exceeds R$ 70 billion (~$12.1B). The interest burden has become self-reinforcing: the company paid R$ 7.6 billion (~$1.3B) in interest costs in the nine-month period, consuming cash faster than operations can generate it. At 5.3x net debt/EBITDA, the company is more than triple the 1.3x leverage it carried just 18 months ago at the end of the 2024/25 crop year.

The week leading into this earnings release was among the most damaging in Raízen’s history. All three major rating agencies revoked the company’s investment grade in rapid succession. S&P cut the rating from BBB- to CCC+ with negative watch. Fitch was the most aggressive, slashing five notches in two actions within seven hours, landing at CCC. Moody’s followed with a downgrade from Ba1 to Caa1 with negative outlook.
The triggers were clear: Raízen had announced the hiring of Rothschild & Co as financial advisor and Pinheiro Neto / Cleary Gottlieb as legal counsel to evaluate “structural alternatives.” The agencies interpreted this — correctly — as the opening move in a debt restructuring process. Bondholders responded by forming an ad hoc group, retaining Moelis as financial advisor and White & Case for legal representation.
Raízen’s bonds are now trading at approximately 30 cents on the dollar, implying the market expects substantial losses for creditors. The roughly R$ 27 billion (~$4.7B) in outstanding bonds, with maturities stretching from 2027 to 2054, represent the bulk of what will need to be renegotiated. The S&P moved to revise the outlook on parent Cosan to negative, citing potential spillover risks — though the agency noted that immediate cash impacts on Cosan appear limited.
Raízen ended December with R$ 17.3 billion (~$3.0B) in cash and expects to receive approximately R$ 1.5 billion (~$259M) from divestments already contracted. The company also has access to revolving credit lines. However, this liquidity buffer must be measured against R$ 70 billion-plus in gross debt and negative operating cash flow — what the rating agencies describe as persistent “cash burn.”
Controllers Shell and Cosan have committed to participating in a “capital solution,” though no specific amount or structure has been disclosed. A prior R$ 1.8 billion capital injection was widely dismissed by analysts as insufficient given the scale of the problem. Fitch projects that free cash flow will remain negative through 2027, with leverage staying at 5.0–5.4x — a level fundamentally incompatible with the company’s current capital structure.
Management’s language has shifted from optimism to survival mode. The company acknowledged hiring advisors to evaluate “structural alternatives that maintain its viability and long-term competitiveness” — the corporate equivalent of calling for help. The earnings release emphasized that the R$ 11.1 billion impairment was non-cash and that the restructuring conversations would be conducted jointly with Shell and Cosan.
The operational narrative pointed to continued headwinds from a “challenging macroeconomic environment” including negative impacts on agricultural productivity and weaker sugar and ethanol prices. Notably absent was any guidance for the current crop year or beyond — a silence that speaks volumes about the uncertainty surrounding the company’s future operating configuration.
| Metric | 3T26 | 3T25 | YoY |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Revenue (R$ B) | 60.4 | 66.8 | -9.7% |
| Adj. EBITDA (R$ B) | 3.15 | 3.26 | -3.3% |
| Reported EBITDA (R$ B) | (4.4) | 2.55 | n.m. |
| Net Loss (R$ B) | (15.65) | (2.57) | -509% |
| Impairment (R$ B) | (11.1) | — | — |
| Net Debt (R$ B) | 55.3 | 38.6 | +43.3% |
| Net Debt / Adj. EBITDA (x) | 5.3x | 3.0x | +2.3x |
| Cane Crushed (M tonnes) | 10.6 | 13.8 | -23% |
| Sugar Production (M tonnes) | 1.50 | 1.81 | -17% |
| Cash Position (R$ B) | 17.3 | — | — |
Shell and Cosan have committed to a capital solution. Shell alone has the balance sheet to resolve this entirely — the question is willingness, not capacity. A credible recapitalization would reprice both the equity and the bonds sharply higher.
The adjusted EBITDA of R$ 3.15 billion shows the underlying business still generates cash. The fuel distribution franchise, in particular, continues to deliver improving margins and is a valuable asset in any restructured entity.
At sub-R$ 1.00 per share, the stock has priced in existential risk. Any resolution that preserves equity — even with significant dilution — could represent a multi-bagger from current levels for those willing to bet on a turnaround.
The numbers tell a story of irreversible deterioration: cumulative losses of nearly R$ 20 billion in nine months, R$ 70 billion in gross debt, and an interest burden that exceeds the company’s ability to generate free cash flow. The impairment formally acknowledges that invested capital will not earn its cost of capital.
The restructuring has barely begun. Bondholders at 30 cents are pricing in haircuts of 50% or more. Any debt-for-equity swap would massively dilute existing shareholders, while maturity extensions merely defer the problem. Fitch projects negative FCF through 2027.
Contagion risk is real. S&P has already moved Cosan’s outlook to negative, and the restructuring dynamics of a three-way JV (Cosan/Shell/public float) add complexity that simpler corporate restructurings don’t face. Neither controller may want to throw good money after bad.
The risk profile is dominated by restructuring uncertainty. The company has hired advisors but disclosed no framework, timeline, or parameters for negotiation. In distressed situations, the gap between announcement and resolution can span quarters, during which operational focus suffers, talent departs, and counterparty relationships erode. Each day of uncertainty compounds the problem.
Cross-default provisions embedded in Raízen’s various debt instruments mean that any renegotiation deemed “distressed” by rating agencies could trigger acceleration clauses across the full R$ 70 billion-plus debt stack. The legal complexity of a Cosan-Shell joint venture adds layers of governance friction that pure-play restructurings don’t face — every decision requires alignment between two controlling shareholders with potentially divergent strategic interests.
The operational base continues to shrink. Moagem fell 23%, production is declining, and asset sales — while generating liquidity — remove the cash-generating capacity needed to support any restructured entity. Brazil’s high interest rate environment means that any new debt will carry punitive coupons, and the loss of investment grade permanently raises Raízen’s cost of capital across all funding channels.
Raízen’s crisis stands in stark contrast to the relative resilience of its sugar-ethanol peers. In the same reporting cycle, Jalles Machado swung to profit thanks to hedging discipline and a nimble production mix, while São Martinho — despite lower volumes — maintained a manageable balance sheet. The divergence illustrates a basic truth of the sector: leverage kills. Raízen’s expansion-driven strategy, centered on the capital-intensive second-generation ethanol (E2G) push, left it with a debt structure that could not survive the combination of drought, falling sugar prices, and rising interest rates.
In fuel distribution — the other half of Raízen’s business — peers Vibra and Ultrapar have posted strong results and share price gains. This raises the question of whether the distribution franchise might ultimately be worth more separated from the sugar-ethanol operations in a restructured entity. XP downgraded Raízen to neutral with a R$ 1.10 target before the 3Q26 results, noting that the stock is unlikely to trade on fundamentals until the restructuring path becomes clearer.
With RAIZ4 trading around R$ 0.70 — down more than 80% from its 2021 IPO price — and bonds at 30 cents, Raízen has become a restructuring story rather than an operating company analysis. The outcome will be determined not in the cane fields but in the boardrooms and law offices of São Paulo, New York, and London. For the roughly R$ 255 billion in annual revenue that flows through Raízen’s operations, the question is no longer about growth. It’s about survival.
Related coverage: Brazil’s Morning Call | Brazil Shuts Its Stock Exchange for Carnival — While the Par

