Latin America Defense Monitor – Feb 28–Mar 8, 2026

Regional Posture: The Shield of the Americas summit crystallizes a new architecture for hemispheric security: a formal military coalition, built around like-minded conservative governments, explicitly designed to bypass the multilateral institutions that have historically governed inter-American relations. The expansion of Operation Southern Spear to Ecuadorian soil — from boat strikes to land operations in under six months — represents the most significant projection of U.S. military force in Latin America since the Panama intervention in 1989, and the first acknowledged U.S. land combat operations on South American soil. For defense watchers, the critical question is no longer whether Washington will project military force across Latin America, but how fast the operational footprint expands and which partners sign on.

HEMISPHERE
1. Trump launches Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition at Shield of the Americas summit — 17-nation military alliance formalized

President Trump convened leaders from across the Western Hemisphere at Trump National Doral Miami on March 7 for the inaugural “Shield of the Americas” summit, signing a proclamation establishing the Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition (A3C) — a 17-nation military alliance built around a commitment to using lethal military force against cartel and narco-terrorist networks.

The coalition was formally launched two days earlier at SOUTHCOM headquarters by Defense Secretary Hegseth, who called it “a historic effort” and the “first ever Americas Counter-Cartel Coalition.” SOUTHCOM Commander Gen. Francis Donovan described narco-terrorism as the “single gravest threat to security in our region.”

Leaders of Argentina, Bolivia, Chile (President-elect Kast), Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guyana, Honduras, Panama, Paraguay, and Trinidad and Tobago attended. Trump compared the effort to the U.S.-led coalition that fought the Islamic State, declaring that “we must now do the same thing to eradicate the cartels at home.” He urged all attendees to deploy their militaries against drug trafficking organizations.

Kristi Noem, freshly removed as Homeland Security Secretary, was named Special Envoy for the Shield of the Americas on March 5. Secretary of State Rubio told assembled leaders that Noem would be “very involved with each of you at a personal level and on a daily and weekly and monthly level.”

Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia — the region’s three largest economies and the historical linchpins of U.S. anti-narcotics strategy — were absent. Trump used the summit to attack Mexico directly, calling it the “epicenter of cartel violence” and stating that “the cartels are running Mexico.” The summit replaced the collapsed 10th Summit of the Americas, which was scrapped during the Caribbean military buildup last year.

Assessment: The Shield of the Americas represents a fundamental restructuring of hemispheric security architecture. Rather than working through the OAS or traditional multilateral frameworks, Washington is building a coalition of ideological allies committed to military solutions. The absence of Brazil, Mexico, and Colombia is telling — these are the countries with the most direct experience fighting cartels, but also the ones least willing to subordinate sovereignty to a U.S.-led military framework. The real test is whether the coalition produces operational results beyond the summit communiqué, or whether it remains a political platform for aligning conservative governments behind the Donroe Doctrine.

ECUADOR
2. Operation Southern Spear expands to South American soil — U.S. and Ecuador bomb Comandos de la Frontera camp in the Amazon

On March 3, U.S. and Ecuadorian military forces launched joint operations against designated terrorist organizations in Ecuador — marking the first acknowledged U.S. land operations targeting cartel infrastructure on South American soil. The Pentagon described the actions as falling under Operation Southern Spear.

SOUTHCOM Commander Gen. Francis Donovan had met with Ecuadorian President Daniel Noboa in Quito on March 2 to finalize operational coordination. U.S. Special Forces deployed in an advisory, intelligence, and planning capacity, with Ecuadorian forces conducting the kinetic operations. The Pentagon confirmed that U.S. troops are not participating directly in raids or firefights.

On March 6, the operation escalated significantly. Ecuadorian and U.S. forces used helicopters, fixed-wing aircraft, riverboats, and drones to locate and bomb a Comandos de la Frontera (CDF) training camp in the Santa Rosa sector of Cascales canton, Sucumbíos province, near the Colombian border. The camp served as a rest area for CDF leader alias “Mono Tole” and had a training capacity for approximately 50 members. Ecuador dubbed the operation “Total Extermination.”

Neither the U.S. nor Ecuador confirmed casualties or captures from the bombing. Weapons and other evidence linked to illicit activities were recovered during the subsequent sweep. The Comandos de la Frontera are composed of FARC dissidents who rejected Colombia’s 2016 peace agreement.

Noboa’s government simultaneously imposed a curfew from March 15 to March 30 in the provinces of Guayas, Los Ríos, Santo Domingo de los Tsáchilas, and El Oro. Voters had rejected Noboa’s proposed constitutional change to allow a permanent U.S. military base in Ecuador in a November 2025 referendum, but the current operations sidestep that restriction through cooperation agreements and the SOFA framework.

Assessment: This is the most consequential escalation of U.S. military operations in Latin America since the intervention in Venezuela in January. Southern Spear has evolved from maritime interdiction to land warfare in six months — precisely the trajectory that classified briefings had signaled since last fall. The Ecuador operations establish a template that other coalition partners may be expected to follow: request U.S. assistance, accept advisory special forces, allow “lethal kinetic operations” against FTO-designated groups. The fact that Ecuadorian voters explicitly rejected a permanent U.S. base but are now hosting U.S. combat operations under a different legal framework is a political contradiction that critics will exploit.

CARIBBEAN
3. Southern Spear maritime strikes push past 156 killed — tempo unbroken despite force-posture shift to land operations

Even as Operation Southern Spear expanded to land operations in Ecuador, the maritime interdiction campaign continued unabated. A March 8 strike in the Eastern Pacific killed six people aboard a vessel SOUTHCOM said was transiting known narco-trafficking routes, bringing the campaign total to at least 156 killed since September 2025.

The strike was directed by Gen. Donovan and followed the pattern established over the past six months: intelligence confirmation of vessel activity on trafficking routes, followed by lethal engagement. SOUTHCOM reported no U.S. casualties. The campaign is now averaging approximately two maritime strikes per week, consistent with the tempo established in February.

The continued maritime strikes alongside the new Ecuador land operations mean Southern Spear is now simultaneously active across three domains: the Eastern Pacific, the Caribbean Sea, and the Ecuadorian interior. This multi-domain expansion occurred without a corresponding increase in force levels, as the Ford carrier strike group remains deployed to the Middle East.

Legal and political challenges continue to mount. The Trinidad and Tobago lawsuit filed by families of victims remains active, the St. Lucia fishermen case is unresolved, and the expansion to land operations in Ecuador adds new jurisdictional and sovereignty questions. At the Shield of the Americas summit, Trump framed the coalition as providing the legal and political foundation for continued and expanded military action.

Assessment: The simultaneous execution of maritime strikes and land operations across multiple countries represents a qualitative shift in the campaign’s scope. Southern Spear began as naval interdiction and has become a multi-domain counter-terrorism campaign spanning thousands of miles. The 156 killed figure continues to generate international scrutiny, but the Shield of the Americas coalition provides the political cover Washington needs to sustain operations. The real constraint is not political will but operational bandwidth — the question is whether SOUTHCOM can maintain this tempo while the Middle East draws down carrier and intelligence assets.

MEXICO
4. CJNG succession crisis enters second week — El Mencho buried in golden casket as four commanders vie for control

The CJNG’s power vacuum deepened this week as El Mencho was buried on March 2 in Zapopan, Jalisco, in an elaborate funeral ceremony featuring a golden casket. The event drew dozens of attendees in a public display of cartel influence that underscored the organization’s continued capacity despite losing its founder.

Mexico’s security minister Omar García Harfuch confirmed that authorities have identified four “strongest leaders” within the CJNG, two of whom are considered the most likely successors. The U.S. National Counterterrorism Center has designated El Mencho’s stepson, Juan Carlos Valencia González (“El Pelon”), as the de facto second-in-command, with a $5 million U.S. bounty on his head. Other contenders include Ricardo Ruiz Velasco (“El Doble R”), Audias Flores Silva (“El Jardinero,” also carrying a $5 million bounty), and Hugo Mendoza Gaytán (“El Sapo”) — though some reports suggest El Sapo may have been killed during the February 22 operation.

Security analysts noted that El Mencho had anticipated his incapacitation by creating a council of regional commanders to whom he delegated key leadership functions, partly because his kidney disease required regular dialysis. The CJNG operates through a franchise model that allows semi-autonomous regional factions to use the cartel’s name and methods in exchange for profit-sharing, a structure that may prevent immediate fragmentation.

At the Shield of the Americas summit, Trump called Mexico the “epicenter of cartel violence” and declared that “the cartels are running Mexico.” Mexico was not invited to the summit. Security analysts warn that CJNG factions may ramp up smuggling operations and test the border harder while Mexican forces remain tied down with internal security operations. The cartel retains an estimated 15,000–20,000 members with a presence in over 100 countries.

Assessment: The golden casket funeral was a power statement: the CJNG demonstrated that it can hold a public spectacle for its fallen leader in a major Mexican city without interference. The franchise model may provide short-term stability, but the competition between four or more commanders for supreme authority creates the conditions for precisely the kind of internal warfare that historically fragments Mexican cartels. For Southern Spear’s maritime campaign, the question from Issue #03 remains: if CJNG’s Pacific trafficking networks scatter into smaller cells, targeting becomes exponentially more complex.

CHILE
5. Kast collapses transition talks over Chinese sea cable — first break in post-Pinochet democratic handover tradition

President-elect José Antonio Kast pulled his incoming administration out of transition talks with outgoing President Gabriel Boric on March 4 — the first collapse of presidential transition negotiations since Chile’s return to democracy in 1990. Kast accused the Boric government of withholding information about the construction of an undersea cable connecting Chile to China.

Boric’s transport secretary Juan Carlos Muñoz had approved the cable project in January but did not make a public announcement. The process was paused in February due to cybersecurity concerns. The United States subsequently sanctioned three Chilean transport ministry officials, including Muñoz, for allegedly directing activities that “compromised critical telecommunications infrastructure and undermined regional security.”

Boric disputed Kast’s characterization, telling the press that the president-elect had been informed weeks before. Analysts see Kast’s decision as strategically timed ahead of the Shield of the Americas summit, sending a strong signal to Washington about his administration’s alignment on the China question.

Kast traveled to the Shield of the Americas summit in Doral before returning for his March 11 inauguration. At least a dozen heads of state have confirmed attendance, including Spain’s Felipe VI, Argentina’s Milei, and Ecuador’s Noboa. China is sending President Xi Jinping’s special envoy, and South Korea is sending a special envoy from President Lee Jae-myung. Kast will be Chile’s most right-wing president since Pinochet and has pledged to unblock stalled defense programs including the F-16 modernization, submarine replacement, and the Cromo armored vehicle program.

Assessment: The cable dispute is a tactical move with strategic implications. By making the China sea cable his first crisis, Kast simultaneously signals loyalty to Washington, creates distance from the Boric legacy, and frames his presidency around the U.S.-China competition that will define Latin American geopolitics for the coming decade. The U.S. sanctions on Chilean officials are remarkable — Washington sanctioning outgoing government officials of a democratic ally over telecommunications infrastructure is an aggressive use of economic statecraft. For defense procurement watchers, the clear takeaway is that Kast-era programs will be oriented firmly toward U.S. and NATO-standard platforms.

VENEZUELA
6. Venezuela oil acceleration continues — PDVSA signs new U.S. supply contracts as Chevron and Repsol ramp production targets

PDVSA announced on March 4 the signing of new contracts to supply crude oil and refined products to refineries along the U.S. Gulf Coast, deepening the commercial reintegration of Venezuelan oil into the American energy system. Although PDVSA did not disclose counterparty names, the agreements add to existing operations with Chevron, which plans to increase exports to approximately 300,000 barrels per day this month.

Repsol, the Spanish energy major with a 33-year history in Venezuela, is targeting 100,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day in 2026 — up from 71,300 in 2025. CEO Josu Jon Imaz announced plans to triple crude production at the Petroquiriquire heavy oil joint venture to approximately 135,000 bpd within three years, following a 20-year field extension through 2048.

During his State of the Union address, Trump highlighted the arrival of 80 million barrels of Venezuelan crude and described Venezuela as a “new friend and partner” in energy cooperation. Energy Secretary Chris Wright has stated the sanctions embargo has “essentially ended” and projects $5 billion in additional revenue from Venezuelan crude sales.

ExxonMobil continues to hold back. CEO Darren Woods has called Venezuela “uninvestable,” insisting the country must transition to full democracy before investment makes sense. The contrast with Chevron and Repsol’s aggressive posture highlights the divergence between companies willing to accept political risk and those demanding institutional guarantees before committing capital.

Assessment: The pace of Venezuelan oil reintegration is remarkable. In barely two months since Maduro’s capture, PDVSA is signing new supply contracts, Chevron is targeting 300,000 bpd, and Repsol is committing to triple production. The strategic architecture outlined in Issue #03 — Western companies in, Russia and China out — is being implemented faster than most analysts predicted. The outstanding variable remains the Exxon holdout: whether the world’s largest private oil company eventually enters Venezuela or whether Chevron and European firms consolidate an early-mover advantage will shape the sector’s competitive dynamics for a generation.

PROCUREMENT
7. Peru classifies fighter acquisition under “military secrecy” — three contenders officially remain as April decision approaches

Peru’s government took the unusual step of classifying its 24-aircraft fighter acquisition under “military secrecy” through Ministerial Resolution 001-2026-DE, signed by the Minister of the Interior Hugo Begazo de Bedoya (acting in the defense portfolio). The classification authorizes the purchase to proceed as a direct acquisition rather than a public tender process.

The resolution covers investment project CUI No. 2573425, the “strengthening of operational capabilities” program that encompasses the replacement of Peru’s aging MiG-29, Mirage 2000, Su-25, and A-37 fleet. Despite persistent reports that the F-16 Block 70 has been selected, the official competition formally includes three contenders: Lockheed Martin’s F-16 Block 70, Saab’s Gripen E, and Dassault’s Rafale F4.

The secrecy classification ensures the process remains subject to Peruvian state oversight bodies, including the Comptroller General’s Office, while shielding procurement details from public scrutiny. If no objections are raised, the process moves to the Armed Forces Procurement Agency (ACFFAA) for negotiations and contract signing.

Peru was designated a Major Non-NATO Ally by Washington on January 14, 2026, granting access to Foreign Military Financing, priority for excess defense articles, and expanded joint training — mechanisms that significantly favor the U.S.-built platform. The formal announcement remains expected in mid-April following Peru’s general elections, with the contract valued at up to $7 billion for all 24 aircraft.

Assessment: The secrecy classification is a double-edged sword. It accelerates the procurement by removing public tender requirements, but it also shields a $7 billion decision from the transparency that competing manufacturers and opposition politicians will demand. For Saab and Dassault, the classification narrows their window for legal or diplomatic challenge. The Major Non-NATO Ally designation and the $300 million budget allocation from Issue #03 together create an almost irreversible momentum toward the F-16 — but “almost” leaves room for surprise, and April’s elections add an unpredictable political variable.

BRAZIL
8. Brazil excluded from Shield summit as Lula-Trump bilateral approaches — hemisphere’s largest economy navigates isolation

Brazil’s conspicuous absence from the Shield of the Americas summit underscored the growing rift between Lula’s government and Washington’s new hemispheric security architecture. Alongside Mexico and Colombia, Brazil was left out of the 17-nation counter-cartel coalition, leaving the region’s largest economy on the outside of the defining security initiative of 2026.

The Lula-Trump bilateral meeting, described in Issue #03 as the “most consequential bilateral meeting of the quarter,” remains expected in early March in Washington. The agenda encompasses Venezuela, U.S. tariffs on Brazil, critical minerals, Cuba, and military cooperation. Analysts expect Lula to arrive without firm objectives and are skeptical of a substantive deal.

The Inter-American Dialogue’s Brazil Program noted that Lula is walking a political tightrope: his October 2026 reelection campaign makes substantial concessions to Trump unlikely, but the 50 percent tariffs on Brazilian goods (with exemptions for beef, coffee, and orange juice) create economic pressure. Critical minerals — including lithium, rare earths, and iron — represent the most promising area for cooperation, with Brazil seeking investment to boost midstream refining capacity.

Lula’s rhetorical positioning has intensified. He compared U.S. intervention in Venezuela to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and demanded that Maduro be tried in Venezuela rather than the United States. At the AI summit in New Delhi, Lula set boundaries by declaring that “the world does not want a new cold war.” The message to Washington is clear: Brazil will engage, but not subordinate its sovereignty or foreign policy independence to any military coalition.

Assessment: Brazil’s exclusion from the Shield summit is a strategic choice by both sides. Trump wants a coalition of the willing, not a multilateral negotiation; Lula wants to preserve his independent positioning ahead of elections. But the gap is widening: Brazil is simultaneously outside the U.S.-led security framework and deepening its own defense partnerships with South Korea and India. Whether the Lula-Trump bilateral can bridge this gap or merely manage the divergence will determine whether Latin America’s security architecture remains bipolar or fragments further.

United States

Russia

China

CHILE
Kast inaugurated March 11. Immediate defense policy signals: cabinet defense appointments, China stance formalization, and first meetings with SOUTHCOM. FIDAE 2026 (Apr 7–12) exhibitor list finalizing — F-35 Demo Team confirmed. Submarine replacement study, F-16 M6.6 modernization, and Cromo armored vehicle program expected to receive political green light.

ECUADOR
Scope and timeline of U.S. land operations: do they expand beyond Sucumbíos? March 15–30 curfew in four provinces signals larger kinetic campaign ahead. Watch for Comandos de la Frontera and Los Lobos/Los Choneros targeting. Colombia’s reaction to cross-border strikes near its territory is a critical diplomatic variable.

MEXICO
CJNG succession dynamics: which commander consolidates first? Watch for factional violence, border smuggling spikes, and shifts in Pacific trafficking patterns. Mexico’s exclusion from Shield summit deepens U.S.-Mexico tensions; Sheinbaum response to Trump’s “cartels are running Mexico” comment will set the bilateral tone.

BRAZIL
Lula-Trump bilateral in Washington — still the quarter’s most consequential diplomatic meeting. Critical minerals offer the most realistic area for cooperation. Watch for any movement on U.S. basing access to Brazil’s northeast coast and whether exclusion from Shield coalition changes Lula’s calculus on military cooperation.

VENEZUELA
Oil sector pace: Chevron’s 300K bpd target is the benchmark. Watch for Repsol and Eni early investment commitments. SOUTHCOM security cooperation agreements with Rodríguez government. Political prisoner releases and election timeline under continued U.S. pressure. Trump-Xi Beijing meeting in late March could address Venezuelan oil flows to China.

This was the week the Western Hemisphere’s security architecture was formally rebuilt. At a golf resort in Doral, seventeen nations signed onto a military alliance that treats drug cartels the way the previous generation treated the Islamic State. At a jungle camp in the Ecuadorian Amazon, U.S. and Ecuadorian forces bombed a FARC-dissident training facility — the first acknowledged American land combat operation in South America in thirty-seven years. And in the Eastern Pacific, another six people died on a boat that SOUTHCOM said was trafficking narcotics.

Operation Southern Spear is no longer a maritime campaign. It is a multi-domain war against designated terrorist organizations across the Western Hemisphere, with land, sea, and air components operating simultaneously from the Caribbean to the Ecuadorian interior. The pace of escalation — from boat strikes in September, to Venezuelan regime change in January, to South American ground operations in March — has outrun every prediction made by analysts tracking the campaign.

The countries gathered at the Shield summit are the ones willing to follow Washington’s lead. The countries absent — Brazil, Mexico, Colombia — are the ones with the deepest experience fighting cartels but also the strongest attachment to sovereignty. It is a coalition built for action, not consensus, and that is precisely the point.

In Chile, an incoming president collapsed his own transition over a Chinese submarine cable, choosing alignment with Washington over democratic tradition. In Mexico, a dead cartel leader was buried in a golden casket while his successors prepare to fight each other and the state simultaneously. In Venezuela, oil companies are signing contracts to rebuild an industry that was destroyed by the same geopolitical forces now being redeployed to reshape the continent.

Peru quietly moved its $7 billion fighter purchase behind the wall of military secrecy. Brazil was left outside the room while its neighbors signed military compacts. And in the background of it all, a new war with Iran is pulling carrier groups and presidential attention thousands of miles away from the hemisphere.

The pattern is clear. Washington is building a military coalition for the Americas, prosecuting ground operations in South America, and integrating oil sectors while fighting a major war in the Middle East. The last time the United States simultaneously managed multiple kinetic campaigns, a hemispheric realignment, and a resource-extraction agenda on this scale, it was 2003. The architects of this strategy are betting that the result will be different. The people of Latin America are waiting to find out.