Key Points
— Brazil’s first-quarter trade surplus reached a record US$14.2 billion — up 47.6% year-on-year — driven by total Q1 exports of US$82.3 billion, also a historical record. Crude oil exports alone jumped 31% to US$12.56 billion as Asian buyers rerouted purchases away from Middle East suppliers during the Iran war disruption.
— The bilateral shift is extreme. China absorbed 57% of Brazilian crude volume in Q1 and 65% in March alone, doubling its dollar take from Brazilian oil to US$7.19 billion. India’s Brazilian crude imports rose 78% to US$1.03 billion. US oil purchases collapsed 40%, from US$1.065 billion to just US$632 million, while overall Brazilian exports to the US fell 18.7%.
— The federal government revised 2026 projections to US$364.2 billion in total exports and a US$72.1 billion annual surplus. FGV/IBRE researcher Lívio Ribeiro and AEB president José Augusto de Castro warn that imported inflation and commodity price volatility could erode the windfall, and that the underlying dependence on three commodities — oil, soybeans, iron ore — is deepening rather than diversifying.
Brazil’s Q1 trade surplus record is the sharpest example yet of how the Iran war has rewired the Atlantic oil trade — but the underlying economist caution about commodity dependence is a warning that this windfall should not be mistaken for structural improvement.
Brazil has just posted the best first-quarter trade performance in its history — and the country’s own economists are urging caution about what it means. The Rio Times, the Latin American financial news outlet, reports that Brazil’s Q1 2026 trade surplus hit a record US$14.2 billion, up 47.6% year-on-year, with total exports of US$82.3 billion, both historical firsts, and the Brazil trade surplus record was driven almost entirely by a US$12.56 billion oil shipment that the Iran war redirected from Middle East routes to Atlantic ones.
The government reacted quickly, revising its 2026 projections upward to US$364.2 billion in total exports and a US$72.1 billion annual surplus. That would beat 2025’s US$68.3 billion by a comfortable margin and cement petroleum as the single most important driver of Brazil’s external accounts.
Economists at FGV/IBRE and the Brazilian Foreign Trade Association (AEB) see the record differently. They see a war dividend that could reverse as quickly as it arrived.
The Hormuz Pivot in Numbers
Brazilian crude exports to China jumped from US$3.70 billion in Q1 2025 to US$7.19 billion in Q1 2026 — a 94% increase in value and a 122% increase in volume (7,400 to 16,500 tonnes). China absorbed 57% of all Brazilian crude exports in the quarter, rising to 65% in March alone, the month the Iran war intensified.
March registered the highest monthly volume of Brazilian oil exports to China since 1997 — the start of the historical series. India’s purchases rose 78% to US$1.03 billion. Both flows are direct substitutions for the roughly 40% of Chinese oil imports that normally transit the Strait of Hormuz.
The mirror image is the United States. Brazilian crude exports to the US fell from US$1.065 billion to US$632 million — a 40% decline — and broader Brazilian exports to the US dropped 18.7%, reflecting the Section 122 surcharge regime still applying to 22% of Brazilian goods shipped north.
Why Economists Worry About the Brazil Trade Surplus Record
Lívio Ribeiro, FGV/IBRE researcher and founding partner of consulting firm BRCG, framed the Q1 result as an amplification of an existing trend rather than a breakthrough. “There is a scenario of diversification of suppliers because of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the hostilities in the Middle East,” he said. “In fact, I would say this is expanding a trend that was already being observed previously.”
The caution matters because the lift is largely a volume story, not a price story. Brazilian oil production hit an all-time high of 3.77 million barrels per day in 2025, and limited domestic refining capacity means most of the incremental output goes abroad. The global oil price did not fully explain the surplus jump — the volume did.
José Augusto de Castro, president of AEB, is blunter. “Depending on commodity exports means we have no control, because they rise and fall at the whim of events,” he said. The same Iran war that lifts the oil surplus also pushes up the cost of imported machinery, chemicals, and manufactured goods that Brazil has to bring in.
The Imported-Inflation Offset
Ribeiro’s concern is that the gross surplus overstates the net benefit. “We cannot only look at the short-term effect. There was an initial gain, but the import prices of other products will also grow in an environment of higher global inflation generally,” he said.
The same Hormuz disruption that rerouted oil flows also threatens the 41% of Brazilian urea imports that transited the strait in 2025 and the food corridors to the Middle East.
That offset is one reason the Copom has signaled it may proceed more cautiously on rate cuts than the market had priced before the conflict. Imported inflation from a stronger dollar and higher global input costs can blunt the rate-cutting cycle Brazilian markets have been counting on since December.
The surplus revenue improves the fiscal trajectory, but the inflation side of the ledger complicates the monetary-policy path.
The Structural Dependence Critique
What concerns Ribeiro and Castro most is the underlying composition. Three commodities — oil, soybeans, and iron ore — now account for more than 75% of Brazilian exports to China. The return flow is dominated by manufactured goods, including US$1.23 billion in Chinese electric and hybrid vehicles imported into Brazil in Q1 alone.
Roberto Ardenghy, president of the Brazilian Petroleum and Gas Institute (IBP), summarized the tension in a single sentence: “The relationship with China is fundamental and will continue to be, but Brazil’s challenge is to reduce dependence on commodities and expand insertion in more sophisticated value chains.” The surplus is a symptom of exactly that failure — a country monetizing raw extraction while importing value-added products.
For context, petroleum and derivatives surplus hit US$29.6 billion in 2025, equivalent to 43.3% of the total trade surplus. On the Q1 2026 trajectory, that share is rising — not shrinking — as the oil windfall scales.
The US-China Rebalancing
The Q1 numbers show a sharper US-China rebalancing than Brazilian negotiators expected when the Section 122 tariffs hit last year. Brazilian exports to China rose 21.7% to US$23.9 billion in Q1, producing a US$6 billion bilateral surplus. Exports to the US fell 18.7% to US$7.78 billion, producing a US$1.39 billion deficit.
The monthly surplus with China in March — US$3.83 billion — was nearly ten times the monthly deficit with the US. Chinese purchases are now three times the US level, a ratio that did not exist two years ago and that is not reversible under current tariff architecture.
The European Union remains Brazil’s most balanced partner, with Q1 exports up 9.7% to US$12.23 billion and the EU-Mercosur provisional implementation set for May 1 providing a parallel diversification channel.
Lula’s Fuel-Price Pledge
President Lula told reporters during his Portugal stop Tuesday that the government intends to prevent the Iran-driven oil price spike from reaching Brazilian pump prices. “I want to build partnerships with states to prevent the effect of the war in the Middle East from reaching the people’s pocket,” he said.
The political logic is obvious — Lula’s approval has been under pressure and the administration is six months from the October election. The fiscal logic is trickier. Subsidizing fuel prices means transferring part of the Petrobras export windfall to domestic consumption rather than the Treasury, which weakens the very surplus the oil boom is generating.
That is the electoral calculus BofA and other foreign investors are watching when they flag pre-election fiscal loosening as the secondary risk to their otherwise-bullish Brazil thesis.
What to Watch Next
The April trade data, due in early May, will be the first clean read on whether the oil pivot persists past the March spike. The Iran ceasefire expired Wednesday, and Trump’s decision to extend it indefinitely removes the immediate trigger for further escalation but does not restore pre-war Hormuz volumes.
The second marker is the 2026 USMCA review opening July 1 and Section 122 expiration on July 24. Both events will clarify whether the US import channel recovers any of the 18.7% Q1 decline, or whether the structural pivot toward Asia becomes permanent.
For now, Brazil is capturing a windfall that economists warn it did not earn and cannot count on. The surplus is real. The structural improvement it implies is not.
As Lívio Ribeiro put it, what Brazil is seeing is “the expansion of a trend that was already being observed” — accelerated, not created, by Hormuz. That framing is the one global investors pricing a Brazil trade surplus record into their allocations should internalize before mistaking a war dividend for a country’s structural transformation.
Related Coverage: Brazil Oil Exports to China Double • Brazil Trade 2026: US Down, China Up • BTG and Goldman on Brazil Oil Trade

