— Twelve Brazilian cargo ships sailed for Persian Gulf ports since the Iran war began on February 28, with eight departures in March and four more since early April.
— Brazilian exports to Iran rose to US$134.8 million in March despite the war, with roughly 1.7 million tonnes of corn waiting at or arriving into Bandar Imam Khomeini port.
— Brazil signed a port-transit deal with Turkey in March as an alternative Gulf route, while the Navy issues risk analyses to shipping firms but does not halt traffic.
Brazil Gulf shipping has not stopped despite more than fifty days of limited traffic through the Strait of Hormuz because of the Iran war. Twelve Brazilian cargo vessels have left ports bound for Persian Gulf destinations, the Brazilian Navy confirmed to Valor Econômico, with eight departing in March — the first month of the US and Israeli military campaign against Iran — and four more since the start of April. The strait is the main approach to most Gulf ports.
The Rio Times, the Latin American financial news outlet, reports that the Navy declined to name the precise destination countries for each vessel. It said only that it continues to monitor the conflict zone and issues maritime security analyses to Brazilian exporters, with particular attention to areas deemed sensitive. The Navy does not order ships to turn back.
What the shipments show is a commercial calculation built on necessity. Brazil’s largest Gulf customers are Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which buy Brazilian sugar, chicken, and corn in volume, while Iran ranks third but carries outsized weight in one category. Iran alone imported 23% of Brazil’s total corn exports in 2025 — more than nine million tonnes, according to the National Association of Cereal Exporters.
Iran Sales Rose Even As the War Began
The March data from the Ministry of Development, Industry, Trade and Services shows Brazilian exports to Iran reached US$134.8 million — higher than the US$128.6 million recorded in March 2025, before any war. Brazilian Gulf shipping to Saudi Arabia edged down to US$248 million from US$255.6 million a year earlier, while sales to the Emirates dropped more sharply, from US$248.3 million to US$207 million.
Annual trade with Iran hovered around US$3 billion in both 2024 and 2025, making Tehran a mid-sized but structurally important customer for Brazilian grain. Those shipments have always operated under strain. Banks and companies fear secondary penalties from countries that sanction Iran, even though food is formally outside the sanctions regime.
André Veras, Brazil’s ambassador in Tehran, told Valor that Iranian officials commonly describe a figure closer to US$9 billion in Brazilian imports — the gap suggesting that substantial volumes are routed through third countries before reaching the Islamic Republic. Brasília announced a deal with Turkey in March to allow Turkish ports to serve as an alternative transit route into the Persian Gulf.
The Corn Pipeline Into Bandar Imam Khomeini
Even with Hormuz constrained, Brazilian corn vessels kept arriving at the Iranian port of Bandar Imam Khomeini. A trading source told Valor that around 500,000 tonnes were waiting to unload by the end of the second week of April, another 560,000 were already being discharged, and a further 675,000 tonnes arrived during the second half of March.
Total corn arrivals into Iran fell nonetheless: March saw roughly 1.1 million tonnes unloaded from all origins, around 200,000 tonnes less than in March 2025, with traders reporting longer berth waits and delays in payments to exporters. As earlier Rio Times coverage of the corn and fertilizer chokepoint documented, the Brazil-Iran trade is uniquely exposed. Iran is simultaneously the largest single buyer of Brazilian corn and a critical source of urea fertilizer flowing the other way.
Since the war began on February 28, Iran had effectively halted ship movements through Hormuz. Last week the United States announced it would start blocking passage for vessels serving Iran, and on Saturday Tehran responded with new transit restrictions.
Navy Role and the Sanctions Question
“The Navy monitors the situation and disseminates risk analyses and maritime security guidance to companies in the sector, especially regarding areas considered sensitive,” the force said by email to Valor. That posture stops short of the more assertive line pursued by European navies operating escort missions in the region.
The sanctions backdrop adds commercial friction that shipping logistics cannot fully resolve. As covered in earlier Rio Times reporting on US tariff threats tied to Iran trade, Washington has floated 25% duties on countries that continue doing business with Tehran. Brazilian firms weighing Iranian sales against access to the much larger US market now face tighter compliance scrutiny from banks, insurers, and freight forwarders.
The Hormuz redirect has also reshaped Brazilian export flows at the macro level. Chinese buyers turned to Brazilian crude as Middle East supply narrowed, pushing Brazilian oil exports to China to record levels in the first quarter of 2026. Agricultural trade is now following a parallel, if more hazardous, path.
What the Twelve Ships Tell Markets About Brazil Gulf Shipping
The takeaway is that Brazilian Gulf shipping flows have not collapsed; they have simply become more expensive and more politically exposed. Insurance premiums for Gulf-bound cargoes have risen, transit times have lengthened, and the Turkey workaround adds a second handling step that cuts into margins.
For Brazilian agribusiness, keeping the corridor open matters beyond the March and April numbers. The second-crop corn harvest now underway in Mato Grosso and Goiás will produce the volumes that typically flow to Iran and other Gulf buyers in the second half of the year. The timing of any permanent Hormuz reopening — or a broader conflict escalation — will determine whether those harvests find buyers.
Readers tracking the wider oil and shipping picture can consult the Rio Times guide to the Iran War and Hormuz Crisis of 2026 for the timeline of strait closures, price impacts, and Latin American exposure. The twelve Brazilian ships already at sea suggest that commerce, for now, is outpacing diplomacy.