Venezuela says it is finally ready to send natural gas to Colombia, turning on a pipeline that has been mostly idle for more than a decade.
President Nicolás Maduro announced that the first shipment is loaded on the Venezuelan side of the border and only “technical details” remain before commercial flows begin.
He wrapped the news in a larger message of economic recovery, again promising to lift oil production toward 1.2 million barrels per day and crediting state workers for the effort.
The gas would move through the Antonio Ricaurte, or Trans-Caribbean, pipeline, a 224-kilometer link between Venezuela’s Zulia state and Colombia’s La Guajira.
Built in 2007 to send Colombian gas eastward, it was always supposed to reverse after 2011 so that Venezuela could export. Instead, PDVSA’s collapse, years of mismanagement and sanctions left the line largely unused.
Colombia now has a clear interest in seeing it work. Caribbean fields such as Chuchupa and Ballena are in decline, planners warn of supply gaps later this decade, and the government in Bogotá wants to avoid expensive LNG imports as it pushes a politically driven energy transition.
Venezuelan gas deal offers shortcut but risks remain
Venezuelan gas looks like a shortcut: cheaper molecules from next door, no regasification terminals, and a narrative of regional integration.
But serious doubts remain. Technical assessments say the cross-border pipeline has degraded and needs heavy maintenance before it can safely operate at meaningful volumes.
U.S. sanctions on Venezuela’s oil and gas sector, and Washington’s shifting stance between limited relief and renewed pressure, complicate long-term contracts.
Colombian analysts and opposition figures also question the wisdom of relying on an authoritarian, crisis-ridden neighbor for strategic energy supply. For Caracas, the project is about more than gas.
The government presents it as proof that it can diversify beyond crude exports, build a binational economic zone along the 2,219-kilometer border, and restore state authority in regions long dominated by smuggling and armed groups.
For outsiders, it is a test of whether political projects and fragile institutions can really support regional energy security—or simply add a new layer of risk.