| INSTRUMENT | LEVEL | MOVE | NOTE |
|---|---|---|---|
| US CPI (YoY, Feb) | 2.4% | — unchanged from Jan | In line; core 2.5%; “calm before the storm” — oil shock to hit March data |
| S&P 500 | ~6,740 | ▼ −2% since war began | Outperforming Europe/Japan as US is net oil exporter; 2.7% trading range in 41 days |
| WTI Crude ($/bbl) | ~$87 | ▲ +4% Wed; +35% in one week | Largest weekly gain since WTI introduced 1983; briefly topped $100 Mon |
| US Nonfarm Payrolls (Feb) | −92,000 | ▼ vs +50K expected | 3rd loss in 5 months; unemployment 4.4%; Dec revised to −17K; net job loss since Apr 2025 |
| Fed Funds Rate | 3.50–3.75% | — held; next cut Sep expected | 43% chance of 2nd cut before year-end; war complicates dual mandate |
| DXY (US Dollar Index) | ~98.65 | ▼ −0.5% (Wed) | Safe-haven bids fading on Trump war-end signals; monthly gain ~2% |
| Gold ($/oz) | ~$5,210 | ▼ −1.1% (Wed) | Profit-taking; still near highs; record $5,595 earlier this year |
| CAD/USD | ~C$1.41/$ | ▲ CAD supported by oil | Scotiabank: $10/bbl rise = ~3% CAD appreciation; net energy exporter benefit |
| US 30Y Mortgage Rate | 6.083% | ▲ +0.03pp (Wed) | Refi activity strongest since 2022; MBA apps +11% week ending Feb 27 |
| US Avg Hourly Earnings (Feb) | $37.32 (~€31.90) | ▲ +0.4% MoM; +3.8% YoY | Above forecast; wages rising but labor’s income share at record low |
| COUNTRY | INDICATOR | SIGNAL |
|---|---|---|
| United States | CPI 2.4%; Fed 3.50–3.75% | −92K jobs Feb; rate cut Sep earliest; oil shock to hit Mar CPI; tariffs add $1,100/yr/household |
| Canada | Net energy exporter; C$1.41/$ | GDP +0.5% per $10/bbl; trade rotating to 27 partners; Section 232 crushing steel/aluminum/auto |
| US Labor Market | Unemployment 4.4%; wages +3.8% | Net job loss since Apr 2025; fed govt −330K since Oct 2024; labor income share at record low |
| US Energy | WTI ~$87; net exporter | IEA 400M bbl release; +35% in 1 week; Farm Bureau warns crop risk; gasoline toward $5/gal |
| US-Canada Trade | CUSMA “zombie”; 35% tariff | Steel/aluminum/auto at 50%; China canola deal; 100% tariff threat; C$8.8bn net loss in targeted sectors |
| US Productivity | +2.8% Q4 2025 | Tech/AI-driven gains; labor income share at record low; productivity–wage disconnect widens |
| DATE | EVENT | SIGNIFICANCE |
|---|---|---|
| Mar 11 (Wed) | US February CPI released; IEA reserve vote | CPI 2.4% in line; 400M barrel release decision; G7 energy ministers meet |
| Mar 16 | Japan oil reserve release begins | 15 days private + 1 month national; first unilateral release since system created |
| Mar 19 | FOMC rate decision | Fed funds 3.50–3.75%; hold expected; war impact on inflation outlook key discussion |
| Apr 10 | US March CPI release | First reading to capture Iran war oil shock; gasoline and energy to drive headline higher |
| Nov 2026 | US midterm elections | Economic conditions — jobs, inflation, gas prices — will shape GOP’s House and Senate defence |
| TBD | CUSMA renegotiation pressure | Agreement in “zombie” state; sectoral tariffs ongoing; Trump using trade as geopolitical lever |
The February CPI at 2.4% is the last clean inflation reading the United States will get. Every subsequent report will carry the oil shock, and analysts at CNBC estimate CPI could reach 3.5% by year-end if the conflict persists. This is part of The Rio Times’ daily intelligence coverage of the USA and Canada for the Latin American financial community. Gasoline approaching $5/gallon (~$1.32/litre) in Q2, combined with tariffs that have already added $1,100 to the average household’s annual costs, creates a consumer squeeze that the Fed cannot solve. Cutting rates would stoke inflation; holding them starves a labour market that has lost jobs on net since April 2025. The dual mandate has become a dual bind.
February’s 92,000 job loss is not a weather story or a strike story. It is a pattern. Three of the last five months have seen payroll declines. December was revised from gains to losses. Federal government employment has fallen 330,000 since October 2024 — an 11% reduction. Manufacturing lost 12,000 despite tariffs designed to reshore production. Without healthcare, which was itself distorted by a Kaiser strike, the economy would have shed roughly 202,000 jobs since Trump took office. Labour’s share of income has fallen to the lowest level on record even as productivity climbs 2.8%. The economy is generating more value per hour of work, but workers are not capturing it.
The IEA’s proposed 400 million barrel reserve release — the largest in its history — is the energy market’s equivalent of a central bank emergency intervention. Japan’s decision to act unilaterally signals that importing nations view the Hormuz closure as structural. The US is relatively insulated as a net energy exporter — the S&P 500 is down only 2% while the DAX has fallen 6.8% and the Nikkei 7.9%. But insulation is not immunity. Gasoline prices are surging, the Farm Bureau warns of a crop shortfall from disrupted fertiliser supply, and airline fares could see CPI increases from 2.2% to 20% on jet fuel costs alone.
Canada occupies a unique position: it benefits from the oil shock as a net energy exporter while simultaneously suffering from US tariffs that have crushed its steel, aluminum, auto, and lumber sectors. Scotiabank estimates every persistent $10/barrel increase adds 0.5% to GDP in year two. Canadian firms have diversified impressively, recovering C$11 billion of the C$18.5 billion US export loss through 27 new trading partners. But Carney’s China canola deal — however economically rational — exists in the shadow of Trump’s 100% tariff threat. Every move Ottawa makes toward Beijing risks Washington’s retaliation.
The US-Canada trade relationship is no longer a bilateral economic arrangement — it is a geopolitical instrument. CUSMA is a “zombie” agreement, kept alive by exemptions while sectoral tariffs up to 50% operate outside it. Trump has explicitly used the threat of 100% tariffs to deter Canada from deepening ties with China, transforming trade policy into foreign policy. For Latin American economies watching from the south, the lesson is clear: proximity to Washington provides no exemption from its coercive trade tools, and the North American economic order that existed for three decades is being fundamentally restructured.
US economy news today presents a picture of an economy that Trump promised would be “roaring” but is instead whimpering through its worst stretch of job losses in years, facing an inflation shock it cannot yet see in the data, and conducting a war whose economic costs are only beginning to materialise. The midterm elections in November will be contested on this terrain. The gap between the president’s rhetoric and the data has never been wider — and the Iran war ensures that the data will get worse before voters decide whether the rhetoric was ever credible.

