What Happened in GPA’s Q4 2025
What Happened
GPA (PCAR3), the parent company of Brazil’s Pão de Açúcar supermarket chain, reported a consolidated net loss of R$572 million (~$110 million) in the fourth quarter of 2025, a 48.2% improvement from the R$1.1 billion (~$212 million) loss in the year-ago period but far worse than the R$134 million loss analysts had expected, according to LSEG consensus data. The loss from continuing operations attributable to controlling shareholders was R$523 million (~$101 million), a 29% reduction year-over-year.
The bottom-line miss was driven by non-cash items below the operating line, most notably a R$179 million (~$34 million) positive tax effect from the recognition of a deferred tax asset related to the impairment recorded on GPA’s stake in FIC, the financial-services joint venture with Itaú. While this item improved the headline loss relative to 4T24, the overall result still fell well short of market expectations, which had anticipated a cleaner quarter as the company moves further past its restructuring phase.
Net revenue fell 2% to R$5.114 billion (~$984 million), reflecting a softer consumer environment, the ongoing contraction of the Aliados B2B channel, and the base effect of strong holiday-season comparable figures from Q4 2024. For the full year, revenue totaled R$19.1 billion (~$3.7 billion), up 1.7%, while the full-year net loss narrowed 65.8% to R$824 million (~$158 million) from R$2.4 billion (~$462 million) in 2024.
Key Drivers Behind GPA’s Results
Key Drivers
Operational Efficiency and EBITDA Margin Expansion
Adjusted EBITDA of R$510 million (~$98 million) rose 2.5% year-over-year, with the margin expanding 40 basis points to 10.0% — GPA’s highest fourth-quarter margin in the post-restructuring era. For the full year, adjusted EBITDA reached R$1.75 billion (~$337 million), up 5.2%, with the annual margin improving to 9.2%. The gains are the product of a sustained simplification effort: over 700 headcount reductions, contract renegotiations, and the elimination of overlapping administrative functions that began under former CEO Rafael Russowsky in mid-2025.
The quarterly EBITDA of R$510 million also beat the LSEG consensus of R$466 million by a comfortable margin, confirming that whatever is happening below the operating line, the core grocery business is producing incremental efficiency gains. The planned R$415 million (~$80 million) in cost cuts for 2026, announced during the Q3 results call, should extend this trend.
Revenue Deceleration and Competitive Pressures
The 2% revenue decline stands in contrast to the robust same-store sales growth GPA delivered throughout 2024, when the Pão de Açúcar and Extra Mercado banners were posting SSS above 9%. In the first three quarters of 2025, SSS growth decelerated sequentially — from 7.3% (calendar-adjusted) in Q1 to 5.1% in Q2 and 4.1% in Q3. The Q4 trajectory, while not yet broken out by banner in the available wire data, appears to have slipped further, consistent with the overall revenue contraction.
The slowdown reflects a more competitive grocery landscape in Brazil. The atacarejo (cash-and-carry) format continues to capture share from conventional supermarkets, with Assaí (ASAI3) and Grupo Mateus (GMAT3) expanding aggressively. Meanwhile, GPA’s own Aliados B2B channel — which sells directly to small businesses — has contracted sharply over the past year, falling to just 2.8% of total sales by Q3 after a 41% year-over-year revenue decline, as management prioritized profitability over volume.
Balance Sheet and Leverage Challenges
GPA’s balance sheet remains the most critical variable in the investment case. Net debt stood at approximately R$2.7 billion (~$519 million) heading into the quarter — roughly double the company’s market capitalization of approximately R$1.5 billion (~$288 million). Leverage as measured by net debt-to-EBITDA (pre-IFRS 16) climbed from 1.6x at year-end 2024 to 2.8x by the end of Q1 2025 and 3.1x by mid-year, as seasonal cash consumption and elevated financial expenses eroded the gains from asset sales and the prior-year equity offering. With Brazil’s Selic rate at 15%, the carrying cost of GPA’s debt remains exceptionally burdensome — financial expenses have been the primary driver of the persistent net losses even as operating performance improves.
GPA Financial Detail and Quarterly Progression
Financial Detail
Quarterly Loss Trajectory
The Q4 net loss of R$572 million (~$110 million) is a step backward from the Q3 profit of R$137 million (~$26 million) — which had been celebrated as GPA’s first black-ink quarter in years. However, the Q3 result was aided by R$418 million in tax-credit recognition related to accumulated fiscal losses, which had no immediate cash impact. The Q4 loss underscores that, absent favorable non-recurring items, GPA remains structurally unprofitable at current interest rates.
For the full year, the net loss of R$824 million (~$158 million) represents a marked improvement over 2024’s R$2.4 billion loss, but the trajectory remains one of shrinking losses rather than approaching breakeven. The disconnect between operating improvement (EBITDA +5.2% for the year) and bottom-line deterioration highlights the dominance of financial expenses in GPA’s P&L.
FIC Impairment and Tax Effects
The R$179 million (~$34 million) positive income-tax effect in Q4 stems from GPA‘s recognition of a deferred tax asset linked to the write-down of its stake in FIC, the consumer-finance joint venture with Itaú Unibanco that has been part of the company’s broader divestment and simplification strategy. This is consistent with the pattern seen throughout 2025, where tax-credit recognition has been a recurring feature of the results — R$418 million in Q3, for instance — reflecting the company’s accumulated fiscal losses and its strategy of monetizing these credits as they become legally recoverable.
GPA Management Signals and Strategic Direction
CEO Alexandre Santoro, who took over in January 2026 after being recruited from IMC (the operator of Pizza Hut and KFC in Brazil), framed the quarter around three pillars: operational cash generation, financial discipline, and customer-experience enhancement. He emphasized a constructive relationship with suppliers and positioned the results as validation that the efficiency agenda is producing measurable improvements.
The cost-reduction plan announced in Q3 — targeting R$415 million (~$80 million) in annualized savings through headcount reductions, contract renegotiations, and administrative simplification — is GPA’s primary self-help lever. Capital expenditure is being reduced to R$300–350 million (~$58–67 million) per year from R$693 million in the twelve months through September 2025, effectively pausing the store-expansion program after 213 of a planned 300 openings.
Management has confirmed negotiations to sell a “relevant” asset to accelerate debt reduction, though it has not disclosed which asset is under consideration. With most non-core properties already divested — including fuel stations, the former headquarters, and various sale-leaseback transactions — the remaining options appear limited, though monetization of insurance-brokerage contracts has been mentioned as a possibility.
What to Watch Next for GPA
Watch Next
The central question for GPA is whether the efficiency agenda and cost-cutting program can generate enough free cash flow to service and gradually reduce a debt burden that exceeds the company’s market capitalization. At current Selic rates of 15%, the math is punishing: even with EBITDA approaching R$1.75 billion annually, the financial expense burden consumes the vast majority of operating profit, leaving the company structurally loss-making at the net level.
Analyst sentiment remains cautious. Bank of America and JP Morgan have underperform recommendations, citing the heavy debt load and contingent liabilities. Citi has flagged the persistent cash burn and the re-escalation of leverage after the seasonal Q4 2024 improvement. The stock, which has fallen roughly 25% year-to-date in 2026 and trades around R$3.00–3.50, reflects significant skepticism about the turnaround timeline.
The governance story adds another layer of complexity. The Coelho Diniz family — which has no relation to the company’s late founder — became GPA’s largest shareholder in mid-2025 with a 24.6% stake, supplanting the French group Casino (now in restructuring). Nelson Tanure and investor Rafael Ferri have also gained board seats. The interplay between these new power centers and the incoming CEO will shape capital-allocation decisions in the quarters ahead.
GPA Q4 2025 Results Summary Table
| Metric | Q4 2025 | Q4 2024 | YoY |
| Net Revenue | R$5.11B (~$983M) | R$5.22B | −2.0% |
| Adj. EBITDA | R$510M (~$98M) | R$498M | +2.5% |
| Adj. EBITDA Margin | 10.0% | 9.5% | +40 bps |
| Net Loss (Consolidated) | R$(572M) (~$110M) | R$(1,104M) | −48.2% |
| Net Loss (Cont. Ops, Controlling) | R$(523M) (~$101M) | R$(737M) | −29.0% |
| LSEG Consensus (Net Loss) | R$(134M) | — | Miss |
| LSEG Consensus (EBITDA) | R$466M | — | Beat |
GPA Full Year 2025 Summary Table
| Metric | FY 2025 | FY 2024 | YoY |
| Net Revenue | R$19.1B (~$3.7B) | R$18.8B | +1.7% |
| Adj. EBITDA | R$1.75B (~$337M) | R$1.66B | +5.2% |
| Adj. EBITDA Margin | 9.2% | — | — |
| Net Loss (Consolidated) | R$(824M) (~$158M) | R$(2,410M) | −65.8% |
Key Risks Facing GPA
Risks
Leverage and liquidity risk dominate the outlook. With net debt at roughly R$2.7 billion (~$519 million) and a market capitalization of approximately R$1.5 billion (~$288 million), GPA’s debt-to-equity ratio is deeply stretched. Some analysts estimate total leverage including off-balance-sheet items exceeds 5x EBITDA. At Selic of 15%, the company faces financial expenses that have been running in the range of R$150–190 million per quarter — dwarfing operating improvements. Without either a material rate cut by the Central Bank, a significant asset sale, or an equity capital raise, the path to profitability remains narrow.
Contingent liabilities are a second major risk factor. GPA carries approximately R$12.6 billion (~$2.4 billion) in off-balance-sheet contingent liabilities, primarily related to tax disputes with Brazil’s federal revenue service and social-security authorities. While the company reduced this figure by R$3.2 billion over 2024 through settlements and reclassifications, the remaining exposure is roughly 8.5 times the company’s market capitalization.
Competitive erosion in the grocery market is a slower-burning but equally important risk. The atacarejo format continues to outgrow conventional supermarkets, and GPA’s premium positioning under the Pão de Açúcar banner, while defensible in upscale neighborhoods, does not easily scale. The suspension of the store-expansion program — with 87 of 300 planned openings deferred indefinitely — limits the company’s ability to grow its way out of the leverage problem.
Brazilian Grocery Retail Sector Context
Brazil’s food retail sector generates annual revenues of approximately R$1 trillion according to the ABRAS supermarket association. The five largest players — Carrefour Brasil (which delisted from B3 in 2025), Assaí (ASAI3), Grupo Mateus (GMAT3), Supermercados BH, and GPA (PCAR3) — are competing in an environment where the atacarejo format continues to gain share at the expense of traditional supermarkets. GPA’s differentiation through the premium Pão de Açúcar brand and its leadership in online grocery (representing roughly 13% of total sales) provide some insulation, but the top-line deceleration suggests these advantages are not sufficient to fully offset the structural headwinds.
The ownership landscape at GPA has been transformed over the past two years. Casino Group, the former French controlling shareholder that is now in judicial restructuring, has been reducing its stake from approximately 20% and seeking to exit entirely. The Coelho Diniz family has emerged as the largest shareholder at 24.6%, followed by Silvio Tini’s Bonsucex group at 10.3%. This shareholder transition, combined with the arrival of new board members affiliated with Nelson Tanure and Rafael Ferri, means GPA’s strategic direction may evolve significantly under the new governance structure — creating both opportunity and uncertainty for minority investors.