Africa Intelligence Brief – Tuesday, February 10, 2026

What happened: Eritrea on Monday formally rejected Ethiopia’s February 7 demand for troop withdrawal, calling the accusations “patently false and fabricated” and “astounding in tone and substance.” Information Minister Yemane Gebremeskel said the claims were “yet another deplorable act in a pattern and spiral of hostile campaigns against Eritrea for more than two years now.”

Eritrea said it had “no appetite for, or desire to, engage in meaningless acrimony to add fuel and exacerbate the situation.” Separately, Ethiopian police said Eritrea had been caught “red-handed” trying to arm rebels. Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki responded that his country did not want war but said “we know how to defend our nation.”

Meanwhile, a climate of fear is spreading in Tigray. Residents report anxiety over both renewed clashes between federal forces and Tigrayan militia—ten days after the latest fighting—and the escalating Addis-Asmara confrontation along their border.

So what: Eritrea’s blanket rejection eliminates any near-term diplomatic offramp. Ethiopia had offered dialogue on mutual interests including Red Sea access via Assab port—but that olive branch was ignored in Asmara’s response. Analysts at Africa Defense Forum note there is no indication of troop buildup yet, but Ethiopia has been parading military hardware on state television. Egypt has deepened ties with Eritrea, complicating the picture further. For investors: the Ethio-Djibouti corridor handling 90%+ of Ethiopian trade is the key vulnerability. Any military escalation would disrupt the Horn’s most critical supply chain.

What happened: Angolan President João Lourenço, as AU chairperson, called “on the Parties to the conflict in the DRC to declare a ceasefire to take effect on a date and time to be agreed” after hosting DRC President Tshisekedi, Togolese President Gnassingbé (AU mediator), and former Nigerian head of state Obasanjo (facilitator) in Luanda on Sunday.

The leaders endorsed the US-brokered Washington peace deal signed in December and mandated Angola to “initiate consultations with all interested Congolese parties.” This effectively gives Lourenço the green light to prepare for a broader national dialogue. The FARDC also claimed it shot down a second M23 one-way attack drone at Kisangani airport on February 5—the second strike on the facility in a week.

So what: The ceasefire call is welcome but faces immediate credibility challenges. M23 continues to clash with Wazalendo fighters south of Bukavu and in Bwisha chiefdom. The Washington Accords and Doha framework have produced paper commitments but no meaningful Rwandan troop withdrawal. The second drone strike on Kisangani shows M23’s deep-strike capability is operational, not opportunistic. MONUSCO’s mandate was renewed last week, but South Africa’s troop withdrawal and the broader SADC retreat mean the mission has fewer boots on the ground precisely when they are needed most.

What happened: Senate President Akpabio convened an emergency plenary session today—cutting short a recess originally scheduled until February 24—after intense public backlash over the Electoral Act Amendment Bill. Protests erupted outside the National Assembly, with civil society groups, the Nigeria Labour Congress, and opposition leader Peter Obi demanding mandatory real-time electronic transmission of results.

The crisis centres on disputed Clause 60(3). The Senate retained the 2022 provision allowing INEC to transmit results electronically only at its discretion. Critics say this fatally weakens transparency ahead of the 2027 elections. The House of Representatives reportedly supported stronger mandatory requirements, setting up a conference committee showdown.

So what: The fact that the Senate was forced to reconvene under public pressure is itself significant—it signals that the street has leverage. The Nigeria Bar Association has also called for mandatory electronic transmission. If the conference committee produces a final bill that mandates real-time transmission via the IReV portal with clear legal standing, it would be a genuine reform. If the language stays ambiguous, expect sustained protest energy and deeper erosion of democratic credibility ahead of 2027.

What happened: President Tinubu met AFRICOM Commander General Dagvin Anderson at the State House on Sunday evening, alongside the full Nigerian security establishment: NSA Ribadu, Defence Minister Musa, the Chief of Defence Staff, all service chiefs, and heads of the NIA and DSS.

The visit comes weeks after the US confirmed it has deployed a small advisory team to Nigeria for intelligence gathering and training. This follows the December 25 Christmas Day airstrikes on Islamic State-linked militants in Sokoto State—the first US kinetic action on Nigerian soil.

So what: The composition of both delegations—with the entire Nigerian security architecture present—signals this is far more than a courtesy call. Defence Minister Musa insists there are “no combatant US boots on the ground” and that the US role is “purely supportive.” But the trajectory is clear: from Trump‘s CPC designation and threats of intervention, through the Christmas strikes, to a resident advisory team and now a commander-level visit. Nigeria reportedly hired lobbying firm DCI Group for $9M to manage the relationship. Separately, Tinubu opened the National Economic Council Conference today declaring Nigeria “will defeat terrorism and banditry,” calling insecurity an “unacceptable” obstacle to growth.

What happened: UK Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper announced fresh sanctions targeting senior figures in both the SAF and RSF, plus a network of individuals procuring weapons and recruiting mercenaries, following her visit to the Chad-Sudan border. The UK is also funding a £20M programme for survivors of sexual violence.

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Volker Türk, addressing the Human Rights Council, warned that “we can only expect worse to come” without international intervention, and called for extending the Darfur arms embargo to all of Sudan. Saudi Arabia denounced RSF “criminal attacks” in Kordofan and condemned foreign interference. On the ground, the RSF and SPLM-N are attempting to open a new front in Blue Nile state.

So what: The UK’s dual sanctions—targeting both sides—are notable for their evenhandedness but unlikely to alter the conflict calculus. The real danger is El Obeid: the North Kordofan capital is now under intensifying RSF drone strikes, and analysts warn it could become “the next El Fasher.” If El Obeid falls, the RSF would be practically at the gates of Khartoum again, raising the spectre of what Yale researcher Nathaniel Raymond called the bloodiest year yet. An estimated 40,000 are dead and 14 million displaced. Famine is spreading in Darfur and Kordofan.

What happened: Trade Minister Parks Tau and Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao signed the China-Africa Economic Partnership Agreement (CAEPA) on February 6 in Beijing. The deal grants South African exports duty-free access to the Chinese market, with an Early Harvest Agreement to be concluded by end of March.

Days earlier, on February 4, South Africa formally acceded to the African Export-Import Bank (Afreximbank), becoming the 54th member state. Afreximbank announced an $8 billion country programme for South Africa, marking the bank’s largest single-country commitment.

So what: These moves are directly linked to US tariff pressure. Washington slapped South Africa with 31% tariffs under Trump’s Liberation Day, later reduced to 10% baseline. Pretoria is hedging—deepening China ties while seeking alternative financial architecture through Afreximbank. Combined with the MONUSCO withdrawal, the picture is of a South Africa fundamentally recalibrating: reducing military commitments abroad, building new economic partnerships, and preparing for a world of fragmenting trade blocs. The rand’s strength at 15.95 reflects investor approval of the dual-track strategy.

What happened: The IOM confirmed that 53 migrants, including two babies, are dead or missing after a rubber dinghy capsized off Zuwara, Libya, on February 6. Only two Nigerian women survived. One survivor reported losing her husband; the other lost both babies. The boat had departed Al-Zawiya at 11pm on February 5 and capsized six hours later.

The incident brings the 2026 death toll on the central Mediterranean route to at least 484. In January alone, 375 people were reported dead or missing amid severe winter weather. The IOM warned that smuggling networks “continue to exploit migrants using unseaworthy boats.”

So what: Since Gaddafi’s overthrow in 2011, Libya has been a transit corridor where trafficking and smuggling networks operate with near-impunity. Nearly 34,000 migrants have died or gone missing on this route since 2014. This is not a crisis that ebbs—it intensifies each winter. For African governments, the toll falls disproportionately on Nigerian, Sudanese, Eritrean, and Somali nationals fleeing conflicts documented elsewhere in this brief. The displacement-migration-drowning pipeline is the humanitarian through-line connecting Africa’s conflicts.

What happened: Mozambique’s National Institute for Disaster Management now reports approximately 812,000 people affected since October, with 392,000 displaced and over 100,000 sheltered in accommodation centres. Roughly 300 people have died across southern Africa from the extreme flooding. Roads are being restored and intense heat is helping dry out the country faster.

The $187M UN humanitarian response plan is underway but the response remains overwhelmed. Nearly 60,000 hectares of farmland and 58,000 head of livestock have been permanently lost. UNHCR warns of heightened risks of gender-based violence and child separation in overcrowded shelters.

So what: The flooding compounds a triple crisis: climate disaster in the south, insurgency escalating in the north (Cabo Delgado conflict is now spreading into Nampula province), and political instability from disputed 2024 elections. The agricultural destruction will hit food production hard in a country where the average age is 17 and poverty exceeds 60%. Cyclone season is still underway. The UN’s 2025 humanitarian response plan was less than one-third funded, leaving gaping holes.

What happened: Nigeria is set to acquire M-346FA combat aircraft and AW-109 attack helicopters from Italian defence firm Leonardo in a $1.4 billion deal. The contract includes approximately 24 jets and 10 helicopters, with deliveries throughout 2026.

The M-346FA provides strike and surveillance capabilities while the AW-109 enhances troop mobility, reconnaissance, medical evacuation, and rapid-response operations. This is part of Nigeria’s broader effort to expand its air force’s operational reach.

So what: This represents Nigeria‘s largest single defence procurement in years and comes at a moment when the Tinubu administration faces intense pressure on security—from the Kwara massacres to the US-designated CPC status and AFRICOM’s expanding presence. The Italian platform diversifies Nigeria’s supplier base beyond the US, Turkey, and Pakistan. Combined with the AFRICOM advisory team, Abuja is executing a multi-vendor security strategy while trying to avoid appearing dependent on any single partner.

What happened: ACLED’s Conflict Watchlist 2026 warns that insurgency violence by groups linked to al-Qaeda and Islamic State in the Sahel is now affecting countries along Africa’s western coast. ACLED observes “the consolidation of a new front line in the Benin, Niger, and Nigeria borderlands” with Sahelian and Nigerian militancy theatres “gradually integrating, extending from Mali to western Nigeria.”

IS Sahel Province has continued its post-Niamey airport offensive tempo, attacking a National Guard camp in the departmental capital of Ayorou in early February. Analysis of the Niamey airport assault footage suggests coordination between IS Sahel and IS West Africa Province, with Kanuri speakers identified.

So what: The integration of Sahelian and Nigerian jihadist theatres is a structural shift. It means the security problems of landlocked junta-run states are no longer containable—they are pushing south toward Benin, Togo, and Ghana. ACLED cites lack of international support and leadership in regional efforts as a fuelling factor. The withdrawal of French forces, the expulsion of MINUSMA from Mali, and the juntas’ reliance on Russian mercenaries have not delivered security—they have created vacuums that IS and JNIM are exploiting. Coastal West African states should be planning for spillover, not hoping to avoid it.