Market Snapshot
| Pair / Index | Level | Day Chg | Signal |
|---|---|---|---|
| USD/ZAR | 15.90 | -0.5% | ▲ Rand firms post-budget; near strongest since 2022 |
| USD/NGN | ~1,530 | Flat | ▶ CBN window stable; new crude grade export in March |
| USD/KES | ~128.5 | Flat | ▶ Remittance flows steady; Somalia border reopening April |
| Brent Crude | $71.10/bbl | +0.1% | ▲ US–Iran Geneva talks Round 3; Hormuz warning active |
| Gold | $5,165/oz | -0.3% | ▼ Consolidating near ATH; SA mining windfall intact |
| Platinum | ~$2,300/oz | +2.8% | ▲ Geopolitical premium; SA supply deficit; ATH $2,920 Jan 26 |
| Copper | ~$9,450/t | -0.5% | ▼ DRC supply stable; Glencore/Orion MOU on KCC assets |
| Cobalt | ~$24,800/t | +1.2% | ▲ DRC supply risk; Pentagon $500M stockpile bid active |
| Lithium (Spodumene) | ~$820/t | +3.5% | ▲ Zimbabwe ban removes 8–10% of global supply overnight |
| JSE All Share | ~120,300 | -0.5% | ▼ COSATU strike drag; off ATH 126,952 |
Conflict & Stability Tracker
Critical
Tense
Tense
Watching
Fast Take
Developments to Watch
What happened: Reuters reported Feb 24 that the Trump administration will use DARPA’s Open Price Exploration for National Security (OPEN) AI programme to generate reference prices for critical minerals. VP Vance proposed at the Feb 4 Critical Minerals Ministerial that 50+ countries impose these reference prices backed by adjustable tariffs. Initial focus: germanium, gallium, antimony, tungsten. S&P Global and Finnish data firm Rovjok supply data. The programme transfers to the nonprofit Critical Minerals Forum next year.
So what: This is the architecture of a Western “China-free” pricing system. For African mineral producers, the implications are profound: a Pentagon AI model that strips out alleged Chinese market manipulation to calculate “fair value” could reprice African mining assets overnight. Projects previously dismissed as uneconomic could become viable if reference prices reflect supply-chain resilience rather than lowest-cost production. But the model cannot create liquidity or compel transactions in thin markets. Without allied coordination and increased non-Chinese processing capacity, arbitrage will undermine enforcement. African governments should watch whether this creates genuine investment commitments or merely political architecture layered over unchanged supply reality.
What happened: Somaliland’s Minister of the Presidency Khadar Hussein Abdi told AFP on Feb 22 that Hargeisa is prepared to grant Washington exclusive access to mineral deposits (lithium, coltan) and host US military installations. He did not rule out Israeli military presence. Somalia’s State Minister for Foreign Affairs countered on Feb 23, offering to renew the 1980 US port/airport access agreement. Somalia cancelled all UAE port and security deals on Jan 12 over sovereignty concerns. Israel recognised Somaliland in December 2025. Saudi mining company Kilomass secured a lithium exploration deal in Somaliland in 2024. UK holds a financial stake in Berbera port via BII alongside DP World.
So what: The Horn is becoming the most contested minerals-for-bases frontier since the Cold War. Somaliland’s offer creates a recognition-for-resources template that could reshape how unrecognised states leverage geological assets. The Gulf of Aden corridor — opposite Houthi-controlled Yemen — makes this strategically explosive. Washington already has Djibouti’s Camp Lemonnier; a Somaliland facility would give dual-access redundancy. But the absence of independent geological verification of Somaliland’s claimed lithium/coltan reserves is a material gap. Somalia’s counter-bid exposes the legal minefield: any US agreement with Somaliland triggers a sovereignty crisis with Mogadishu, the AU, and the Arab League.
What happened: Mines Minister Polite Kambamura announced an immediate suspension of all raw mineral and lithium concentrate exports on Feb 25, including cargo already in transit. The directive accelerates Zimbabwe’s beneficiation timeline by a year (originally 2027). Zimbabwe exported 1.128 million tonnes of spodumene in 2025 (+11% YoY), representing 8–10% of global supply. The ban directly impacts Chinese operators: Huayou’s $400M lithium sulphate plant, Sinomine’s $500M Bikita Minerals investment, Chengxin, and Yahua. Mining contributes 14.3% of GDP. Separately, Valterra Platinum (demerged from Anglo American) is owed $100M in unpaid export proceeds.
So what: This is the most aggressive African beneficiation move since the DRC’s cobalt royalty hikes. The immediate inclusion of in-transit cargo signals political urgency over economic calculation. Chinese miners face a binary choice: build downstream processing in Zimbabwe or lose access to Africa’s largest lithium reserves. Global lithium stocks rallied on the news. The timing is significant: it arrives just as the Pentagon’s OPEN programme threatens to create a parallel pricing system that could attract Western investment into African processing if reference prices make projects bankable. Zimbabwe may be positioning itself as a beneficiary of both Chinese and Western competition for its resources.
What happened: Sovereign Metals signed a non-binding MOU with Traxys North America at the 2026 Mining Indaba to market graphite from the Kasiya rutile-graphite project in Lilongwe. Traxys is one of three trading houses appointed to procure minerals for the $12 billion Project Vault — the US strategic critical minerals reserve launched Feb 2. Indicative volumes: 40,000t/yr graphite (Stage 1), scaling to 80,000t/yr. Traxys commission: 6%. Delivery FOB Mozambique port. Kasiya is described as the world’s largest natural rutile deposit, with projected $645M annual revenues over 25 years. SVM shares rose 9% on the announcement. US Deputy Assistant Secretary Nick Checker toured the Lilongwe facility.
So what: Malawi — one of the world’s poorest countries — is now in the US critical minerals orbit. But Malawian officials were conspicuously absent from the MOU signing ceremony, and civil society groups are demanding publication of full terms. The geopolitical dimension is sharpened by reports that Chinese state entities quietly acquired a separate Malawian mining asset without notifying regulators. For Lilongwe, the choice is whether this becomes a genuine industrialisation catalyst (local processing, skills transfer, tax revenues) or another headline-grabbing announcement that delivers more strategic security to Washington than economic security to Malawians.
What happened: COSATU-affiliated public service unions staged a Section 77 protected protest on Feb 26 at GEMS Head Office in Menlyn Maine, Pretoria. Seven unions mobilised (DENOSA, NEHAWU, SADTU, POPCRU, SAMATU, PAWUSA, SAEPU). COSATU President Zingiswa Losi gave GEMS seven days to reverse the 9.8% premium hike. GEMS has imposed cumulative increases of 23.3% over two years, while public servants received 5.5% and 4% wage adjustments. The Council for Medical Schemes recommended 3.3%. GEMS trustees received on average R1.4M each in 2023 — the highest in the industry. Principal Officer Stan Moloabi earns double the President’s salary. COSATU threatens to activate freedom-of-choice for members to leave GEMS with full government subsidy.
So what: The timing — one day after a budget that demonstrated fiscal restraint and GNU stability — puts COSATU’s rolling action programme directly in tension with the credibility rally. The threat to break GEMS’ monopoly is the most significant structural challenge to public-sector healthcare architecture in 20 years. For 890,000+ main members and 2.4 million beneficiaries, the stakes are existential. For the GNU, a protracted labour confrontation risks undermining the political stability narrative that has been the rand’s primary tailwind. Phase Two (intensified workplace mobilisation) and a potential national march will test whether Godongwana’s fiscal discipline extends to political management of the union alliance.
What happened: The Foreign Policy Research Institute published an analysis of the Trump NSS (issued Dec 2025), which explicitly frames Africa as a “battleground for resource competition with China” and calls for shifting from a “foreign aid paradigm to an investment and growth paradigm.” At the Feb 4 Critical Minerals Ministerial, Rubio hosted delegations from 54 countries (African invitees: Angola, DRC, Guinea, Kenya, Morocco, Sierra Leone, Zambia). The US signed new bilateral mineral frameworks with Guinea and Morocco. EXIM has issued $14.8B in Letters of Interest for critical mineral projects. The DFC is exploring over $1B in new mineral exploration deals. Orion Consortium’s 40% equity deal on Glencore’s DRC mines (Mumi and KCC) secures 100,000t copper for the US and 50,000t for Saudi/UAE allies.
So what: The infrastructure is now visible: Project Vault ($12B stockpile), DARPA OPEN (AI pricing), DFC (exploration finance), EXIM ($14.8B pipeline), bilateral MOUs (Guinea, Morocco, DRC, Malawi). What’s missing is the processing capacity to compete with China’s downstream dominance. Chinese officials have said Beijing manages exports in accordance with WTO rules. The question for African governments is whether this architecture delivers genuine industrialisation or merely replaces one extractive patron with another. South Africa’s exclusion from the G20 guest list and from the Critical Minerals Ministerial invitees is a conspicuous signal about Washington’s priorities.
Sovereign & Credit Pulse
| Country | Development | Outlook |
|---|---|---|
| South Africa | Budget 2026: debt peaks 78.9% GDP; deficit 4.5%→3.1%; R20B tax hikes withdrawn; first credit upgrade in 16 years; commodity windfall lifts revenues R21.3B | S&P positive outlook; Fitch/Moody’s upgrade path; rand strongest since 2022; COSATU strike risk to political stability narrative |
| Zimbabwe | Blanket raw mineral export ban; mining 14.3% GDP; $100M owed to Valterra Platinum in unpaid export proceeds; beneficiation timeline accelerated one year | Short-term revenue loss vs long-term value chain capture; Chinese miner compliance binary; investor confidence test |
| Malawi | Kasiya MOU with Traxys/Project Vault; $645M projected annual revenues over 25 years; US Deputy Asst. Secretary toured facilities | Potential export base diversification; transparency and contract disclosure demands from civil society; Chinese parallel acquisition flagged |
| DRC | Orion/Glencore MOU for 40% equity in Mumi/KCC; 100,000t copper secured for US; ceasefire collapsed; Rubaya coltan fighting continues | Security–minerals nexus; US investment contingent on stability that does not exist; 7M IDPs |
Power Players
| Name | Role | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| JD Vance | US Vice President | Proposed the 50+ nation minerals trade bloc with reference pricing at Feb 4 Ministerial; DARPA OPEN backstops his vision; Africa’s mineral producers are either inside or outside this architecture |
| Khadar Hussein Abdi | Somaliland Minister of the Presidency | Publicly offered US exclusive mineral access + military bases; signalling willingness to grant Israel military presence; reshaping Horn geopolitics |
| Polite Kambamura | Zimbabwe Mines Minister | Ordered immediate raw mineral export ban including in-transit cargo; most aggressive beneficiation directive on the continent in years |
| Zingiswa Losi | COSATU President | Led National Day of Action; gave GEMS 7-day ultimatum; threatens to break scheme’s monopoly; testing GNU resilience day after budget |
| Mark Kristoff | CEO, Traxys North America | One of three traders selected for $12B Project Vault; signed Kasiya MOU; expanding US strategic mineral procurement footprint across Africa |
Regulatory & Policy Watch
| Jurisdiction | Measure | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Zimbabwe | Immediate ban on all raw mineral and lithium concentrate exports; applies to in-transit cargo; accelerates 2027 beneficiation deadline to 2026 | Active — enforcement immediate; Chinese operators assessing compliance options |
| United States | DARPA OPEN AI mineral pricing; $12B Project Vault strategic reserve; EXIM $14.8B pipeline; bilateral MOUs with Guinea, Morocco, DRC, Malawi | Active — OPEN transferring to Critical Minerals Forum 2027; reference prices to backstop Vance’s trade bloc tariffs |
| South Africa | Budget 2026: global minimum tax from 2026/27; VAT threshold R1M→R2.3M; R2.7B defence; R990M Border Management Authority; R687M judiciary | Tabled — Appropriation Bill and Division of Revenue Bill to follow |
| US–Africa | AGOA extended only to Dec 31, 2026 (shortest in programme history); 30% reciprocal tariffs on most African goods; SA excluded from G20 and Minerals Ministerial invitees | Active — USTR demands reciprocity; 450K US jobs and 1M+ African jobs at stake |
Calendar & Watchlist
| Date | Event | Significance |
|---|---|---|
| Feb 26 | COSATU National Day of Action — GEMS HQ, Pretoria | Section 77 protected; Phase 1 of 3-month rolling action; 7-day ultimatum clock starts |
| Feb 26 | US–Iran nuclear talks Round 3, Geneva | Brent at $71.10; Strait of Hormuz warning; impacts African oil importers (Egypt, Kenya, SA) |
| Feb 26–27 | MQA Mining Skills Lekgotla, Johannesburg | “30 Years of Skills Development Excellence”; SA mining workforce pipeline review |
| Mar 5 | COSATU GEMS 7-day deadline expires | If no reversal: Phase 2 workplace mobilisation and possible national march activated |
| Oct 14–16 | African Mining Week 2026, Cape Town | “Mining The Future: Unearthing Africa’s Full Mineral Value”; policy shifts, investor pipeline |
| Dec 31 | AGOA expiry deadline | Shortest extension in programme history; 450K US jobs and 1M+ African jobs at stake |
Bottom Line
The scramble for Africa’s minerals has moved from diplomatic signalling to operational architecture, and the speed is accelerating.
In the space of three weeks, the United States has launched a $12 billion strategic mineral reserve (Project Vault), hosted a 54-nation Critical Minerals Ministerial, deployed DARPA’s AI programme to set reference prices that strip out Chinese market influence, signed bilateral mineral frameworks with Guinea and Morocco, positioned Traxys to funnel Malawian graphite into American stockpiles, and brokered a 40% equity stake in Glencore’s DRC copper-cobalt mines for a US-backed consortium. The Pentagon is simultaneously seeking to buy $500 million of cobalt. The infrastructure of a Western “China-free” pricing system is now visible.
Africa’s response is not passive. Zimbabwe’s blanket export ban — the most aggressive beneficiation directive on the continent in years — signals that African governments are no longer willing to be raw-material suppliers on extraction-only terms. The inclusion of in-transit cargo makes the message unmistakable: process here or leave. Somaliland’s offer of exclusive mineral rights and military bases to Washington is a different play — sovereignty leveraged as currency in a recognition gambit — but the underlying logic is the same: geological assets are strategic assets, and they have a price that includes political concessions.
The domestic story matters too. COSATU’s National Day of Action — launched one day after a budget that proved South Africa’s fiscal adults are in charge — is a reminder that credibility rallies and labour peace are not the same thing. The 7-day ultimatum to GEMS and the threat to break its monopoly could cascade into a structural confrontation that tests the GNU’s political architecture as severely as any external shock.
The thread connecting DARPA, Harare, Somaliland, Lilongwe, and Menlyn Maine Pretoria is this: the terms on which Africa’s resources and labour are priced are being renegotiated simultaneously from above and below. The Pentagon wants algorithmic pricing. Harare wants processing plants. Hargeisa wants recognition. COSATU wants medical scheme reform. Whether any of these demands produce outcomes that benefit ordinary Africans — rather than simply rearranging who extracts the value — is the question that will define this year.