Oil Flows, Democracy Doesn’t: Venezuela Three Months After Maduro

Venezuela democracy was the stated endgame of the January 3 operation. Three months later, the oil is flowing, the diplomats are back, and the elections are nowhere.

The United States and Venezuela are living through the best moment in their bilateral relationship in years. The embassy in Caracas reopened on March 30 after a seven-year suspension. Acting President Delcy Rodríguez has been formally recognized by Washington. PDVSA has shipped over 80 million barrels of crude to the US under the new framework. The hydrocarbon law was rewritten to open the door to private foreign investment. Secretary of State Rubio outlined a three-phase plan: stabilization, recovery, and transition to Venezuela democracy through free elections. But as Bloomberg Línea reported this week in a detailed analysis drawing on three experts, the first two phases are proceeding while the third has barely begun.

What Has Changed

The progress is real and should not be dismissed. The Foro Penal NGO counts 670 political prisoners released since January 3. The Asamblea Nacional passed an amnesty law on February 20. Journalists who were banned from the country for a decade have been invited back to Miraflores. Energy Secretary Chris Wright visited Caracas in February and called the start of cooperation “excellent.” Four senior US officials — Wright, CIA Director Ratcliffe, Interior Secretary Burgum, and SOUTHCOM commander Donovan — have visited in three months. The new hydrocarbon law and a pending mining law are restructuring the legal framework for foreign investment.

What Has Not

Juanita Goebertus, Human Rights Watch’s Americas director, delivered the starkest assessment: the Trump administration “decapitated the regime of Nicolás Maduro but allowed the repression structure to remain absolutely intact.” No presidential elections have been called. No timeline has been proposed. The security forces that enforced Maduro’s rule remain in place. Benigno Alarcón, a Venezuelan political analyst, argued that the Rodríguez government has no interest in dismantling what he called the “fear apparatus” because doing so would invite the kind of mass protests that could topple the regime. Unions are organizing a march to Miraflores for April 9.

Ronal Rodríguez of the Universidad del Rosario’s Venezuela Observatory agreed that Delcy Rodríguez’s government has sent no signal of “de-escalation of the dictatorship or the repressive apparatus.” On the contrary, he argued, “stability has been prioritized above human rights and democratization.” Opposition leader María Corina Machado and President-elect Edmundo González were sidelined from the transition — a decision Washington justified as necessary to prevent a coup attempt by those who still hold military power.

The Mutual Convenience Trap

Alarcón framed the dynamic as one of mutual time-buying. “Trump is negotiating with someone he can impose whatever he wants on — like the hydrocarbon law and now the mining law — rather than with an elected government that could say ‘yes’ to some things and ‘no’ to others,” he said. Meanwhile, Delcy and Jorge Rodríguez “are buying time” to consolidate their own position. The arrangement works as long as oil keeps flowing. But without elections, Alarcón warned, “this government will have to sustain itself by force” — and US legitimacy for the intervention erodes.

The formal restoration of diplomatic ties has not changed the underlying power structure. PDVSA’s output has climbed back toward one million barrels per day. Vitol and Trafigura are authorized to trade Venezuelan crude alongside Chevron. The gold doré deal with Trafigura — 650 to 1,000 kilograms for US refining — represents the third extraction contract under Washington’s supervision. Burgum brought over 20 mining and commodities executives to Caracas. The American economic footprint in Venezuela is expanding at a pace driven by resource access, not political reform.

The Panama Precedent

The last time the United States captured a Latin American head of state was Panama’s Manuel Noriega in December 1989. After that operation, the Panamanian military was dissolved entirely, and it took five years before the country held democratic elections. Venezuela’s military has not been dissolved. Its intelligence services remain operational. And the chavista political machinery — minus its figurehead — continues to function. As the Universidad del Rosario’s Rodríguez put it: “We will have to see whether Venezuela achieves a return to democracy, or the consolidation of a dictatorship with the acquiescence of the United States in exchange for energy resources. That would be the worst possible outcome.”

For investors tracking the Venezuelan oil revival, the democratic question is not abstract. A government sustained by repression rather than legitimacy is inherently fragile. Contracts signed under such conditions carry political risk that no hydrocarbon law reform can eliminate. The Hormuz crisis has made Venezuelan crude more valuable than at any point since the Maduro capture. But value without stability is a familiar Latin American story — and one that rarely ends well for the investors who arrive first.