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Anti-Democratic Values Impact the Foundations of Brazilian Parties (Analysis)

RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL – The wear and tear on the image of political parties in society is not a new phenomenon or exclusive to Brazil. In recent years, the rise of far right-wing candidates throughout the world, Brazil included, has heightened people’s distrust of democratic institutions, particularly given the attacks promoted by presidents and other political players.

In recent years, the rise of far right-wing candidates throughout the world, Brazil included, has heightened people's distrust of democratic institutions.
In recent years, the rise of far right-wing candidates throughout the world, Brazil included, has heightened people’s distrust of democratic institutions. (Photo: internet reproduction)

While it is true that there are challenges to the democratization of parties and major obstacles to a greater presence and representativeness of some groups, recognizing that parties have been and continue to be key factors for the operation and stability of democracies is essential.

Given this scenario, examining how parties have been affected by the radicalization scenario in Brazil and other countries, particularly heightened by the influence of far right-wing leaders, is crucial. How have the attacks on democratic institutions, which became commonplace with the rise of Jair Bolsonaro to the presidency, reverberated within the Brazilian parties? Do openly undemocratic attitudes and values have any resonance among the people making everyday politics in Brazil?

An unprecedented opinion poll conducted among party members and leaders sought to answer these and several other questions. The survey involved 2,514 members of all Brazilian parties, in all states of the federation. They filled out a questionnaire with some 50 questions sent by e-mail between March and May 2020. While surveys of this kind are common in more traditional democracies, understanding the profile, values, and behavioral patterns of these individuals is still virtually minimal in Brazil.

In the survey’s experimental stage, we randomly divided respondents into two groups, with the aim of investigating how attacks on democratic institutions are perceived among party members. Using an agree-disagree scale, part of respondents (control group) spontaneously reported to what extent they agreed with statements regarding the Federal Supreme Court’s (STF) legitimacy to mediate political conflicts in the country; democracy as the best form of government; and the legitimacy of negotiations between the President and the parties represented in Congress seeking governability.

For the other group of respondents (processing group), slips of paper reproducing statements made by Bolsonaro and his closest group of supporters were shown, placed immediately before the Agreed-Disagree questions summarized above. The purpose was to determine how hate speech and attacks on institutions can influence members’ perception of and adherence to democratic values. The wording of the slips of paper contained attacks against the STF, against democracy as the most appropriate means to improve people’s lives, and a sentence challenging negotiations and coalitions between parties as a legitimate component of democratic politics.

The initial findings point to the impact of these radicalized lines on members’ perceptions of democratic institutions. In particular, embracing democracy as a universal value, unrelated to governments’ short- and medium-term results, suffers a major blow when challenged by anti-democratic positions – suggesting the fragility of democratic values even among those who make up the daily lives of political parties.

When prompted by the statement that “by democratic means, the transformations that Brazil wants will not occur at the desired speed”, there was an increase of 51 percent in the proportion of respondents who believe that democracy is not always the best form of government. In this scenario, the proportion of respondents who disagree with democracy as the best form of government rises from 20 to 30.3 percent of members.

When given slips of paper with attacks on the performance of deputies and senators – accused of cooperating with the President solely in exchange for funds and positions – the members reacted contrary to expected, thereby increasing their agreement with the logic of coalitions (by 13 percent). The result suggests that respondents are aware of the need to build bridges between the Executive and the Legislative, and understand the relevance of state resources (such as parliamentary riders and patronage positions in public administration) for the operation of party structures and the survival of its members.

The only paper slip that had no significant impact was that of attacks on the STF. In general, the confrontations failed to change the members’ spontaneous perception regarding the legitimacy of the Brazilian Judiciary’s governing body. However, the spontaneous rejection of the STF is relatively high among members, reaching approximately one third of respondents.

In order to identify how attacks on democratic institutions are perceived among members according to their ideological orientation, respondents were divided into three groups – right, center, and left – based on their self-declaration in the questionnaire.

The results suggest that as we move to the right of the ideological spectrum, the proportions of members who subscribe to anti-democratic values increase, challenging the STF’s legitimacy, party coalitions, and democracy itself as the best form of government. More importantly, however, it is the evidence that anti-democratic messages impact the members of the three ideological groups.

The proportion of respondents who spontaneously challenge the STF’s legitimacy as a key component of Brazilian democracy can be observed in the control group. The proportion of those who disagree with the STF’s legitimacy increases greatly as we move from the left to the center and right. In the processing group, the left and right members react differently to the attacks on the STF, and the right-wing members repel it.

Even so, the percentage of members who reject the body’s democratic legitimacy remains much higher for the right-wing (43 percent), followed by the center (33 percent) and, finally, for respondents to the left of the ideological spectrum (25.8 percent).

When prompted by the statement that "by democratic means, the transformations that Brazil wants will not occur at the desired speed", there was an increase of 51 percent in the proportion of respondents who believe that democracy is not always the best form of government.
When prompted by the statement that “by democratic means, the transformations that Brazil wants will not occur at the desired speed”, there was an increase of 51 percent in the proportion of respondents who believe that democracy is not always the best form of government. (Photo: internet reproduction)

When analyzing the members’ perception of the assertion of democracy as the best form of government, one notes that the attack contained in slips was reflected among the three groups in the same direction, thereby increasing the proportions of members who challenge democratic methods.

The percentages follow the same pattern along the left-center-right scale, both for the group on which spontaneous assessment was made (12.8, 17.9, and 25 percent, respectively) and for the group receiving the stimulus that conveys an attack on democracy (24.3, 31.1 and 36.7 percent). Thus, the attacks generally impact the adherence to democracy among party members.

Finally, leftist party members are the ones who least disagree with the logic of party coalitions that guides the Brazilian political system, with a share of around 38 percent in the control and processing groups. On the other hand, 56.6 percent of center members and 65.4 percent of right-wing respondents spontaneously reject party coalitions.

In this regard, it is important to note that respondents who positioned themselves in the center and on the right-wing do not welcome the slip accusing deputies and senators of cooperating with the President only when funds are released. The two groups repel the attack, reducing the proportions of respondents who disagree with the logic of coalitions; nevertheless, the proportions remain high, and above those of left-wing members.

These initial results – mainly those related to the corrosion of support for democracy – send a warning signal about the impacts of radicalization and polarization among the foundations of politics in Brazil, appreciably influenced by the troubled political environment that marked the rise of a far right-wing leadership to the Presidency.

In a scenario of increasing escalation and polarization among the Powers and political players, in which interventions, ruptures, and blows are now on the daily menu of solutions to differences; and faced with a severe economic depression that is looming, which tends to polarize and heighten tensions also among the electorate, the signs coming from the parties are worrying.

If party members and leaders of the caucuses, which are part of one of the mainstays of representative democracy, question the legitimacy of the system itself amid a difficult scenario, what can we expect from other players less involved with democratic institutions and practices?

The risk of contamination of certain layers of society by authoritarian discourses is there, and should not be underestimated. This shows the value of nipping in the bud any kind of irresponsible flirtation with authoritarian outbursts, of refusing to standardize proto-fascist messages, and of preventing the adoption of institutional contingencies (such as changing the government system) as a tool to solve short-term stalemates.

No democracy can survive without stability in the rules of the game, and without the construction of negotiated solutions among responsible political players committed to the health of democratic institutions.

Pedro Floriano Ribeiro is a professor of Political Science at the Federal University of São Carlos and a former visiting professor at the University of Cambridge and the Kellogg Institute of the University of Notre Dame (USA).

Vinícius Silva Alves holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Brasília, a former visiting researcher at the University of California, San Diego (USA), and a post-doctoral researcher at the Graduate Program in Political Science at UFSCar (CAPES Fellow).

Source: El País

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