RIBEIRÃO PRETO, SP – (Opinion) In a recent column, we posited that the resurgent “Centrão” bloc in Brazil’s Congress has supplanted the “300 Picaretas” of yesteryear, resuming their role as the President’s chief source of support, in exchange for patronage, power and profits.
Bolsonaro’s purpose, not unlike that of his acknowledged idol Trump, is twofold: (1) avoid impeachment and (2) win re-election. Bolsonaro, who is cleverer than most people give him credit for, has forsaken his prior ideologies, and placed his bets on the “old politics”.
His eventual goal, with the 2022 Presidential elections in mind, is to emulate President Trump, who has managed to wrest control of the Republican party from its traditional bulwarks, replacing it with subservient loyalty to him personally.
The Centrão parties in Brazil, viewed as a whole, arguably correspond roughly to the Republican party in the US Congress: overwhelmingly, they are weathy white males; ideologically, they range from center-right to far-right; and demographically, they come more from the vast quasi-rural center of the country rather than populous state capitals.
A common trait of both Centrão and Republican legislators, traditional defenders of balanced budgets, is the recent abandonment of this policy after watching their presidents’ popularity grow when spending billions on coronavirus aid.
Another common feature of Centrão and Republican legislators is mistrust of their respective country’s Supreme Courts. Both groups portray the judicial branch of government as an enemy that has usurped executive and legislative powers, rather than an ally needed to govern a democratic republic.
Acknowledging this antipathy to justice, both Bolsonaro and Trump have made executive appointments designed to eviscerate the power of their Supreme Courts. Trump appointed an Attorney General who openly advocates completely unrestrained presidential power. He appointed a Solicitor General who defends the president personally, rather than the national government.
Brazil’s Executive Branch has three top legal positions – the Minister of Justice, the Prosecutor General (PGR), and the Solicitor General (AGU). The President can nominate anyone he chooses for these positions, and Bolsonaro has chosen candidates who will work to protect both him and the Centrão.
In the background of this scenario is the fact that Bolsonaro will soon be able to appoint two new Justices to Brazil’s Supreme Court (STF).
Bolsonaro’s appointment strategy is simple, if unacknowledged – his appointees believe that, if they do his bidding – no matter what, no questions asked – they stand a chance of becoming a Supreme Court Justice.
This strategy is working well on all fronts. Bolsonaro’s latest Minister of Justice lamely acquiesces to his choice of a political crony to head the Federal Police in Rio de Janeiro; his new Prosecutor General has turned on Lava-Jato, threatening to close it down; and his Solicitor General illegally defends the Bolsonaro clan, not the government.
A similar tactic is also in evidence at Brazil’s second-highest court, the Superior Federal Court (STJ), where cases are pending involving the Bolsonaro clan, or their political friends and enemies. Historically, STJ judges are often “promoted” to the STF, and Bolsonaro has repeatedly praised those STJ judges whose decisions (for instance removing Rio’s Governor Witzel) please him and his new-found best friends forever.
The Centrão, meanwhile, sit quietly on the sidelines, applauding all this, for they know that, as long as Bolsonaro is President, and as long as they support him, they do not need to fear Lava-Jato, or the STF, or indeed, any other investigation into their own nefarious affairs, which are legion.
Brazilian tradition has a phrase for this: “To my friends, everything; to my enemies, The Law!”