RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL – As of August, a portrait of Gustavo Petro Urrego wearing the presidential sash will hang on the wall of all military barracks in Colombia. At that time, he will be not only the new president of the country but also the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.
He will be in command of an institution that has often interpreted him as an enemy because of his status as a leftist politician and former guerrilla fighter, even though, in reality, he has been holding public office for more than half his life.
Within it, some extremist sectors are convinced that the adversary will now be at the top. General Eduardo Zapateiro, the representative of the most hard-line and pro-war wing, has withdrawn these days to avoid walking next to him during the inauguration.
Petro inherits armed forces shrouded in many questions. The citizenry looks at them with suspicion for their management of last year’s social outbreak, in which the use of force was favored over dialogue.
Their conception is that the internal enemy hides in the population and must be exterminated. Because of this mentality, they are still seen as an invasion force in some parts of the country.
The report of the Truth Commission, which covers six decades of violence in the country, clearly states that military justice has become a mechanism to hide human rights violations against the troops.
It is documented that the military murdered 6,402 innocent citizens to pass them off as guerrillas and collect a bonus.
The military itself is confused and demoralized, according to experts consulted.
President Juan Manuel Santos, who led the peace process with the FARC, made them see that the demobilization of Latin America’s most powerful guerrilla was a victory for the Army, which had cornered it until it had no choice but to sit down and negotiate.
A handful of guerrilla commanders were annihilated shortly before the talks. The image of insurgents and soldiers coming down from the mountains together after decades of killing each other seemed to open a new era in Colombia’s history.
However, Santos’ successor, Ivan Duque, did not believe in a negotiated peace and has boycotted its implementation these past four years. He has turned the argument around to re-embrace the thesis of his mentor, Álvaro Uribe: the peace process was a humiliation; it meant kneeling before the enemy.
It has been installed in the imaginary of the armed forces, which has underpinned the war mentality that prevails in the barracks.
The success of their missions is measured by taking down leaders of cartels and paramilitary groups who, despite the shock of being disbanded, put new leaders in place.
The rapprochement with the people has not happened. The homicide rate rose in 2021 for the first time in seven years.
Petro has already named his finance and foreign ministers but is taking more time to place someone in defense. He knows that a good part of his government’s success hinges on that appointment.
“Although, in the end, the real person in charge will be Petro himself. He will be very much on top of it,” says one of his closest collaborators. The doubt lies in whether he will appoint a retired military officer or a civilian.
“It would be wrong for Petro to appoint a retired general. It would show a weakness that does not suit him. The reading of the military would be that he is appointing one of their own because he is afraid of them,” says Gabriel Silva Luján, former Minister of Defense under Uribe.
The next step will be to appoint a leader with a different mentality than the current one. It will not be easy. The Duque government has purged all the top commanders who worked on the peace process with Santos.
The current commanders are all people trusted by Zapateiro, recognized for his bravery in combat but who has retired after a questionable tenure. Petro will have to make appointments without touching any nerves.
“For him, in turn, to make a purge would be a huge mistake,” agrees Jorge Restrepo, a professor at the Universidad Javeriana, adding, “It would favor extreme right-wing groups to remain outside the law and would generate an enormous division.”
Silva Luján also believes that this is where the game is played and that Petro should not break the tradition of seniority in promotions. He must find affinity with those in line.
“If he (Petro) were to take a false step and promote captains and majors to remove the leadership, as Chávez did in Venezuela, he would get into serious trouble. He can give himself some luxuries, but without abusing them,” Luján says.
The two experts also agree that there is no risk of a coup d’état. The Colombian military forces have a history of respect for political power, unlike other countries in the region.
There is a greater risk, and that is that the generals will use a phrase that has been passed down among them from generation to generation: “I obey, but I do not obey”. It has happened in the past.
President Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) had to dismiss the then head of the armed forces, General Harold Bedoya, for contempt. His successor, Andres Pastrana, faced a rebellion when he asked a battalion to vacate a region during an attempted dialogue with the FARC. Ultimately, the waters returned to normal.
Petro’s moves, for now, have been shrewd. The week after his election, he met with Uribe in search of a national agreement to unite the country after a highly polarized campaign. He knows the former president’s ascendancy in the armed forces. His theses still permeate the barracks.
During his time, he himself gave lectures in the training schools and held private meetings with the officers who would be promoted. He maintains a very close relationship with the commanders and the structure.
In fact, Duque, an unknown whom he placed in the presidency, has had as ministers two very loyal Uribistas who, rather than exercising a role of authority over the military, have been their defenders and spokespersons.
Experts agree that Zapateiro has wielded a power in security matters that surpasses that of Duque himself.
The new president also receives an institution with minimal capacity for self-criticism. Any questioning of his work is met with chest-thumping and references to honor and loyalty.
In last year’s protests, it was evidenced by videos that some demonstrators or even passers-by who were passing by at the time were killed at the hands of the security forces.
The events were not condemned by the president or the head of the armed forces. A few months earlier, during a military operation in Putumayo, several civilians were killed in suspicious circumstances, and there was no hint of soul-searching either.
“It is a vain and arrogant force that has a hard time accepting mistakes,” describes someone who was at the top for a time.
Petro has been one of the main critics. He himself was tortured by uniformed officers when he belonged to the M-19, an urban guerrilla group. Later, he went into exile in Europe for fear of dying, like many other leftist colleagues killed by the military and paramilitaries.
Now, he will be in charge of the institution in a few weeks. The challenge is enormous. His success depends on getting the military who come across his portrait in the barracks to see him as a leader, not as the enemy.
With information from El País