RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL – During former U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration in 2019, Brazil became an “Extra-NATO Preferred Ally,” a position that designates countries that are not full members of the North Atlantic Organization (NATO) but are strategic military allies of the United States. Almost three years later, Brazil finds itself in a delicate position concerning the alliance in the context of the war in Ukraine.
Currently, the status allows, in theory, advantages in the military field, such as collaboration with the US in areas of research and development of defense technology; cooperation for military training; preferential access to the purchase of American military equipment; among other measures.
The USA has granted the status of extra-NATO allies to 20 countries. Brazil and Argentina are the only South American countries to receive this status.
In an interview with DW Brasil, Harvard researcher Vitelio Brustolin, professor at the Institute for Strategic Studies at the Fluminense Federal University (INEST-UFF), explains that the status of an extra-NATO ally is not aimed at mutual defense with the US, but in the current context of the conflict in Eastern Europe, “if the war escalates, Brazil could be pressured to take a more incisive position,” he says.
The demand for a direct Brazilian position in the war may already be occurring. Brazil has been requested by Germany to supply ammunition for dozens of armored cars donated to Ukraine.
Last week, Germany announced the shipment of 50 old Gepard-type anti-aircraft armored vehicles, manufactured in the 1970s and retired by the German Armed Forces about a decade ago. Dozens of them were purchased by Brazil in 2013. The same model was donated to the Ukrainians by Germany, but there is a shortage of ammunition in the war industry for the model. That’s why the German government is in dialogue with the countries that use the old system to get around the ammunition shortage.
DW Brazil contacted Brazil’s Foreign Ministry (Itamaraty) and the Brazilian Army for comment.
DW Brazil: What does the “extra-NATO” status mean for Brazil in the context of the Ukraine-Russia war?
Vitelio Brustolin: The partnership does not have mutual defense objectives unless this is foreseen in a bilateral agreement, which is not the case. Brazil can even maintain good relations with Russia, as Turkey does, for example, which is a member of NATO, but has good relations with Moscow and even provides Ukraine with military equipment to defend itself.
However, if the war escalates, Brazil may be pressured to take a more incisive position. Right now, the country has been voting against Russia, both in the Security Council and in the UN General Assembly. Brazil’s official stance has been in favor of Ukraine, the United States, and NATO – with the caveat that Brazil’s votes are accompanied by criticism of some sanctions against Russia, and except for Bolsonaro’s visit to Putin on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, which Washington criticized.
In practical terms, what does this mean for Brazil to be pressured to take a more incisive position on the war?
Brazil is already being pressured but in a subtle way. The US criticism of Bolsonaro’s visit to Putin, on the eve of the invasion of Ukraine, for example, is pressure for alignment. The US praise for the Brazilian diplomatic positions regarding the war in Ukraine, in which Brazil has been voting against Russia in the Security Council and the General Assembly, is also a form of pressure.
Therefore, at this moment, the pressures are for diplomatic alignment, in the case of the UN votes, for example, and commercial, in the case of the purchase of fertilizers from Russia. If the war escalates, if more countries start to act directly with acts of force, Brazil can be pressured to take sides in some more incisive way. One such way would be, for example, to supply ammunition from war tanks to Ukraine.
That said, it should be remembered that neutrality [in international affairs] is provided for in the Brazilian Constitution and that despite this, Bolsonaro has sought a military rapprochement with the United States by becoming a preferential extra-NATO partner.
Brazil would be dialoguing with Germany to send ammunition for the war tanks in Ukraine. Could Brazil’s possible collaboration in the conflict result from pressure from NATO members?
For the moment, this is only a hypothesis. If the sending of ammunition occurs, this configures an involvement of Brazil in the conflict, but I believe that the status of extra-NATO partner has nothing to do with it. What happens is that the Flakpanzer Gepard tanks sent by Germany to Ukraine for anti-aircraft defense were developed in the 1960s, put into operation in the 1970s, and stopped being operated by the Germans in 2010. So there is a shortage of ammunition.
In 2013, Brazil bought Gepard tanks from Germany and would have purchased a large amount of ammunition. Experts say that even if Brazil does all the planned military exercises with the tanks, some ammunition would still have to be discarded due to expiration.
However, I emphasize again that Brazil has sought this alignment in the military area with the US, so it would not be unusual for it to be called upon to collaborate directly in the conflict.
What would change Brazil’s foreign relations, especially with Russia, if the Brazilian government sent ammunition to Ukraine? Could the country be cornered because it also depends on Russian fertilizers, for example?
That is in the realm of speculation, but we can compare it with the case of Turkey to understand the issue. As I mentioned earlier, Turkey is a member of NATO and provides drones for Ukraine to fight Russia. Still, the relationship between Russia and Turkey is relatively stable. One evidence of this is that some rounds of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine have been held on Turkish soil.
We should keep in mind that relations between countries are usually pragmatic. The fact is that Brazil is one of the members of the BRICS group, which also includes Russia, India, China, and South Africa. It is a non-military and informal group, i.e., it does not have the status of an international organization, but it does have some formal characteristics, such as the BRICS Bank, for example. But the existence of the economic group shows that there is interest among the member countries to get closer.
As you explained, Brazil has been voting against Russia in the UN, but always with criticism of the sanctions against Putin. Can this be interpreted as a dubious position?
Brazilian diplomacy follows a standard position and has been voting against Russia on the most critical issues – in the Security Council and the General Assembly.
In the only recent position in which it did not vote against, Brazil abstained in the vote that excluded Russia from the Human Rights Council. It did not vote against, but it did not vote in favor either.
Bolsonaro, on the other hand, did not condemn the Russian invasion. It is also true that the United States has criticized Bolsonaro for visiting Putin on the eve of the invasion and that Russia cites Brazil as a country that understands Russian objectives in Ukraine. However, to date, there are no consequences for Brazil’s bilateral relations in the context of the war in Ukraine.
Could this conflicting position between Bolsonaro and Brazil’s own diplomacy lead Joe Biden to remove Brazil’s extra-NATO status?
That is unlikely. The US has an interest in Brazil maintaining this status. Also, the presidential elections in Brazil are near, and there is no motivation, nor would it be wise, to propose a change in the status at this time.
What does the US gain from having extra-NATO allies in Latin America, like Brazil and Argentina?
For the United States, there are some central issues in South America. First, Venezuela, with which there has been recent occasional US rapprochement, but only to further isolate Russia and get oil supplies.
Second is the increasing influence of China in the region. Some analyses are in the sense that the partnership could be a resumption of the Monroe Doctrine. In any case, as it was a partnership made mainly through personal influence, the results of the last US presidential elections influenced it. In the same way, the US should wait for the results of the presidential elections in Brazil to make decisions about this partnership.
Regarding national sovereignty, can the extra-NATO status constrain Brazil to create NATO bases on national territories, such as in the Amazon, or to give in on national infrastructures, such as the Alcântara Center?
The extra-NATO status, by itself, does not provide for the constraint of Brazil’s sovereignty. Some bilateral agreement with the United States would be required to create bases in Brazil. However, if this were to happen, the bases would be US and not NATO bases since both the extra-NATO status and any eventual agreement would be with the Americans, not with NATO.
In a balance of these three years as an extra-NATO ally, has the status brought political and economic advantages to Brazil?
The status can help Brazil obtain technologies and safeguard agreements that benefit technological programs in the aerospace sector, in which the United States produces 90% of the mechanisms.
In addition, there may be benefits in authorizing the use of mechanisms for the Gripen NG – the turbine and radar, for example, are US technologies. Also, acquiring technology for the Brazilian nuclear-powered submarine could be a positive aspect. But these are still only expectations.
The status of a preferred non-NATO ally of the United States does not work without political alignment. As I said, the Brazilian government sought this alignment personally between Presidents Bolsonaro and Trump. However, Trump lost the 2020 election, and Bolsonaro, who had declared direct support for his re-election, took more than a month to acknowledge Biden’s victory.
In October 2021, 63 US congressmen, representing a quarter of the Democratic Party’s caucus in the US House, sent a letter to Biden asking that Brazil’s status be canceled because of Bolsonaro’s statements and actions. The status was not revoked, but it is clear that Bolsonaro’s relationship with Biden is not a close one. Of course, this translates into the absence of strategic advantages mentioned here for Brazil by the US.
If Brazil prioritizes its national interest, the status can, in the future, foster the Brazilian defense industrial base, but any alignment mustn’t be done automatically since the National Defense Strategy foresees integrated actions undertaken by the State, industry, and academia synergistically, seeking technological upgrading and independence. Brazil cannot use its status to become dependent on US technologies.
ARMS SUPPLIES TO UKRAINE DIVIDE THE GERMAN POPULATION
Reacting to mounting pressure from the German public and international allies, Berlin announced on March 27 that it would send combat tanks to Ukraine. The following day, the coalition government, made up of the Social Democratic (SPD), Green, and Liberal Democratic (FDP) parties, joined forces with the main opposition group, the conservative Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and Christian Social Union (CSU) to approve the sending of the heavy weapons in the federal parliament by a large majority.
However, recent opinion polls show that the German electorate is divided on the measure. The Infratest Dimap institute polled more than 1,300 voting citizens between April 25 and 27: 45% were in favor – a 10% drop from the previous month. Even so, 52% want more decisive and severe action against Russia.
The results of this poll were released in parallel with the parliamentary vote. A day later, Forschungsgruppe Wahlen reported an increase in approval of heavy arms exports: Of the 1,170 voters polled between April 26 and 28, 56% were in favor and 39% against. On the other hand, 59% were convinced that arms supplies increase the danger of a Russian attack on Western countries.
HEAD OF GOVERNMENT IN THE PUBLIC EYE
The feminist magazine Emma published an open letter to Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz, initially signed by 28 cultural personalities from the country, urgently calling on him not to supply any more heavy armaments to Ukraine.
Contrary to those who have accused him of indecision, the signatories praised the head of government for having “so far so thoroughly considered the risks” and done everything possible to prevent Russian military aggression in Ukraine from escalating into a third world war.
Despite this, Scholz’s approval ratings have been falling due to what is perceived as his hesitant attitude. Only a third of those polled by Infratest Dimap find his Ukraine policy convincing; almost half do not believe that the Social Democrat can lead the country through the crisis. These figures indicate a significant loss of confidence since the 2021 general elections.
CUT OFF RUSSIAN GAS OR MAINTAIN DEPENDENCE?
Another controversial issue in Germany is energy: 54% of the poll participants want a gradual end to Russian gas and oil imports. Only 22% are for an immediate halt, while 19% prefer to maintain the status quo of German dependence on this fuel source.
These results also reflect the official position of Berlin, which has warned of the economic consequences of a boycott while stating that it is looking for alternatives to Russia as soon as possible. The goal would be to cut dependence on oil within the next few months and gas within two years.
At the party preference level, the April edition of Infratest Dimap’s Deutschlandtrend report showed little difference: Scholz’s Social Democrats are on 24%, trailing the Christian conservative opposition (CDU/CSU) by two percentage points.
The SPD’s allies in government, the Greens and the neoliberals of the FDP, maintain their positions, with 18% and 9%, respectively. Together, the three parties still hold 51% of the vote, confirming their status in the federal government.