RIO DE JANEIRO, BRAZIL – After at least two decades of studies, forecasts, intentions and postponed decisions, the Colombian government under President Iván Duque is finally implementing the demands of the Armed Forces and the determination of the Social and Economic Policy Council of 2019 to re-equip the Integrated National Defense System (SIDEN).
In this context, the Colombian Armed Forces have insisted on the need to initiate processes of renewal, replacement, modernization and, especially, re-equipment of the main national defense systems, as deterrence capabilities continue to decline due to their obsolescence-and, in many cases, due to the end of their useful life; a need that the State has only recognized as imperative in 2019 through a Conpes document.
Read also: Check out our coverage on Colombia
However, in connection with the latent problem of obsolescence, in recent years there have been repeated incidents at the border in which the Bolivarian National Armed Forces (FANB) have violated Colombian sovereignty and the neighboring government has repeatedly threatened to invade (descocainizar) Colombian territory, citing this country’s alleged support for organized armed groups or organizations it describes as paramilitary.
This tense situation has also been caused by Russia’s public support for the Bolivarian regime, which has even manifested itself in the presence of surveillance systems and personnel (Wagner Group) in the border areas, which in turn has provoked reactions from Colombia’s allies-such as the United States-which regularly conducts intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights precisely with the aim of monitoring and tracking Russian activities in the neighboring country.
Since last year, Colombian intelligence (DNI) has reported a notable increase in interference operations, particularly of a non-conventional nature, against Colombia, emanating from both Russia (St. Petersburg) and Venezuela (Caracas), with the apparent aim of spreading disinformation and destabilization campaigns against the national establishment, including by financing (with gold) violent protests amid the peaceful demonstrations of 2021.
These actions reported by Colombian intelligence alone would not have changed the perception of the Colombian government, despite developments reported by allied countries in the same direction that warned of a possible greater threat in the immediate future.
However, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, new reports came in, especially from allied (NATO) intelligence agencies, of possible actions in border areas that would threaten territorial integrity.
BOLIVARIAN SHIELD
These reports coincided with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s allegation that Colombia was forming and funding groups of individuals he described as armed Colombian drug terrorists (Tancol) whose goal was to destabilize his country, carry out attacks, and consequently violate the rights of its citizens, based on information from his Directorate General of Military Counterintelligence (DGCIM). In addition, there is the almost immediate development of Operation Bolivarian Shield 2022 Vuelvan Caras, which concentrated an unusual number of FANB troops and resources less than a kilometer from the border, whose deployment – in principle – did not correspond to an operation structured for traditional operations, as analyst Andrei Serbint Pont commented to this newspaper.
It was precisely at this time that the Colombian government was informed of the likelihood of a FANB military incursion into its territory, which was presented as a necessary special military operation, to be legitimized as an anti-drug, anti-terrorist and anti-fascist operation, and supported by the Russian government, This, in turn, led to the deployment of Colombian forces at various points along the border and the decision to examine in detail the process of replacing equipment and resources for the Colombian armed forces, which would take the form of approving and signing the corresponding Conpes and Confis documents.
It should be noted that the aforementioned invasion – which was to be carried out in the departments of Arauca and Boyacá – did not materialize due to the Russian operational failure in Ukraine, which not only diplomatically but also logistically limited any future support, which weighed heavily on the Venezuelan decision, despite the statements that have been and continue to be used to try to delegitimize the Colombian government and associate it with drug trafficking organizations that, on the contrary, have proven links with the Bolivarian government and a permanent presence in that country (Second Marquetalía and ELN).
At this point, it must be recalled that Russian aid to Venezuela – as noted by the former commander of the Colombian Air Force, General Carlos Bueno – “has led to an increase in support, which has also been maintained through the sale and support of armaments, especially for the Bolivarian Military Aviation (AMB) and its Command of Air Defense Operations (CODA), which has led to an imbalance of forces between the two nations – and also a regional imbalance, but also by the deployment and overflight of national airspace by Ilyushin II-96 and Tupolev TU-160 aircraft (the latter were intercepted by K-Fir C10 fighters and forced to leave the airspace), which was a clear provocation and an open and public show of force, In the process, the installation and operation of intermediate-range ballistic systems was even considered at some point, and open sources know of possible institutional destabilization through cyberattacks and disinformation, for which personnel and agents have been dispatched to the country for this purpose. As can be seen in a nutshell, there are many threats and a permanent and ongoing military escalation of capabilities. These are openly hostile attitudes, behaviors, and statements toward Colombia.”
This, of course, has led to tensions on the border (especially since 2009) due to constant statements by Venezuelan leaders to attack Colombia or specific targets in that country, which have increased with the growth of the Russian presence in Venezuela.
In this regard, the director of the Regional Coordinator for Economic and Social Research (Cries), Andrei Serbint Pont, points out that “the main concern or danger brought by the Russian presence in Venezuela is the tension on the border. On the one hand, U.S. Special Forces are providing advisory support to the Colombian Armed Forces (FFMM), in addition to their public and permanent reconnaissance flights (with RC-135), providing various advisory services, which shows the support of the FFMM, especially in counterinsurgency and counter-narcotics, but on the other hand, they also support the country in the tensions with Venezuela. On the other side – in Venezuela – the situation is quite similar, i.e., Russian special forces are training Venezuelan forces and supporting them in electronic warfare (with these radio-electronic scanning units), in addition to using drones and other systems.”
“The biggest risk we are taking is that with the increase of tensions between the U.S. and Russia at the global level, this border between Apure and Arauca could become a kind of focal point of geopolitical tensions, so that this possible conflict between Colombia and Venezuela becomes a global geopolitical dimension and the interests of the U.S. and Russia come to play directly, which is the biggest risk we have to consider in this area, apart from the border tensions that have existed for decades,” Serbint Pont said.
CONPES AND CONFIS
Given the certain threat and the current lack of deterrence capabilities, the Colombian government can only opt for the approval of the corresponding documents of the National Council for Economic and Social Policy (Conpes) and the Supreme Council for Fiscal Policy (Confis), which foresee the financing of projects to renew the current equipment of the Armed Forces over a ten-year period, to be developed and implemented by the next two presidential administrations.
This decision will then be the result of detailed analyses and studies, not only strategic but also economic, and in light of the various programs for modernization and renewal of their resources presented by the individual Armed Forces and the General Command of the Armed Forces, which reveal the almost complete lack of deterrent capabilities in the face of the constant and growing threat to Colombian sovereignty and territorial integrity.
However, given the traditional policy of diplomatic settlement of disputes and the recent Covid-19 pandemic and its impact on the global economy, the Colombian government has refrained from making strategic decisions on national defense, which in the past were responsible for the deficit and imbalance of national defense capabilities.
This deficit is particularly noticeable in the current geopolitical situation, as Colombian columnist and politician Sergio Araujo warns: “For Vladimir Putin, Maduro’s needs have provided the opportunity to install a strong Russian military and economic presence in an American territory that, unlike Cuba, is one of the richest countries in the world in terms of natural resources and is located in the Americas, with the possibility of being a military reference point that is not necessarily subsidized and hosts a long-term alliance to counterbalance NATO’s presence in the Americas on Russia’s borders.”
“To the extent that Colombia is the main ally of the United States on the same continent, our country becomes the first temptation to serve as a stage for the power struggle between Vladimir Putin and the United States,” Araujo said.
SISDAN AND PES
Colombia’s decision to finally realize its Siden could mean projects such as the Integrated National Air Defense System (Sisdan) and the renewal of the Air Force-led fleet of fighter jets and helicopters; the Strategic Surface Platform (PES) program, which will renew the Navy’s surface fleet, and the Multi-layered Mobile Air Defense System (SDAM), with which the Colombian Air Force will renew its Air Force-led fleet of fighter jets and helicopters; and a series of other programs aimed at strengthening the national defense and security industry (through technology transfer and through the GSED), increasing minimum deterrence capabilities that are currently scarce, and providing the armed forces with the necessary tools to fulfill their constitutional mandate to protect and safeguard national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
This will allow Colombia to finally guarantee the integrity and sovereignty of its territory, eliminate the Venezuelan threat, hand in hand with NATO (as its preferred ally), and lay the foundation for a new concept of hemispheric security through which the self-determination and freedom of the continent’s nations will be protected, on the one hand, against the expansionist aspirations of some regimes and, on the other, against the intentions of powers to escalate regional conflicts.
With information from infodefensa