

**Views of American Democracy and Society and Support for Political Violence:
First Report from a Nationwide Population-Representative Survey**

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ABSTRACT

Background: Several social trends in the United States (US) suggest an increasing risk for political violence. Little is known about support for and personal willingness to engage in political violence and how those measures vary with lethality of violence, specific circumstances, or specific populations as targets.

Design, Setting, Participants: Cross-sectional nationwide survey conducted May 13 to June 2, 2022; participants were adult members of the Ipsos KnowledgePanel.

Main Outcomes and Measures: Weighted, population-representative proportions endorsing an array of beliefs about American democracy and society and the use of violence, including political violence, and extrapolations to the US adult population.

Results: The analytic sample included 8,620 respondents; 50.6% (95% Confidence Interval (CI) 49.4%, 51.7%) were female; mean (SD) age was 48.4 (18.0) years. Two-thirds of respondents (67.2%, 95% CI 66.1%, 68.4%) perceived “a serious threat to our democracy,” but more than 40% agreed that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy” and that “in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants.” Half (50.1%) agreed that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States.” Among 6,768 respondents who considered violence to be at least sometimes justified to achieve 1 or more specific political objectives, 12.2% were willing to commit political violence themselves “to threaten or intimidate a person,” 10.4% “to injure a person,” and 7.1% “to kill a person.” Among all respondents, 18.5% thought it at least somewhat likely that within the next

few years, in a situation where they believed political violence was justified, “I will be armed with a gun”; 4.0% thought it at least somewhat likely that “I will shoot someone with a gun.”

Conclusions and Relevance: Coupled with prior research, these findings suggest a continuing alienation from and mistrust of American democratic society and its institutions. Substantial minorities of the population endorse violence, including lethal violence, to obtain political objectives. Efforts to prevent that violence, which a large majority of Americans already reject, should proceed rapidly based on the best evidence available. Further research will inform future prevention efforts.

INTRODUCTION

Recent events in the United States (US)—mass shootings, Supreme Court decisions, hearings of the House committee investigating the January 6 attack on the Capitol, and others—have reminded Americans of the daily presence of violence in their nation’s public life. This study is motivated by 5 recent trends that, in their apparent convergence, create the potential for even greater violence that could put at risk the future of the US as a free and democratic society.

First is a striking rise in violence, and particularly in firearm violence. The 28% increase in homicide from 2019 to 2020¹ was the largest single-year percentage increase ever recorded.² Firearms accounted for 57.7% of violent deaths in 2019 but 62.1% in 2020, when 78.9% of homicides (19,995 of 25,356) and 52.8% of suicides (24,292 of 45,979) involved firearms.^{1,3}

Second is an equally unprecedented increase in firearm purchasing that began with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020 and, except for a brief respite late in 2021, has continued through June 2022.^{2,4} From January 2020 through June 2022, background checks on firearm purchasers have averaged 46.6% above expected levels (Supplement Figure 1); an estimated 14.5 million excess background checks have been conducted, of 45.7 million checks altogether.

Third is growing uncertainty about the stability and value of democracy in the US. Most Americans across the political spectrum now perceive a serious threat to democracy in the US.^{5,6} At the same time, nearly 70% of adults—with very similar results for Democrats and Republicans—agree that “American democracy only serves the interests of the wealthy and

powerful.”⁷ Approximately 20% of Republicans, conservatives, and voters for Donald Trump (and 9% of Democrats, liberals, and voters for Joe Biden) disagree with the statement that “democracy is [the] best form of government.”⁸

Fourth is the expansion into the mainstream of American public opinion of extreme, false beliefs about American society. Approximately 1 adult in 5 endorses the core elements of the Q-Anon belief complex, that “government, media, and financial worlds in the US are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles” (16%) and that “there is a storm coming soon that will sweep away the elites in power and restore the rightful leaders” (22%).⁹ Nearly 1 adult in 3 (32%) endorses the assertion that “a group of people in this country [is] trying to replace native-born Americans with immigrants.”¹⁰

Fifth is growing support for the use of violence to accomplish political or social objectives. More than a third (36%) of American adults (56% of Republicans and 22% of Democrats) agree that “the traditional American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it.”⁷ Nearly one-fifth of adults (18%) agree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country.”⁹

Research on the prevalence and determinants of support for political violence in the US is sparse.¹¹⁻¹⁵ Existing work has been criticized on multiple grounds, including failures to define violence, to determine whether support for political violence reflects support for violence generally, and to determine whether persons who endorse political violence are willing to engage in such violence themselves.^{14,15}

Many important and urgent questions remain insufficiently explored, or unexplored altogether. Does support for political violence reflect a general predisposition to violence as a means of solving problems? How prevalent are support for, and willingness to engage in, political violence when that term is defined? How do those prevalences vary with specific political objectives for which violence might be employed, with the lethality of that violence, and with its target? Beyond demographics, what individual characteristics (e.g., extreme political and social beliefs, firearm ownership) and community characteristics are associated with support for political violence? What specific preparations for political violence have its supporters made?

We developed the 2022 Life in America survey to answer these and related questions with data from a large nationally representative sample, augmented by oversamples for populations of special interest. This first report outlines the study's overall methods and presents descriptive tabulations of data from the main study sample on key questions regarding respondents' political and social beliefs and their support for—and willingness to engage in—political violence.

METHODS

Data for this cross-sectional survey study are from the 2022 Life in America Survey, which was designed by the authors and administered online in English and Spanish from May 13 to June 2, 2022 by the survey research firm Ipsos.¹⁶ Before participants accessed the questionnaire, they were provided informed consent language that concluded, “[by] continuing, you are agreeing to participate in this study.” The study was approved by the University of California Davis Institutional Review Board and is reported following American Association for Public Opinion Research guidelines.¹⁷

Participants

Respondents were drawn from the Ipsos KnowledgePanel, an online research panel that has been widely used in population-based research, including studies of violence and firearm ownership.¹⁸⁻²³

To establish a nationally representative panel, members are recruited on an ongoing basis through address-based probability sampling using data from the US Postal Service’s Delivery Sequence File.²⁴ Recruited adults in households without internet access are provided a web-enabled device and free internet service. A probability-proportional-to-size procedure was used to select a study-specific sample. All panel members who were aged 18 years and older were eligible for selection. Invitations were sent by e-mail; automatic reminders were delivered to non-respondents by e-mail and telephone beginning 3 days later.

A final survey weight variable provided by Ipsos adjusted for the initial probability of selection into KnowledgePanel and for survey-specific nonresponse and over- or under-coverage using design weights with post-stratification raking ratio adjustments. With weighting, the sample is designed to be statistically representative of the noninstitutionalized adult population of the US as reflected in the 2021 March supplement of the Current Population Survey.

Measures

Sociodemographic data were collected by Ipsos as KnowledgePanel members created and maintained their member profiles. Survey questions that supplied data for this analysis covered 3 broad domains: beliefs regarding democracy and the potential for violence in the US; beliefs regarding American society and institutions; and support for and willingness to engage in violence, including political violence. Prior polls or surveys on these topics were reviewed, and selected questions were included or adapted in this questionnaire to track trends in opinion and provide context for responses to questions that had not been asked previously. The full text of all questions reported on here, including sources for questions from prior surveys, is in the Supplement.

The questionnaire used the phrase “force or violence” in place of violence. Force or violence was defined as “physical force strong enough that it could cause pain or injury to a person.” “Force or violence to advance an important political objective that you support” was used in questions about respondents’ support for and willingness to engage in political violence.

Implementation

Ipsos translated the questionnaire into Spanish, and interpreting services staff at UC Davis Medical Center reviewed the translation. Forty KnowledgePanel members participated in a pretest of the English language version that was administered April 27 to May 2, 2022.

Respondents were randomized 1:1 to receive response options in order from negative to positive valence (e.g., from ‘do not agree’ to ‘strongly agree’) or the reverse throughout the questionnaire. Where a question presented multiple statements for respondents to consider, the order in which those statements were presented was randomized unless ordering was necessary. Logic-driving questions (those to which responses might invoke a skip pattern) included non-response prompts.

To minimize inattentive responses to questions regarding political violence, those questions were immediately preceded by a question asking respondents about the justifiability of the use of force or violence under 7 other conditions. These were presented to all respondents in a fixed order from what the authors considered likely to be seen as justifying violence (“in self-defense”) to unlikely (“to get respect”). This was done to create an expected response transition from support to nonsupport that respondents would need to reverse to indicate support for political violence. Questions on personal willingness to engage in political violence were asked only of respondents who considered violence to be at least sometimes justified to achieve 1 or more specific political objectives.

Statistical Analysis

To generate prevalence estimates, we calculated weighted percentages and 95% confidence intervals (CI) for each measure using PROC SURVEYFREQ in SAS version 9.4 (SAS Institute, Inc., Cary, NC) and Complex Samples Frequencies in IBM SPSS Statistics, version 28 (IBM Corp., Armonk, NY). Estimated counts of adults in the US were generated by simple extrapolation, multiplying weighted percentages from our sample by the estimated adult population of the US as of July 1, 2021 (258.33 million persons).²⁵

RESULTS

Of 15,449 panel members invited to participate as part of the main study sample, 8,620 completed the survey, yielding a 55.8% completion rate. The median survey completion time was 15.7 minutes (Interquartile Range, 11.4-23.0 minutes). Item non-response ranged from 0.28% to 2.34%.

Slightly more than half of the respondents (50.6%, 95% CI 49.4%, 51.7%) were female; 62.6% (95% CI 61.4%, 63.9%) were white, non-Hispanic; 11.9% (95% CI 11.1%, 12.8%) were Black, non-Hispanic; 16.9% (95% CI 15.9%, 17.8%) were Hispanic (of any race); and 5.4% (95% CI 4.8%, 6.1%) were Asian American/Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic (Table 1). Mean (SD) respondent age was 48.4 (18.0) years. Compared to nonrespondents, respondents were older and more frequently white, non-Hispanic; were more often married; had higher education and income; and were less likely to be working (Supplemental Table 1).

Democracy and the Potential for Violence

More than two-thirds of respondents (67.2%, 95% CI 66.1%-68.4%) perceived “a serious threat to our democracy,” and 88.8% believed it is very or extremely important “for the United States to remain a democracy” (Table 2). But at the same time, 42.4% agreed with the statement that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy”; 19.0% agreed strongly or very strongly.

Significant minorities of respondents agreed strongly or very strongly with each of 3 statements about potential conditions in the US might justify violence (Table 2): to “protect

American democracy” if “elected leaders will not” (18.7%); to save “our American way of life,” which is “disappearing” (16.1%); and to “save our country” because “things have gotten so far off track” (8.1%). Half the respondents (50.1%) agreed at least somewhat that “in the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States.”

American Society and Institutions

Four items explored beliefs on race and “great replacement” thinking (Table 3). While 39.0% of respondents agreed strongly or very strongly that “white people benefit from advantages in society that Black people do not have,” 27.1% agreed strongly or very strongly that “discrimination against whites is as big a problem as discrimination against Blacks and other minorities.” Nearly 1 in 5 (18.6%) disagreed with the statement that “having more Black Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans is good for the country,” and 41.2% agreed—16.2% agreed strongly or very strongly—with the proposition that “in America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants.”

Another 4 items addressed the central elements of QAnon mythology and other beliefs (Table 4). More than 1 in 5 respondents (22.7%) endorsed the statement, with 9% agreeing strongly or very strongly, that US institutions are “controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles” who traffic children for sex. Nearly 30% (29.7%) agreed (10.1% strongly or very strongly) that “a storm coming soon” will “sweep away the elites in power and restore the rightful leaders.” More than 2 in 5 (43.4%) agreed (19.3% strongly or very strongly) that “we are living in what the Bible calls ‘the end times.’” Nearly a third of respondents (32.1%) endorsed

the statement that “the 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump, and Joe Biden is an illegitimate president”; nearly 1 in 5 (18.4%) agreed strongly or very strongly.

Violence

Respondents’ views on the justifiability of violence varied substantially, and predictably, with circumstance (Figure 1). Nearly all respondents saw violence as at least sometimes justified in self-defense (97.1%), or to prevent assaultive (96.5%) or self-inflicted (92.8%) injury to others. Conversely, large majorities reported that violence to win an argument (85.7%), respond to an insult (81.5%), or get respect (86.2%) was never justified. One in 5 respondents (20.5%) believed that “in general,” political violence was at least sometimes justified; 3.0% considered it usually or always justified (Table 5, Figure 1).

Substantial minorities of respondents considered violence to be at least sometimes justified to achieve a wide array of specific political objectives (Table 5, Supplemental Figure 2): 11.6% “to return Donald Trump to the presidency this year,” 24.8% “to stop an election from being stolen,” 7.3% “to stop people who do not share my beliefs from voting,” 24.2% “to preserve an American way of life based on Western European traditions,” 18.8% “to oppose the government when it does not share my beliefs,” and 38.0% “to oppose the government when it tries to take private land for public purposes.” More than a third of respondents (36.2%) reported that violence was at least sometimes justified “to prevent discrimination based on race or ethnicity.”

The 6,768 respondents who considered violence to be at least sometimes justified to achieve 1 or more specific political objectives were presented 3 series of items regarding

personal willingness to use force or violence “in a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective.” One series (Table 6) concerned types of violence. Among these respondents, 13.7% were at least somewhat willing to use force or violence “to damage property,” 12.2% “to threaten or intimidate a person,” 10.4% “to injure a person,” and 7.1% “to kill a person.” Approximately 3% were very or completely willing to threaten, injure, or kill another person to advance a political objective.

A second series concerned categories of people as potential targets of such violence, because of who those people were (Table 7). When asked, again in a situation where they thought political violence was justified, “how willing would you personally be to use force or violence against a person because they are...,” 8.6% of respondents were at least somewhat willing to commit violence against “an elected federal or state government official,” 7.7% against “an elected local government official,” 5.6% against “an election worker, such as a poll worker or vote counter,” 6.4% against “a public health official,” 8.7% against “a member of the military or National Guard,” 8.7% against “a police officer,” 5.8% against “a person who does not share your race or ethnicity,” 5.2% against “a person who does not share your religion,” and 6.5% against “a person who does not share your political beliefs.”

Finally, all respondents were asked to predict the likelihood of their future use of a firearm “in a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective” (Table 8). Nearly 1 in 5 (18.5%) thought it at least somewhat likely that “I will be armed with a gun,” 9.9% that “I will carry a gun openly, so that people know I am armed,” 2.4% that “I will threaten someone with a gun,” and 4.0% that “I will shoot someone with a gun.”

DISCUSSION

The motivating premises for this survey were that current conditions in the US create both perceived threats and actual threats to its future as a free and democratic society. The findings bear out both premises. As to the former, more than two-thirds of respondents perceived “a serious threat to our democracy”; just over half expect civil war in the next few years. As to the latter, 10% thought it at most somewhat important for the US to remain a democracy; more than 40% agreed that “having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy”; and 20.5% considered political violence to be in general at least sometimes justified.

Many findings from this survey are concordant with those of polls taken over the last 2 years.^{5-10, 26-30} These include support by substantial minorities of the population for broad statements of the potential need for violence to save a society that has somehow headed in the wrong direction and for false beliefs, such as the Q-Anon complex, “great replacement” thinking, and the myth that Donald Trump won the 2020 Presidential election. This concordance reflects the stability of those earlier findings and provides a foundation for the new results presented here.

Our population-level extrapolations suggest that more than 50 million adults in the US consider violence to be at least sometimes justified in general to achieve political objectives that they support. More than 60 million could at least sometimes justify violence “to preserve an American way of life based on Western European traditions”; nearly 20 million could justify violence to stop people who do not share their beliefs from voting.

These are not abstract beliefs, made without commitment. Our extrapolations suggest that to achieve a political objective that they support, 6 million Americans would be very or completely willing to damage property and between 4 million and 5 million to threaten or intimidate someone, injure them, or kill them. Between 3 million and 5 million Americans would be very or completely willing to commit violence against others because they are representatives of social institutions: government officials, election officials, health officials, members of the military or police. Three million would commit politically-motivated violence against others because of differences in race/ethnicity or religion.

For many, situations in which they consider political violence to be justified call for the use of firearms. Based on our extrapolations, nearly 20 million Americans think it very or extremely likely that they will be armed in such a situation in the next few years, nearly 11 million that they will carry a gun openly, and nearly 3 million that they will shoot someone.

In the aggregate, these initial findings suggest a continuing alienation from and mistrust of American democratic society and its institutions, founded in part on false beliefs. They suggest a high level of support for violence, including lethal violence, to achieve political objectives. The prospect of large-scale political violence in the near future is entirely plausible.³¹ Forthcoming analyses will shed light on factors associated with that support and inform efforts to prevent that prospect from being realized.

It is important to emphasize that these findings also provide firm ground for hope. A large majority of respondents rejected political violence altogether, whether generally or in support of any single specific objective. A large majority of those who did endorse political violence were unwilling to resort to violence themselves. The challenge now for those large

majorities is to recognize the threat posed by those who are willing to engage in political violence and respond adequately to it.

Limitations

Several technical limitations exist. The findings are cross-sectional and subject to sampling error and bias due to nonresponse and other factors. Many important outcomes are uncommon, with response counts <100 and weighted prevalences below 5%. The large study sample results in relatively narrow confidence intervals in these cases, but the estimates remain particularly vulnerable to bias from sources such as inattentive or strategic responses. Widely publicized mass shootings occurred in Buffalo, NY and Uvalde, TX while the survey was in the field. The Buffalo shooting is understood to have been a race-related hate crime motivated by “replacement” thinking and may have affected respondents’ views on race, violence, and that particular belief. Russia’s war against Ukraine may have influenced responses on violence and democracy.

This initial report presents only simple descriptive tabulations to establish prevalences. Further analyses of these data are in progress to explore variation in those prevalences across the study population, such as with demographics, position on the political spectrum, and firearm ownership. Follow-up studies are in development to explore the meaning and implications of the findings here. For example, no questions were asked to obtain respondents’ opinions in cases where they would be helpful: does a respondent who expects civil war view that war positively or negatively? Similarly, this survey did not solicit specific information on

what gives rise to support for political violence, or on how that support or its causes might best be addressed in prevention efforts.

Conclusion

Findings from this large, nationally representative survey suggest that current conditions in the United States put at risk the future of the country as a free and democratic society. Among these are support by substantial minorities of the population for violence, including lethal violence, to obtain political objectives. Efforts to prevent that violence should proceed rapidly based on the best evidence available, while further research identifies factors associated with support for political violence and informs further prevention efforts.

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Table 1. Personal characteristics of respondents

Characteristic	Respondents (n= 8,620)	
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)
Age (mean [SD])	53.8 (17.2)	48.4 (18.0)
18-24	447	10.5 (9.6, 11.5)
25-34	1024	16.6 (15.6, 17.6)
35-44	1374	18.5 (17.6, 19.5)
45-54	1215	14.5 (13.7, 15.3)
55-64	1833	17.4 (16.6, 18.2)
65-74	1788	14.4 (13.7, 15.1)
75+	939	8.0 (7.4, 8.5)
Non-response	0	0
Gender		
Female	4300	50.6 (49.4, 51.7)
Male	4159	47.2 (46.1, 48.4)
Transgender	41	0.6 (0.4, 0.8)
Non-binary	44	0.7 (0.5, 0.9)
Other	20	0.3 (0.1, 0.4)
Non-response	56	0.7 (0.5, 0.9)
Race/Ethnicity		
White, non-Hispanic	6046	62.6 (61.4, 63.9)
Black, non-Hispanic	834	11.9 (11.1, 12.8)
Hispanic, any race	1084	16.9 (15.9, 17.8)
American Indian or Alaska Native, non-Hispanic	54	1.3 (0.9, 1.6)
Asian American / Pacific Islander, non-Hispanic	313	5.4 (4.8, 6.1)
Some other race, non-Hispanic	22	0.1 (0.1, 0.2)
2+ Races, non-Hispanic	267	1.7 (1.5, 2.0)
Non-response	0	0
Marital status		
Now married	5246	56.1 (54.9, 57.3)
Widowed	443	4.0 (3.6, 4.4)
Divorced	909	8.7 (8.1, 9.3)
Separated	139	1.7 (1.4, 2.1)
Never married	1883	29.5 (28.3, 30.7)
Non-response	0	0
Education		
No high school diploma or GED	542	9.5 (8.7, 10.4)
High school graduate (diploma or GED)	2158	28.3 (27.2, 29.4)
Some college or Associate's degree	2364	27.1 (26.0, 28.1)

Characteristic	Respondents (n= 8,620)	
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)
Bachelor's degree	1951	19.7 (18.8, 20.6)
Master's degree or higher	1605	15.4 (14.7, 16.2)
Non-response	0	0
Household Income		
Less than \$10,000	272	3.9 (3.4, 4.4)
\$10,000 to \$24,999	745	9.0 (8.3, 9.7)
\$25,000 to \$49,999	1469	17.0 (16.1, 17.9)
\$50,000 to \$74,999	1414	16.3 (15.4, 17.2)
\$75,000 to \$99,999	1214	13.2 (12.4, 14)
\$100,000 to \$149,999	1500	17.9 (16.9, 18.8)
\$150,000 or more	2006	22.8 (21.8, 23.7)
Non-response	0	0
Employment		
Working – as a paid employee	4323	54.3 (53.1, 55.4)
Working – self-employed	694	8.0 (7.3, 8.6)
Not working – on temporary layoff from a job	40	0.6 (0.4, 0.8)
Not working – looking for work	312	5.1 (4.5, 5.7)
Not working – retired	2478	20.9 (20.1, 21.8)
Not working – disabled	314	4.2 (3.7, 4.7)
Not working – other	459	7.0 (6.3, 7.7)
Non-response	0	0
Census region		
New England	412	4.7 (4.2, 5.2)
Mid-Atlantic	1090	12.5 (11.8, 13.3)
East-North Central	1267	14.3 (13.5, 15.1)
West-North Central	604	6.4 (5.8, 6.9)
South Atlantic	1714	20.5 (19.5, 21.4)
East-South Central	465	5.8 (5.3, 6.4)
West-South Central	904	12.0 (11.1, 12.8)
Mountain	745	7.7 (7.1, 8.2)
Pacific	1419	16.2 (15.3, 17.1)
Non-response	0	0

Table 2. Views on democracy and the potential for violence in the United States

Statement	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
When thinking about democracy in the United States these days, do you believe...			
There is a serious threat to our democracy.	6117	67.2 (66.1, 68.4)	173.7 (170.7, 176.7)
There may be a threat to our democracy, but it is not serious.	1832	23.6 (22.5, 24.6)	60.9 (58.2, 63.7)
There is no threat to our democracy.	573	7.8 (7.1, 8.5)	20.1 (18.3, 21.9)
Non-response	98	1.4 (1.1, 1.7)	3.6 (2.8, 4.4)
How important do you think it is for the United States to remain a democracy?			
Not important	145	2.2 (1.8, 2.6)	5.6 (4.6, 6.6)
Somewhat important	510	7.8 (7.1, 8.5)	20.1 (18.3, 22)
Very important	1828	24.1 (23.1, 25.2)	62.4 (59.6, 65.1)
Extremely important	6058	64.7 (63.6, 65.9)	167.2 (164.2, 170.3)
Non-response	79	1.1 (0.9, 1.4)	2.9 (2.2, 3.7)
Having a strong leader for America is more important than having a democracy.			
Do not agree	5141	56.0 (54.8, 57.2)	144.7 (141.6, 147.8)
Somewhat agree	1835	23.4 (22.3, 24.4)	60.4 (57.7, 63.1)
Strongly agree	821	10.3 (9.5, 11.0)	26.5 (24.6, 28.5)
Very strongly agree	702	8.7 (8.0, 9.4)	22.4 (20.6, 24.2)
Non-response	121	1.7 (1.3, 2.0)	4.3 (3.5, 5.2)
If elected leaders will not protect American democracy, the people must do it themselves, even if it requires taking violent actions.			
Do not agree	4504	50.0 (48.9, 51.2)	129.3 (126.2, 132.4)
Somewhat agree	2468	29.6 (28.5, 30.7)	76.4 (73.6, 79.2)

Statement	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
Strongly agree	834	10.3 (9.6, 11.1)	26.6 (24.7, 28.6)
Very strongly agree	687	8.4 (7.7, 9.1)	21.7 (19.9, 23.5)
Non-response	127	1.7 (1.4, 2)	4.3 (3.5, 5.1)
Our American way of life is disappearing so fast that we may have to use force to save it.			
Do not agree	4959	55.6 (54.4, 56.8)	143.7 (140.6, 146.8)
Somewhat agree	2222	26.7 (25.7, 27.8)	69.1 (66.3, 71.8)
Strongly agree	730	8.9 (8.2, 9.6)	23.0 (21.2, 24.9)
Very strongly agree	585	7.2 (6.5, 7.8)	18.5 (16.9, 20.2)
Non-response	124	1.5 (1.2, 1.8)	4.0 (3.2, 4.8)
Because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country.			
Do not agree	6404	72.4 (71.3, 73.5)	187 (184.2, 189.9)
Somewhat agree	1423	17.6 (16.6, 18.5)	45.4 (43, 47.8)
Strongly agree	369	4.4 (3.9, 4.9)	11.4 (10.1, 12.6)
Very strongly agree	279	3.7 (3.2, 4.2)	9.6 (8.3, 10.9)
Non-response	145	1.9 (1.6, 2.2)	4.9 (4, 5.8)
In the next few years, there will be civil war in the United States.			
Do not agree	4268	47.8 (46.6, 48.9)	123.4 (120.3, 126.4)
Somewhat agree	3126	36.4 (35.3, 37.6)	94.1 (91.1, 97.0)
Strongly agree	654	8.4 (7.7, 9.1)	21.8 (20, 23.6)
Very strongly agree	411	5.3 (4.8, 5.9)	13.7 (12.3, 15.2)
Non-response	161	2.1 (1.7, 2.4)	5.4 (4.5, 6.3)

Table 3. Views on race and “replacement”

Statement	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
White people benefit from advantages in society that Black people do not have.			
Do not agree	2866	31.8 (30.7, 32.9)	82.2 (79.3, 85)
Somewhat agree	2443	27.9 (26.8, 29)	72.1 (69.3, 74.8)
Strongly agree	1414	17.0 (16.1, 17.9)	43.9 (41.5, 46.2)
Very strongly agree	1793	22.0 (21.0, 23.0)	56.8 (54.2, 59.4)
Non-response	104	1.3 (1.1, 1.6)	3.5 (2.7, 4.2)
Discrimination against whites is as big a problem as discrimination against Blacks and other minorities.			
Do not agree	4174	48.9 (47.7, 50.1)	126.3 (123.2, 129.3)
Somewhat agree	1986	22.7 (21.7, 23.7)	58.7 (56.2, 61.3)
Strongly agree	1141	13.0 (12.2, 13.8)	33.7 (31.6, 35.7)
Very strongly agree	1225	14.1 (13.3, 15.0)	36.5 (34.3, 38.6)
Non-response	94	1.2 (1, 1.5)	3.2 (2.5, 3.9)
Having more Black Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans is good for the country.			
Do not agree	1721	18.6 (17.7, 19.5)	48.2 (45.8, 50.5)
Somewhat agree	2989	34.0 (32.8, 35.1)	87.7 (84.8, 90.6)
Strongly agree	1960	23.2 (22.2, 24.2)	60.0 (57.3, 62.6)
Very strongly agree	1751	21.9 (20.9, 22.9)	56.6 (54.0, 59.2)
Non-response	199	2.3 (1.9, 2.6)	5.9 (5.0, 6.8)
In America, native-born white people are being replaced by immigrants.			
Do not agree	4884	57.4 (56.2, 58.6)	148.3 (145.3, 151.3)
Somewhat agree	2206	25.0 (24.0, 26.0)	64.5 (61.9, 67.2)

Statement	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
Strongly agree	835	9.8 (9.1, 10.5)	25.4 (23.5, 27.2)
Very strongly agree	584	6.4 (5.8, 6.9)	16.5 (15.0, 17.9)
Non-response	111	1.4 (1.1, 1.7)	3.7 (2.9, 4.4)

Table 4. Views on American society and institutions

Statement	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
The government, media, and financial worlds in the U.S. are controlled by a group of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who run a global child sex trafficking operation.			
Do not agree	6775	74.9 (73.8, 76)	193.4 (190.6, 196.2)
Somewhat agree	1000	13.7 (12.8, 14.6)	35.3 (33.0, 37.6)
Strongly agree	329	4.5 (4.0, 5.1)	11.7 (10.3, 13.1)
Very strongly agree	328	4.5 (4.0, 5.1)	11.7 (10.3, 13.1)
Non-response	188	2.4 (2, 2.8)	6.2 (5.2, 7.2)
There is a storm coming soon that will sweep away the elites in power and restore the rightful leaders.			
Do not agree	6031	67.8 (66.7, 68.9)	175.1 (172.2, 178.1)
Somewhat agree	1610	19.6 (18.6, 20.6)	50.6 (48.1, 53.1)
Strongly agree	429	5.5 (4.9, 6)	14.1 (12.6, 15.6)
Very strongly agree	348	4.6 (4, 5.1)	11.8 (10.4, 13.2)
Non-response	202	2.6 (2.2, 3)	6.7 (5.6, 7.7)
The chaos in America today is evidence that we are living in what the Bible calls “the end times.”			
Do not agree	4905	54.7 (53.5, 55.9)	141.4 (138.3, 144.5)
Somewhat agree	2056	24.1 (23.1, 25.2)	62.4 (59.7, 65.0)
Strongly agree	694	8.9 (8.2, 9.6)	23 (21.1, 24.8)
Very strongly agree	821	10.4 (9.6, 11.2)	26.9 (24.9, 28.8)
Non-response	144	1.8 (1.5, 2.2)	4.7 (3.9, 5.6)
The 2020 election was stolen from Donald Trump, and Joe Biden is an illegitimate president.			

Statement	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
Do not agree	5761	66.2 (65.1, 67.4)	171.1 (168.2, 174.0)
Somewhat agree	1142	13.7 (12.9, 14.5)	35.4 (33.2, 37.6)
Strongly agree	498	5.9 (5.4, 6.5)	15.3 (13.9, 16.8)
Very strongly agree	1083	12.5 (11.7, 13.2)	32.2 (30.2, 34.2)
Non-response	136	1.7 (1.4, 2.0)	4.3 (3.5, 5.1)

Table 5. Views on political violence, generally and by circumstance

What do you think about the use of force or violence in the following situations?	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
In general...to advance an important political objective that you support			
Never justified	7,073	79.1 (78.1, 80.2)	204.4 (201.7, 207.5)
Sometimes justified	1330	17.5 (16.5, 18.4)	45.1 (42.7, 47.6)
Usually justified	131	2.1 (1.7, 2.6)	5.4 (4.5, 6.6)
Always justified	58	0.9 (0.7, 1.2)	2.4 (1.8, 3.2)
Non-response	28	0.4 (0.3, 0.6)	1.0 (0.8, 1.5)
To return Donald Trump to the presidency this year			
Never justified	7,615	86.9 (85.9, 87.7)	224.6 (222.0, 226.5)
Sometimes justified	461	6.1 (5.5, 6.7)	15.8 (14.2, 17.4)
Usually justified	134	1.9 (1.6, 2.3)	5.0 (4.3, 6.0)
Always justified	287	3.6 (3.1, 4.1)	9.2 (8.1, 10.5)
Non-response	123	1.6 (1.3, 1.9)	4.1 (3.4, 4.9)
To stop an election from being stolen			
Never justified	6,411	73.6 (72.6, 74.7)	190.2 (187.4, 192.9)
Sometimes justified	1397	16.4 (15.6, 17.3)	42.4 (40.2, 44.8)
Usually justified	291	3.7 (3.3, 4.3)	9.7 (8.5, 11.0)
Always justified	406	4.7 (4.2, 5.3)	12.2 (11.0, 13.6)
Non-response	114	1.5 (1.2, 1.8)	3.9 (3.1, 4.6)
To stop people who do not share my beliefs from voting			
Never justified	8,031	91.8 (90.9, 92.5)	237.0 (235.0, 238.9)
Sometimes justified	329	4.8 (4.3, 5.4)	12.4 (11.0, 14.0)
Usually justified	94	1.5 (1.2, 1.8)	3.8 (3.0, 4.7)

What do you think about the use of force or violence in the following situations?	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
Always justified	68	1.0 (0.8, 1.3)	3.1 (2.0, 3.5)
Non-response	98	1.3 (1.0, 1.6)	3.4 (2.6, 4.1)
To prevent discrimination based on race or ethnicity			
Never justified	5,592	62.7 (61.5, 63.9)	162.0 (159.0, 165.1)
Sometimes justified	2,236	27.2 (26.1, 28.3)	70.2 (67.4, 73.0)
Usually justified	397	5.2 (4.7, 5.8)	13.4 (12.0, 14.9)
Always justified	280	3.8 (3.3, 4.3)	9.8 (8.6, 11.2)
Non-response	115	1.5 (1.2, 1.8)	3.9 (3.1, 4.6)
To preserve an American way of life based on Western European traditions			
Never justified	6354	74.0 (72.9, 75.0)	191.1 (188.4, 193.8)
Sometimes justified	1,662	18.6 (17.1, 19.5)	48.1 (44.2, 50.5)
Usually justified	287	3.5 (3.1, 4.0)	9.1 (8.0, 10.3)
Always justified	165	2.1 (1.7, 2.5)	5.3 (4.5, 6.3)
Non-response	152	1.9 (1.6, 2.2)	4.9 (4.1, 5.7)
To oppose the government when it does not share my beliefs			
Never justified	7,055	79.7 (78.7, 80.7)	205.9 (203.2, 208.4)
Sometimes justified	1,204	15.3 (14.4, 16.2)	39.5 (37.2, 41.8)
Usually justified	167	2.3 (1.9, 2.7)	5.9 (5.0, 7.0)
Always justified	81	1.2 (1.0, 1.6)	3.2 (2.5, 4.1)
Non-response	113	1.5 (1.2, 1.9)	3.9 (3.1, 4.9)
To oppose the government when it tries to take private land for public purposes			
Never justified	5,330	60.5 (59.3, 61.6)	156.2 (153.1, 159.2)
Sometimes justified	2,423	28.2 (27.2, 29.3)	72.9 (70.2, 75.7)

What do you think about the use of force or violence in the following situations?	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
Usually justified	438	5.8 (5.2, 6.4)	15.0 (13.5, 16.6)
Always justified	307	4.0 (3.5, 4.5)	10.3 (9.1, 11.6)
Non-response	122	1.5 (1.3, 1.9)	3.9 (3.4, 4.9)

Table 6. Personal willingness to engage in specific forms of political violence among respondents who considered violence to be at least sometimes justified to achieve 1 or more specific political objectives

In a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective...	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)		Estimated N of adults in US
		Among respondents asked the question (n= 6,768)*	Among the full sample (n= 8,620)**	N (95% CI) (in millions)
How willing would <u>you personally</u> be to use force or violence in each of these ways?				
To damage property				
Not willing	5911	85.4 (84.4, 86.4)	68.6 (67.6, 69.6)	177.1 (174.6, 179.7)
Somewhat willing	599	9.8 (9, 10.7)	6.9 (6.4, 7.5)	18 (16.6, 19.3)
Very willing	127	2.5 (2, 3)	1.5 (1.2, 1.7)	3.8 (3.1, 4.5)
Completely willing	80	1.4 (1.1, 1.8)	0.9 (0.7, 1.1)	2.4 (1.9, 2.9)
Non-response	51	0.9 (0.7, 1.2)	0.6 (0.4, 0.8)	1.5 (1.1, 1.9)
To threaten or intimidate a person				
Not willing	6016	86.8 (85.8, 87.8)	69.8 (68.8, 70.8)	180.3 (177.8, 182.8)
Somewhat willing	553	9.4 (8.6, 10.3)	6.4 (5.9, 6.9)	16.6 (15.2, 17.9)
Very willing	77	1.6 (1.2, 2)	0.9 (0.7, 1.1)	2.3 (1.8, 2.8)
Completely willing	66	1.2 (0.9, 1.6)	0.8 (0.6, 0.9)	2 (1.5, 2.5)
Non-response	56	1.0 (0.7, 1.3)	0.6 (0.5, 0.8)	1.7 (1.2, 2.1)
To injure a person				
Not willing	6110	88.5 (87.5, 89.4)	70.9 (69.9, 71.8)	183.1 (180.6, 185.6)
Somewhat willing	447	7.7 (6.9, 8.5)	5.2 (4.7, 5.7)	13.4 (12.2, 14.6)
Very willing	82	1.6 (1.3, 2.1)	1 (0.7, 1.2)	2.5 (1.9, 3)
Completely willing	63	1.1 (0.9, 1.5)	0.7 (0.6, 0.9)	1.9 (1.4, 2.4)
Non-response	66	1.1 (0.8, 1.4)	0.8 (0.6, 0.9)	2 (1.5, 2.5)

In a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective...	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)		Estimated N of adults in US
		Among respondents asked the question (n= 6,768)*	Among the full sample (n= 8,620)**	N (95% CI) (in millions)
To kill a person				
Not willing	6300	91.9 (91.1, 92.7)	73.1 (72.1, 74)	188.8 (186.4, 191.2)
Somewhat willing	253	4.4 (3.8, 5)	2.9 (2.6, 3.3)	7.6 (6.7, 8.5)
Very willing	80	1.5 (1.1, 1.9)	0.9 (0.7, 1.1)	2.4 (1.9, 2.9)
Completely willing	79	1.2 (1, 1.6)	0.9 (0.7, 1.1)	2.4 (1.8, 2.9)
Non-response	56	1.1 (0.8, 1.4)	0.6 (0.5, 0.8)	1.7 (1.2, 2.1)

*Respondents (n = 6,768) who considered violence to be at least sometimes justified to achieve 1 or more specific political objectives.

**Percentages in this column were used for extrapolation. A weighted 21.5% (95% CI 20.6%, 22.4%) of the study sample considered violence never justified for any specific political objective.

Table 7. Personal willingness to engage in political violence against specific types of people among 6,768 respondents who considered violence to be at least sometimes justified to achieve 1 or more specific political objectives

In a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective...	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)		Estimated N of adults in US
		Among respondents asked the question (n= 6,768)*	Among the full sample (n= 8,620)**	N (95% CI) (in millions)
How willing would you personally be to use force or violence against a person because they are...				
An elected federal or state government official				
Not willing	6188	90 (89.1, 90.8)	71.8 (70.8, 72.7)	185.4 (183, 187.9)
Somewhat willing	361	6.0 (5.4, 6.7)	4.2 (3.8, 4.6)	10.8 (9.7, 11.9)
Very willing	80	1.6 (1.2, 2.0)	0.9 (0.7, 1.1)	2.4 (1.9, 2.9)
Completely willing	52	1.0 (0.7, 1.4)	0.6 (0.4, 0.8)	1.6 (1.1, 2)
Non-response	87	1.4 (1.1, 1.8)	1 (0.8, 1.2)	2.6 (2.1, 3.2)
An elected local government official				
Not willing	6222	90.6 (89.7, 91.4)	72.2 (71.2, 73.1)	186.5 (184, 188.9)
Somewhat willing	327	5.5 (4.9, 6.2)	3.8 (3.4, 4.2)	9.8 (8.8, 10.8)
Very willing	70	1.3 (1.0, 1.8)	0.8 (0.6, 1.0)	2.1 (1.6, 2.6)
Completely willing	51	0.9 (0.7, 1.2)	0.6 (0.4, 0.8)	1.5 (1.1, 1.9)
Non-response	98	1.6 (1.3, 2.0)	1.1 (0.9, 1.4)	2.9 (2.4, 3.5)
An election worker, such as a poll worker or vote counter				
Not willing	6382	93 (92.2, 93.8)	74 (73.1, 75.0)	191.3 (188.9, 193.6)
Somewhat willing	199	3.5 (3, 4.1)	2.3 (2.0, 2.6)	6 (5.1, 6.8)
Very willing	65	1.3 (1, 1.8)	0.8 (0.6, 0.9)	1.9 (1.5, 2.4)

In a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective...	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)		Estimated N of adults in US
		Among respondents asked the question (n= 6,768)*	Among the full sample (n= 8,620)**	N (95% CI) (in millions)
Completely willing	39	0.8 (0.5, 1.1)	0.5 (0.3, 0.6)	1.2 (0.8, 1.5)
Non-response	83	1.3 (1.1, 1.7)	1.0 (0.8, 1.2)	2.5 (2, 3)
A public health official				
Not willing	6311	92 (91.2, 92.8)	73.2 (72.3, 74.1)	189.1 (186.7, 191.5)
Somewhat willing	260	4.4 (3.8, 5.0)	3.0 (2.7, 3.4)	7.8 (6.9, 8.7)
Very willing	62	1.2 (0.9, 1.6)	0.7 (0.5, 0.9)	1.9 (1.4, 2.3)
Completely willing	44	0.8 (0.6, 1.2)	0.5 (0.4, 0.7)	1.3 (0.9, 1.7)
Non-response	91	1.5 (1.2, 1.9)	1.1 (0.8, 1.3)	2.7 (2.2, 3.3)
A member of the military or National Guard				
Not willing	6246	89.8 (88.9, 90.7)	72.5 (71.5, 73.4)	187.2 (184.7, 189.6)
Somewhat willing	312	5.8 (5.2, 6.6)	3.6 (3.2, 4)	9.4 (8.3, 10.4)
Very willing	76	1.7 (1.4, 2.2)	0.9 (0.7, 1.1)	2.3 (1.8, 2.8)
Completely willing	49	1.2 (0.9, 1.6)	0.6 (0.4, 0.7)	1.5 (1.1, 1.9)
Non-response	85	1.4 (1.1, 1.8)	1.0 (0.8, 1.2)	2.5 (2.0, 3.1)
A police officer				
Not willing	85	89.8 (88.9, 90.7)	71.8 (70.8, 72.7)	185.4 (182.9, 187.8)
Somewhat willing	6185	5.8 (5.2, 6.6)	4.0 (3.6, 4.4)	10.3 (9.3, 11.4)
Very willing	345	1.7 (1.4, 2.2)	1.0 (0.8, 1.3)	2.7 (2.1, 3.3)
Completely willing	90	1.2 (0.9, 1.6)	0.7 (0.6, 0.9)	1.9 (1.4, 2.4)
Non-response	63	1.4 (1.1, 1.8)	1.0 (0.8, 1.2)	2.5 (2.0, 3.1)
A person who does not share your race or ethnicity				
Not willing	6380	92.8 (92, 93.6)	74.0 (73.1, 74.9)	191.2 (188.8, 193.6)
Somewhat willing	202	3.8 (3.2, 4.4)	2.3 (2, 2.7)	6.1 (5.2, 6.9)

In a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective...	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)		Estimated N of adults in US
		Among respondents asked the question (n= 6,768)*	Among the full sample (n= 8,620)**	N (95% CI) (in millions)
Very willing	58	1.1 (0.8, 1.5)	0.7 (0.5, 0.8)	1.7 (1.3, 2.2)
Completely willing	43	0.9 (0.6, 1.3)	0.5 (0.4, 0.6)	1.3 (0.9, 1.7)
Non-response	85	1.4 (1.1, 1.8)	1.0 (0.8, 1.2)	2.5 (2, 3.1)
A person who does not share your religion				
Not willing	6394	93.2 (92.4, 93.9)	74.2 (73.3, 75.1)	191.6 (189.2, 194)
Somewhat willing	180	3.3 (2.8, 3.9)	2.1 (1.8, 2.4)	5.4 (4.6, 6.2)
Very willing	63	1.3 (1.0, 1.7)	0.7 (0.6, 0.9)	1.9 (1.4, 2.4)
Completely willing	35	0.6 (0.4, 0.9)	0.4 (0.3, 0.5)	1.0 (0.7, 1.4)
Non-response	96	1.6 (1.3, 2)	1.1 (0.9, 1.3)	2.9 (2.3, 3.4)
A person who does not share your political beliefs				
Not willing	6394	92.1 (91.3, 92.9)	73.4 (72.4, 74.3)	189.5 (187.1, 191.9)
Somewhat willing	180	4.7 (4.1, 5.3)	3.1 (2.7, 3.5)	8.0 (7.0, 8.9)
Very willing	63	1.1 (0.8, 1.5)	0.7 (0.5, 0.8)	1.7 (1.3, 2.2)
Completely willing	35	0.7 (0.5, 1.0)	0.4 (0.3, 0.6)	1.1 (0.8, 1.5)
Non-response	96	1.4 (1.1, 1.8)	1 (0.8, 1.2)	2.5 (2, 3.1)

*Respondents (n = 6,768) who considered violence to be at least sometimes justified to achieve 1 or more specific political objectives.

**Percentages in this column were used for extrapolation. A weighted 21.5% (95% CI 20.6%, 22.4%) of the study sample considered violence never justified for any specific political objective.

Table 8. Anticipated use of a firearm in situations where political violence is perceived as justified

Thinking now about the future and all the changes it might bring, how likely is it that you will use a gun in any of the following ways in the next few years—in a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective?	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
I will be armed with a gun.			
Not likely	7,107	80.1 (79.1, 81.1)	206.9 (204.3, 209.5)
Somewhat likely	833	10.8 (10.1, 11.6)	27.9 (26.0, 30.0)
Very likely	254	3.4 (3.0, 3.9)	8.8 (7.7, 10.1)
Extremely likely	318	4.3 (3.8, 4.8)	11.0 (9.8, 12.5)
Non-response	108	1.4 (1.1, 1.7)	3.6 (2.8, 4.4)
I will carry a gun openly, so that people know I am armed.			
Not likely	7,779	88.7 (87.8, 89.5)	229.0 (226.8, 231.1)
Somewhat likely	435	5.7 (5.1, 6.3)	14.7 (13.2, 16.3)
Very likely	163	2.2 (1.8, 2.6)	5.6 (4.7, 6.6)
Extremely likely	126	2.0 (1.6, 2.4)	5.1 (4.2, 6.2)
Non-response	117	1.5 (1.2, 1.9)	3.9 (3.1, 4.9)
I will threaten someone with a gun.			
Not likely	8,351	96.2 (95.6, 96.6)	248.4 (247.0, 249.6)
Somewhat likely	93	1.4 (1.1, 1.7)	3.5 (2.8, 4.4)
Very likely	38	0.7 (0.5, 0.9)	1.7 (1.2, 2.4)
Extremely likely	23	0.3 (0.2, 0.5)	0.8 (0.5, 1.3)
Non-response	115	1.5 (1.2, 1.9)	3.9 (3.1, 4.9)
I will shoot someone with a gun.			
Not likely	8,235	94.6 (94.0, 95.2)	244.4 (242.8, 245.9)

Thinking now about the future and all the changes it might bring, how likely is it that you will use a gun in any of the following ways in the next few years—in a situation where you think force or violence is justified to advance an important political objective?	Respondents (n= 8,620)		Estimated N of adults in US
	Unweighted N	Weighted % (95% CI)	N (95% CI) (in millions)
Somewhat likely	198	2.8 (2.4, 3.3)	7.2 (6.2, 8.5)
Very likely	36	0.6 (0.4, 0.8)	1.4 (1.0, 2.1)
Extremely likely	40	0.6 (0.4, 0.8)	1.4 (1.0, 2.0)
Non-response	111	1.5 (1.2, 1.8)	3.9 (3.1, 4.6)

Figure 1. Justifiability of use or force or violence in specific situations

Respondents (n= 8,620) were asked, “What do you think about the use of force or violence in the following situations?” with response options always/usually/sometimes/never justified.

